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1
Introduction and Overview
Employees whose jobs offer pensions leave their positions much
less frequently than do employees whose jobs lack pensions. This
observation has been confirmed by numerous researchers, working
with diverse data sets covering different time periods. For instance,
Alien, Clark, and McDermed (1993) found that over the seven-year
period from 1975 to 1982, over 60 percent of workers not covered by
pensions changed jobs. In the same time frame, less than 40 percent of
workers who had pension coverage moved on to new jobs. Our own
research (Gustman and Steinmeier 1993b) showed that over a one-year
period between 1984 and 1985, the rate of job change among male
workers without pension coverage was almost 20 percent. Meanwhile,
only 6 percent of pension-covered workers switched employers.
Moreover, it does not appear that other factors, such as education or
the type of job, are capable of explaining these differences in mobility
rates. Even after allowing for the effects of various individual and job
characteristics that might be expected to influence mobility, Mitchell
(1982) found that pension-covered workers were 20 percentage points
less likely to change jobs over a four-year period. This result is fairly
typical. Indeed, the observation that workers with pensions move less
from their jobs has come to be one of the most firmly rooted "stylized
facts" in the literature dealing with pensions.
The research presented in this book challenges a widely held view
as to why worker mobility is lower from jobs that offer pensions than
from jobs that do not. According to that explanation, the lower mobility
rate from pension-covered jobs occurs primarily because of financial
disincentives created by pensions. Many pension plans use a formula
to determine the amount of benefits, and the formula often increases
benefits very rapidly in the final years before the specified retirement
age. 1 Such plans are said to be "backloaded."2 If workers leave the firm
before qualifying for retirement, they suffer a pension "capital loss" by
giving up the opportunity for substantial increases in pension benefits. 3
Thus, the prevailing view links the lower mobility of workers from
pension-covered jobs and the backloading of defined benefit plans in a
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causal way, asserting that the capital loss from mobility discourages
covered workers from leaving firms before qualifying for early retire
ment.
Indeed, there is a literature that takes the linkage between reduced
mobility from pension-covered jobs and backloaded pensions as evi
dence of purposeful behavior by firms with regard to the design of pen
sion plans. One branch of this literature argues that pensions are part of
a human resource policy created to reduce the mobility of workers.
Another branch argues that backloaded pensions are an integral part of
compensation schemes that enhance work incentives. A further motiva
tion attributed to the adoption of pensions is to encourage retirement at
optimal ages.4 With regard to this literature, a finding of a relationship
between pensions and mobility, and especially of a negative relation
ship between backloaded pensions and mobility, is taken as support of
a model or set of models of human resource policies in which pensions
are an important tool for regulating mobility and worker productivity.

Background for Research

There are three types of evidence that have led to the belief that
financial penalties from pensions reduce turnover. First, there is evi
dence that workers who are covered by pensions have lower rates of
turnover from their jobs and longer tenure than do workers without
pensions (Bartel and Borjas 1977; Mitchell 1982, 1983; and McCormick and Hughes 1984, among others). Second, as required by the the
ory, there are financial penalties to early mobility. Examinations of
pension plans at a number of firms have revealed that the benefit for
mula of defined benefit plans causes the value of the pension to accrue
disproportionately in the later years of employment (Bulow 1981,
1982; Kotlikoff and Wise 1985, 1987a). In addition, special benefits
often accrue to those who remain with the firm until qualifying for
early retirement. This research establishes the magnitude of the backloading and pension capital losses in defined benefit plans and has sug
gested to analysts that the resulting disincentives are sizable enough to
discourage mobility. Third, there has been some recent work that has
attempted to relate a measure of the disincentive to mobility in pen-
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sions directly to observed turnover behavior. That work (Alien, Clark,
and McDermed 1993) has concluded that a substantial fraction of the
difference in turnover associated with pension coverage is due to the
loss in pension value with turnover.5
Our analysis confirms that turnover is lower from pension-covered
jobs and that pensions are indeed structured in such a way as to result
in financial penalties to early mobility. However, we do not find pen
sion backloading to be large enough to have a strong effect on turnover,
nor do we find the available evidence of the relationship between pen
sion backloading and turnover to be persuasive as to causality. We
believe that our study raises questions about the conventional view that
pension backloading is responsible for the lower mobility rates of pen
sion-covered workers.
If backloading is not the cause of lower mobility, what is? One pos
sibility is that workers who are in pension-covered jobs are different in
a way that makes them inherently more likely to remain in their jobs.
These differences may or may not be observable to the investigator, but
could not have been included in studies finding lower mobility from
pension-covered jobs. Another possibility is that there is some aspect
of pension-covered employment, other than backloading, that is
responsible for reduced mobility. The explanation we favor is that
workers are reluctant to leave pension-covered jobs because they
receive higher compensation on those jobs than they can receive else
where (in the next best opportunity). This extra compensation on a
pension-covered job may be called a "compensation premium."

Research Approach
Previous empirical studies have disregarded the possibility of a
compensation premium, largely because the next best opportunity is
not observed if the worker does not switch jobs. As a result, those stud
ies have attributed whatever effect the compensation premium has on
mobility to other variables, most notably to pensions or to pension
backloading. However, we have developed a procedure that overcomes
this difficulty, and we believe that the compensation premium explana-
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tion for the lower mobility rate among pension-covered workers is sup
ported by the balance of the evidence.
The approach adopted here is more comprehensive than in the usual
model, but it still does not encompass all relevant possibilities. The
methodology does analyze the effects of both the degree of pension
backloading and of any compensation premium on mobility. However,
the model does not incorporate the possibility that backloaded pen
sions are used to select workers on the basis of unobservable character
istics associated with low turnover and that it is this unmeasured
propensity to stay that accounts for the lower mobility of workers on
pension-covered jobs. In this regard, we face the same problem as
other researchers: where there are a number of potential explanations
for behavior, it is often not possible to include all relevant possibilities
in a single model, due to limited empirical information. The typical
empirical model of mobility incorporates one or at best two of these
explanations. The same is true for empirical studies explaining pension
coverage, plan attributes, and pension accrual profiles and their charac
teristics. In all of these studies, it is hoped that the behavioral variables
omitted from the analysis will be orthogonal in their impact to the
included variables so that, in the absence of a relationship between
included and omitted variables, coefficient estimates for included vari
ables are unbiased. Fortunately, for the model we estimate, evidence
from Alien, Clark, and McDermed (1993) suggests that selection, to
the extent it exists, is based on observable, rather than unobservable,
characteristics, which can be included in our analysis.
The model also does not address the source of a wage premium. In a
spot labor market, where only the current period matters, and in which
all agents are competitive, we can anticipate that the wage equals pro
ductivity in each period and that workers shift to jobs providing the
highest benefits net of moving costs. In such a world, we would not
expect to find compensation premiums. Once more realistic assump
tions are adopted, however, compensation premiums may arise; these
assumptions include such factors as long-term attachment of workers
to firms, compensation arrangements that may span a period of time,
training costs, matching workers to jobs, pockets of imperfect competi
tion and a resulting array of rents and quasi rents, monitoring costs,
imperfect and asymmetric information, and unions motivated by a vari
ety of considerations (Krueger and Summers 1988).
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The origin and even the existence of compensation premiums are
intensely debated topics in the field of labor economics. Arguments
abound over whether certain jobs are "good" jobs, meaning that they
pay a given worker more than can be secured in other employment, or
whether industry wage differentials mainly reflect compensating dif
ferentials for unmeasured factors or unmeasured ability. While there is
general agreement on the existence of wage premiums on union jobs,
there is, for example, disagreement on the reasons for the well-docu
mented compensation premium that accrues to those who work at large
firms (Brown and Medoff 1989). Some argue that such wage differen
tials are equalizing, so that those on less pleasant jobs are paid more,
while others find the evidence inconsistent with an equalizing wage
differentials argument. The literature also includes competing views of
how wages are determined, even when there is long-term job attach
ment. Some argue that wage experience and wage-tenure profiles are
more likely to reflect efforts by the firm to economize on the costs of
specific training or on the costs of generating a good match. Others
argue that the profiles reflect selection in mobility over the course of
the life cycle, so that those with higher productivity are more likely to
stay with the job, or even pure returns to seniority.

Research Findings
Our work does not resolve the preceding issues of wage determina
tion or indicate a choice among the competing explanations for com
pensation and employment differentials. Our findings do suggest that
the backloading is smaller than one would expect from a major deter
minant of productivity and turnover and that some aspects of the usual
explanation for the effects of pensions on turnover are not consistent
with observed behavior. Our results also indicate that the wage pre
mium on pension-covered jobs has a suspiciously strong, negative rela
tionship with the turnover observed for pension-covered workers.
More specifically, the evidence that we and others have gathered sug
gests the following:
The penalty to mobility from backloaded pensions is relatively
small. For the average, covered male worker in his thirties or forties,

6

Introduction and Overview

the loss would be a little more than half a year©s pay. If an alternative
job were to pay just a few percentage points more, it would be to the
worker©s advantage to take the pension loss to get the higher wage. As
an example, a raise of just 3 percent, multiplied by 20 years until retire
ment, more than offsets a pension loss of half a year©s pay, especially
since the increase in wages begins immediately, while the loss in pen
sion value comes after 20 years. In general, a once-and-for-all loss of
the equivalent of a few months© pay, which would be realized 20 to 30
years in the future, is not large enough to tie workers in their thirties or
forties to the firm. The loss from pension backloading due to early sep
aration is a stock rather than a flow over time, and that loss remains
small relative to the wage differential from moving until the worker
approaches within a decade or so of retirement age.
It has been suggested that firms use pensions to reduce turnover in
order to lower hiring and training costs. However, the penalty to mobil
ity from defined benefit plans is especially small for young workers.
The incentives against quitting are insubstantial precisely during the
time when the firm has the largest share of unrealized returns on its
training investment. Until the individual reaches within about 10 years
of retirement age, benefit formulas do not create a substantial penalty
to leaving the firm. Thus, the evidence developed here suggests that
firms would use pensions as a tool to economize on training costs only
if these costs occurred throughout the period of attachment to the firm.
The pension would not be helpful in economizing on the substantial
fraction of training costs incurred in the initial year of hire.6 The pen
sion, of course, would also not be useful in economizing on hiring
costs.
Turnover is not lower for workers who hold jobs offering backloaded pensions (mainly defined benefit pensions) than it is for work
ers who hold jobs offering pensions in which benefits are not
backloaded (defined contribution plans). We show that, in reduced
form mobility equations in which defined benefit plans are distin
guished from defined contribution plans, both types of pensions are
found to have an equal, negative association with the probability of
turnover. Generic defined contribution plans are not backloaded, and,
even with the addition of provisions that foster backloading on some
defined contribution plans, such as special bonuses for those who qual
ify for early retirement, a nationally representative sample of defined
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contribution plans does not exhibit much backloading. Thus, it is a
mystery as to why defined contribution plans, which are not backloaded, should be associated with lower turnover. 7 This finding sug
gests that it is not the financial backloading aspect of pensions that
causes lower turnover rates, but some omitted factor that is correlated
both with pension coverage and with turnover. 8
In current empirical models relating mobility to pensions (or to
pension backloading), to wages, and to other variables, the relative
sizes of the pension and wage coefficients are difficult to interpret.
Typically, the pension coefficient is quite large, and the wage coeffi
cient is relatively small. Taken at face value, this would imply that the
effect on mobility of having a pension is the same as that of having a
very substantial wage increase. For instance, Mitchell (1982) estimates
that having a pension has more effect on mobility than a tripling of the
wage! 9 These findings suggest to us that the current models are misspecified if they are to be interpreted as a causal relationship. The prob
lem is that they lack a measure of the compensation premium. If there
are compensation premiums, and if those premiums are more closely
correlated with pensions than with wages, then the explanatory power
that should be attributed to the premiums in a mobility equation would
instead be attributed to pensions. This problem would account for the
pension coefficient being so large relative to the wage coefficient. In
the material that follows, we develop evidence that supports this view.
Some studies find that pensions are associated with reduced turn
over mainly because they are associated with lower layoffs, rather than
lower quits (Mitchell, 1982; Alien, Clark, and McDermed 1993). 10 This
finding raises questions about the motivation for adopting backloaded
pensions and, in particular, about whether firms adopt backloaded pen
sions as a device to reduce turnover. If turnover were lower on pensioncovered jobs due to a reduction in layoffs, backloaded pensions would
be unnecessary as a device for lowering mobility: firms can control
layoffs directly without resorting to backloaded pensions. This sug
gests that firms have adopted a backloaded benefit structure for other
reasons, perhaps having to do with efforts to provide tax-deferred sav
ings, to provide various types of insurance that the worker values and
that are not available in the market, and/or to regulate retirement
behavior (Gustman, Mitchell, and Steinmeier 1994)."
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A finding that compensation premiums, and not pension backloading, account for reduced mobility from pension-covered jobs calls into
question a number of theoretical models of the motivation for pen
sions. The role of backloading is central to models claiming that the
defined benefit pension is a natural outgrowth of implicit contracts
designed to increase worker productivity and to economize on training,
supervision, and related costs. Thus, in addition to its relevance for
models of worker mobility, this study is relevant to the literature on
pension economics. To the degree that it uncovers additional system
atic wage differentials, the study also provides evidence pertinent to
models of wage determination and to the analysis of industry and com
pensating wage differentials.
Along with the theoretical implications, there are a number of policy
implications from the finding that pension backloading per se is not
likely to be responsible for much of the difference in mobility between
workers on pension-covered and nonpension jobs. A mistaken view of
causality may lead to inappropriate policies. For example, there has
been some concern at the U.S. Department of Labor that pensions
adversely affect productivity because they discourage mobility. This
motivates a search for potential legislative cures. Some policy analysts
also fear that, because of backloaded pensions, workers may stay too
long with declining firms, thus worsening the positions of these firms;
similarly, these analysts are concerned that workers might be reluctant
to move to expanding sectors, thereby raising the labor costs of prom
ising enterprises and inhibiting growth. 12 Legislation has required
either cliff vesting where an employee becomes fully vested after a
specified number of years, with no vesting prior to that within five
years or graded vesting where an employee is partially vested after a
certain number of years and then is increasingly vested according to a
schedule until attaining 100 percent vesting within seven years (the
Tax Reform Act of 1986) and has lowered the minimum age for credit
ing a pension to 21 (the Pension Equity Act of 1984). The Congres
sional Budget Office (CBO) has explored the possibility of using a
projection of the wage at retirement rather than the wage at termination
in calculating the pension benefit (CBO 1987). These initiatives, and
other, more sweeping, recommendations, such as those of the Presi
dent©s Commission on Pension Policy (1981), were partly motivated by
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a concern about the effects of turnover and backloading on pension
benefits received at retirement.

Data Sources and Organization of Study
The empirical work in this book uses three major data sources: ret
rospective data for a five-year period from the 1983 Survey of Con
sumer Finances (SCF), the 1984-85 Survey of Income and Program
Participation (SIPP), and the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID),
covering the period 1984 through 1989. All three surveys provide use
ful information for analyzing the pension-mobility relationship, but the
data do have some limitations. The reason for job change is routinely
collected only in the PSID, which is the smallest of the samples we
have available. In the other surveys, either the reason for job change is
not reported or it is available only for a limited, and, as it turns out,
highly unrepresentative sample. As a result, much of our empirical
work pools layoffs and quits, rather than allowing us to examine lay
offs and quits separately. 13 On the other hand, employer-provided
information detailing the pension characteristics and formulas is only
available for the SCF. 14 Consequently, calculating the extent of backloading using the SIPP and the PSID data requires imputation, by
matching pensions to individuals on the basis of personal and job char
acteristics.
We should note that, throughout the book, all empirical work per
tains to men who are initially in their thirties and forties. Prime-aged
workers are selected to avoid contaminating the results with retire
ment-related behavior and to eliminate any mobility associated with
school-work choices or with the initial period of job shopping. Analyz
ing job mobility for women is considerably more complicated than it is
for men, since it is much more reasonable to assume in the case of men
that participation is constant and that work hours are full time. Our
empirical model is not adequate to analyze jointly labor force partici
pation, labor force hours, and mobility decisions, and, as such, would
be inappropriate to use in analyzing the mobility decisions of women.
The book is organized as follows. Chapter 2 presents the basic arith
metic of pension backloading. The literature exploring the relationship
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of pensions to mobility is discussed in chapter 3. Chapter 4 reviews the
relevant descriptive statistics and basic multivariate relationships from
the three surveys used in this study: the SCF, the PSID, and the SIPP.
An econometric model of mobility decisions is developed in chapter 5.
Using data from each of the three surveys, an empirical version of the
model is estimated in chapter 6. In this model, mobility is a function of
the compensation differential between the current and the next best job.
The results of these estimations are then used to simulate the effects of
pension backloading and of compensation differentials. Chapter 7 pro
vides a reestimation of the model with panel data from the SIPP and
the PSID, allowing pension backloading and the remaining compensa
tion premium to have separate and possibly different effects on mobil
ity. 15 The findings in this chapter represent a specification check.
Chapter 8 presents the potential policy issues that arise from this work,
and our conclusions are discussed in chapter 9.
NOTES
1. These plans, which are called defined benefit plans, base pension eligibility and the yearly
pension entitlement on years of service and history of pay on the job. The other major plan type,
defined contribution, bases benefits at retirement on the amount accumulated in an account held in
the name of the covered worker, with accumulation based on contributions made by the worker
and the employer, and on the returns to the investments held by the plan. Defined benefit plans are
declining in importance, but they still are the predominant type of primary plan. Often, defined
benefit plans are supplemented by defined contribution plans. In recent years, they have been sup
plemented by a particular type of defined contribution plan, the 401(k) plan. For recent figures on
plan coverage by type, see Beller and Lawrence (1992). For discussions of the reasons for these
trends, see Clark and McDermed (1990), Gustman and Steinmeier (1992a), Ippolito (forthcoming
a), and Kruse (forthcoming a and b).
2. It is possible to design defined contribution plans so that they are backloaded. Examples of
such plans abound (Turner 1993). Backloading is attained in higher education, for example, by
combining defined contribution plans with special early retirement incentives (Gustman and
Steinmeier 1991 and 1992b). However, as evidence from a representative cross section of the
population will show, the degree of backloading in defined contribution plans is very mild because
early retirement incentives and other backloading devices are not nearly as common in defined
contribution plans as they are in defined benefit plans. Moreover, even when such provisions are
present, the size of the incentives they create, and thus their effects on retirement, are modest.
3. The concept of pension capital loss is discussed by Ippolito (1986), by Alien, Clark, and
McDermed (1993), and by other students of the pension-mobility relationship. We will return to
the question of measuring the pension loss from mobility.
4. More generally, pensions are said to have been promoted by efforts to save at tax-favored
rates of return and to meet other goals of covered workers and their employers. For a review of the
pension literature, see Gustman, Mitchell, and Steinmeier (1994).
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5. The 1993 Alien, Clark, and McDermed article is an important contribution to the literature
on pensions and mobility. This study is based on a series of working papers, including Alien,
Clark, and McDermed (1991). Certain calculations are only available in the working papers.
When appropriate, the working papers will be referenced directly instead of the article.
6. A basic lesson learned from human capital models early on is that human capital investment
expenditures should be undertaken as soon as possible (Ben Porath 1967). Although we are aware
that much of training costs and all hiring costs occur up front, specific training is distributed
throughout the period of worker attachment on the job. For recent data separately reporting train
ing activity at the time of hire and training activity during the course of employment, see U.S.
Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics (1992). For a preliminary effort to relate these
data to pension coverage, see Dorsey, Cornwell, and Macpherson (1994).
7. This finding has been confirmed in work by Even and Macpherson (1992). They suggest
that failure to vest the employers© contribution in the first few years of employment may discour
age mobility of those covered by a defined contribution plan until vesting is attained. This point is
of relevance only for a relatively short span of time and cannot account for defined benefit and
defined contribution plans having similar, negative effects on turnover for workers throughout
their prime working age.
8. Consistent with a view that pensions are used to reduce turnover is a finding that the nega
tive pension-mobility relationship is observed in large firms, which commonly offer defined bene
fit plans, but not in small firms, which more often offer defined contribution plans (Even and
Macpherson 1992). There remains the possibility, however, that other unmeasured characteristics
of large and small firm employment may account for this result.
9. The coefficient of pensions in her probit equation for mobility was 0.700, while the coeffi
cient of log wages was 0.608. Both coefficients are highly significant.
10. One might argue that on jobs where a worker©s compensation is higher than in the next
best opportunity, turnover should be greater because the firm will be encouraged to lay off
employees. The evidence is not consistent with this view. We find that where the compensation
premium is higher, turntiver is lower. Moreover, pension-covered jobs are associated with pay
ment of a compensation premium, yet Mitchell (1982) and Alien, Clark, and McDermed (1993),
find that layoffs are lower on pension-covered jobs.
11. Alien, Clark, and McDermed (1993) explain the effect of pensions on mobility through
layoffs as a reflection of the firm©s commitment to an implicit contract. In such a contract, com
pensation is deferred. It is argued that laying off workers who have backloaded pensions would
violate the implicit contract. We are sympathetic to the idea of an implicit pension contract. There
is no other way to explain the ad hoc postretirement pension increases that have been granted to
most recipients of defined benefit pension plans. Evidence supporting the existence of such
increases is contained in Alien, Clark, and Sumner (1986), and in Alien, Clark, and McDermed
(1992). Indeed, examination of data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) suggests
that cost-of-living adjustments may offset almost half of the adverse effect of inflation on the real
value of pensions for those retired on a fixed nominal pension (Gustman and Steinmeier 1993a).
Nevertheless, if pension backloading decreases mobility by reducing layoffs, as Alien, Clark, and
McDermed find, the question arises as to why firms concerned about mobility would bother to
adopt backloaded pensions, since they can control layoffs directly.
12. There is a separate set of concerns about equity. It is argued that, because of pension backloading, those in the population with the least stable job histories, including women and minori
ties, will have inadequate retirement incomes. For relevant discussions and evidence, see Turner
(1993).
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13. In the PSID, which is the one survey where quits and layoffs can be readily distinguished,
the qualitative results are the same whether the analysis uses quits only or quits and layoffs com
bined.
14. We use retrospective data from the SCF because, for reasons we discuss, attrition from the
1983-86 SCF panel is systematic and renders the data highly suspect for use in a mobility study.
The 1983-89 SCF panel was unavailable at the time this work was done.
15. Censoring of the retrospective data in the SCF prevents estimation of the expanded model
with those data.

2
The Basic Arithmetic
of Pension Backloading
Does pension backloading discourage individuals from leaving
jobs? This chapter explores the mechanics of pension backloading and
evaluates the argument that it provides a severe disincentive to those
who would leave pension-covered jobs, especially in the early years of
employment.
How large is the effect of backloading on the pension received by an
early leaver compared to a worker who remains until qualifying for
retirement benefits? Assume, for example, that the worker joins the
firm this year at age 30. Further suppose that each year of work results
in an increase in the yearly pension that is 1 percent of the salary in the
last year of employment. If the worker stays with the firm until qualify
ing for normal retirement benefits, which in this example occurs at age
62, then the total yearly pension will be equal to 32 percent of final
pay. Alternatively, if the worker joins this year at age 30 and leaves at
age 40, the pension is calculated as 1 percent of the average salary at
age 40 times 10 years of service. However, the pension payments do
not begin until the worker reaches retirement age. Accordingly, in this
example workers who leave after 10 years of service must wait 22
years before they can receive a pension. Yet the salary used in the com
putation is fixed in nominal terms, at the level paid 22 years earlier. At
5 percent annual wage growth, the final salary at age 62 is roughly
three times the salary at age 40. This early leaver not only receives a
lower pension because of having accumulated just one-third of the
years of service of the normal retiree, but each year of service is multi
plied by a salary level that is roughly one-third of the salary the worker
would have received had that individual stayed to retirement age.
Accordingly, in this example, an early leaver with the same starting
salary and one-third the time at work for a normal retiree would receive
a pension of about one-ninth the value of the pension received by the
normal retiree. This example indicates the potential effect of backload
ing on the value of the pension to early versus normal leavers from
pension-covered jobs.
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Moreover, defined benefit pensions typically provide an additional
reward to anyone who remains with the firm until qualifying for early
retirement benefits. The additional reward may result from a variety of
plan provisions. For example, in the years until they qualify for actual
payments from social security, early retirees who are not yet age 62 or
65 may have their pension plan benefits increased by an amount equal
to what their future social security benefits will be. Alternatively, the
firm may use a reduction in yearly benefits that is smaller than actuarially fair for those who stay until qualifying for early retirement but use
an actuarially fair reduction for those vested workers who leave earlier.
For example, if the departing employee has not yet qualified for early
retirement benefits, the firm may reduce benefits by 6 percent for each
year the individual leaves before normal retirement age. For those who
have qualified for early retirement, the reduction in the yearly benefit
may be 3 percent for each year of retirement before normal retirement
age. Under a third mechanism, the generosity of the plan is increased
after the employee has been on the job for a specified number of years.
For example, the benefit may be equal to 1 percent of the final salary
for each of the first 20 years of work, and 2 percent of the final salary
for each year of work after that. This type of explicit backloading of
the pension formula is limited to some extent by specific provisions of
the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA).
Pensions might also reduce turnover via their vesting provisions,
which deter workers from leaving firms until they have worked long
enough to be guaranteed an eventual retirement benefit (Schiller and
Weiss 1979). However, the Tax Reform Act of 1986 specifies that vest
ing must now occur within a few years of hire, five years if there is cliff
vesting and seven years if vesting is graded. This has severely limited
the ability of firms to use vesting to reduce turnover of middle-aged
workers.
The next section explores the fundamental arithmetic of pension
accrual and pension backloading and applies the basic concepts in a
series of examples. Then, a measure of pension backloading is devel
oped for use in our later statistical analysis. This measure indicates that
backloading can have only a very small effect on the mobility deci
sions of young workers. The third section presents statistics from a
nationally representative sample with matched employer-provided pen
sion plan descriptions. These data indicate the size and variation of
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pension backloading both from the basic formulas that have been
adopted by firms and from the special early retirement benefits offered.
The penalty associated with mobility and the increase in compensation
for a new job required to offset the pension loss from moving are cal
culated. Pension accrual is found to be very small within the first
decade of employment, and the penalty to mobility created by backloaded pensions is found to be very low for workers who are more than
a decade from retiring. In the appendix to this chapter, alternative mea
sures of the potential costs of early mobility are described, analyzed,
and compared to the measure that we developed in the chapter. We find
our measure equivalent to ones used by Ippolito (1987) and by Lazear
and Moore (1988).

Pension Accrual From Defined Benefit Plans

We begin by discussing the arithmetic of pension accrual under
defined benefit plans. 1 For purposes of discussion, the simplest type of
defined benefit formula, where the yearly benefit in retirement, Bdb, is
given by the product of the generosity parameter a, typically 1 to 2 per
centage points, times a measure of the final wage 1^, times the number
of years of tenure (service) at retirement T:

(2.1)

Bdb = aWf T.

Assume that wages grow from WQ in period 0 at a rate of g.
Years of service are measured as the difference between the date of
separation k and the date of hire j. Under these circumstances, ten
ure can be expressed as T = k - j, and the final wage can be
expressed as Wf= WQ ekg, where again W0 is the wage in period 0.
The total retirement benefit due to work, from hire in year j through
any time k, evaluated at time k, is then the present value of the benefit
to be paid throughout the retirement years, from date of retirement R to
date of death D, taken back to the date k. The further k is from the date
of retirement R, the greater the effect of discounting, and the lower the
present value of the accruing pension, Pdb (k). This relationship is given
in equation (2.2).2
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(2.2) Pdh (k) =
The term a is the generosity parameter. The next term is the benefit
amount from equation (2.1). The final terms are the result of discount
ing the benefits received throughout the retirement period at an interest
rate r to bring them back to date R, and then further discounting the
benefits from the date of retirement to date k. Equation (2.2) holds for k
< R, that is, for an individual who is working but has not yet qualified
for retirement benefits.
To give perspective on the orders of magnitude, we will develop and
follow a single example throughout the discussion. We will begin with
the relationship between the yearly pension benefit and the present
value of the payments made throughout the retirement period. Assum
ing for purposes of this example that retirement is at age 62 and death
is at age 80, the yearly benefits would be received for 18 years. At an
interest rate of 8 percent, the present value of the 18 years of benefits
on the first day of retirement is about 9.5 times the yearly benefit. (For
comparison, at a 6 percent interest rate, the present value of the benefit
is worth about 1 1 times the yearly benefit, whereas if the interest rate is
10 percent, the present value is worth about 8.3 times the yearly bene
fit.)
Consider now the earnings from work between periods k and k+1.
They include the wage plus the increase in the value of the pension,
less that part of the increase which is due to accruing interest. This
amount is the wage plus Pdb(k+\) - (\+r)Pdb(k). Following Bulow
(1982), the value of the increment in the present value of the pension
from remaining employed can be obtained by differentiating equation
(2.2) with respect to k and subtracting out rPdb(k). Thus equation (2.3)
indicates, for any time k preceding the year of eligibility for normal
retirement, the path of the marginal increment to pension wealth with
additional service:

(23)
With positive wage growth and interest rate, the slope of the curve
relating the present value of the pension to the date k is positive. Pen-
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sion accrual from the growth in the wage and from increasing service
are reflected in g and \l(k -j) respectively.
Pension backloading is reflected in the fact that before the individual
qualifies for retirement, the present value of the pension increases nonlinearly with service, with greater proportionate increases for addi
tional service the longer the individual remains on the job. Thus the
slope of the function relating the present value of the pension to the
date of separation, called the pension accrual rate, is increasing with fc.3
It can also be shown that the pension accrual rate declines sharply after
the age of normal retirement.4
To illustrate these relationships, we insert assumed values in equa
tions (2.1), (2.2), and (2.3). In particular, we assume the following val
ues for the parameters: a = 0.01, W25 = $20,000, g = 0.05, r = 0.08,7 =
25, k = 26, 27,..., 62, R = 62,D = 80. Thus, the example pertains to an
individual with an initial wage of $20,000 when he or she is hired at
age 25, who faces a normal retirement age of 62, and dies with cer
tainty at 80.
Table 2.1 presents the earnings and pension values that result from
this example. It illustrates the magnitudes of measures that will be of
central concern to us in attempting to determine the way in which pen
sions affect the incentives for mobility.
Column 2 of table 2.1 reports representative annual earnings during
the 37 years of employment, beginning at the individual©s 25th birth
day, and lasting until retirement at age 62. Column 3 reports the yearly
pension benefit starting at age 62, based on the assumption that
employment is terminated in the indicated year. Thus, if the individual
stays for 37 years, the pension is $47,063 for each year of retirement.
The presence of backloading can be seen in column 4, with a ratio
showing the annual benefit if employment were terminated in the indi
cated year, divided by the benefit if employment were terminated only
upon qualifying for normal retirement. Thus, if one stays five years,
thereby working 13.5 percent of a full career (5/37), the yearly benefit
would be only 2.7 percent of that received had the individual stayed
until normal retirement. At the other end of the life cycle, the last two
years of work before normal retirement, representing 5 percent of the
full period of attachment (2/37), results in an increase of over 14 per
cent in the yearly pension.

Table 2.1 Pensions and the Reward to Work: An Example
(4)
(3)
Ratio of yearly
(2)
Nominal yearly
benefits to
Earnings
benefits at
potential
Age at
at age k
age
62
benefits
separation
[W\
[B IB ]
M
k
62
26
$ 21,025
$ 210
0.004
30
25,681
1,284
0.027
35
32,974
3,297
0.070
40
42,340
6,351
0.135
45
54,366
10,873
0.231
50
69,807
17,452
0.371
55
89,634
26,890
0.571
60
115,092
40,282
0.856
62
127,196
47,063
1.000

(1)

[B*]

(5)
Total
pension

[V*)]

$

113
947
3,627
10,422
26,619
63,737
146,508
327,418
448,903

(7)
(6)
Ratio
of
accrual to
Pension benefit
compensation
accrual rate
(excluding interest
[dP(k)ldk}
rate effect)
do
$ 127
0.006
312
0.009
834
0.016
2,050
0.028
4,791
0.047
10,835
0.076
23,930
0.120
51,919
0.183
70,490
0.214

NOTE: This example is based on equations (2.1), (2.2) and (2.3) and assumes a = 0.01, W25 = $20,000, g = 0.05, r = 0.08,7 = 25, k = 26, 27, ..., 62, R =
62, and D = 80.
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Because of pension backloading, the worker who stays until retire
ment age will enjoy a rapidly accruing pension. Column 6 shows the
pension accrual including the interest. Column 7 computes the ratio of
the accrual to total compensation (wages plus accrual, which is column
2 plus column 6). However, in calculating the pension accrual, the
interest term is omitted as in equation (2.3); this isolates the effects of
working another year on the wage and service used in computing bene
fits and eliminates the change in the present value of the pension
brought about when the base period advances one year. The figures in
column 7 show that the value of the pension accrual rises rapidly. After
20 years of attachment, it will reach 5 percent of compensation.
Column 7 shows that, although the pension accrual represents only
about half of one percent of compensation in the first year of employ
ment, it is almost a fifth of compensation as the individual comes
within two years of qualifying for normal retirement. Even a basic
defined benefit plan, with a generosity coefficient of only 1 percent,
provides the worker with the opportunity to increase compensation by
amounts that appear to be substantial.
Special early retirement benefits create additional incentives for the
worker to stay with the firm. Further, many defined benefit pension
plans base benefits on two or three formulas. One formula may pertain
to benefits for those who leave the firm before qualifying for early
retirement (i.e., for terminated-vested employees), and another to those
who qualify for normal retirement, with various treatments for work
past normal retirement date. There may also be another formula, or
perhaps an adjustment factor applied to the formula for normal retire
ment benefits, to determine benefits for those who qualify for early
retirement. Special temporary benefits at early retirement, such as the
adjustment until social security eligibility and the granting of addi
tional years to credited service, would create a "spike" in the pension
accrual profile at the early retirement age.
In addition to the discontinuous benefit accrual at early retirement,
pension wealth may change dramatically at other dates. For instance,
some plans specify generous benefits for workers until they reach a
prespecified level of service, while drastically reducing accruals for
work after that point. In general, defined benefit plans are not actuarially neutral with regard to retirement ages, paying wealth values that
differ substantially, depending on when the worker leaves.
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A Measure of Pension Loss From Mobility
Our literature review in chapter 3 shows that a number of authors
have attributed an important part of the negative relationship between
pension coverage and mobility to the effects of backloading of defined
benefit pension plans. Consequently, the mobility equations we esti
mate will be used to isolate the effect of pension backloading. It fol
lows that we should develop a measure of pension backloading and
explore its importance in compensation.
The measure of pension backloading we will employ compares pen
sion accrual in the defined benefit plan with pension accrual in a com
parable defined contribution plan, i.e, having the same value at
retirement. Backloading is simply the difference between the present
value of the defined contribution plan and the defined benefit plan.
Although it might at first appear that the definition of pension capital
loss that we use is rather specialized, the appendix to this chapter will
show that it is equivalent to the measures that are commonly used in
the literature.
Consider first the change in value of a defined contribution pension
with additional service. For the case in which the rate of growth of
wages, g, is unequal to the interest rate, r, the value of a defined contri
bution plan with contribution rate c, as of year k, or Prfc(k), for an indi
vidual hired in year j, is5

If g is equal to r, the value of the defined contribution plan is equal to6
Pdc (k}= cWQe rk (k-j).
In the case where the wage growth rate and interest rate are equal,
the balance in the pension plan is simply the amount deposited in year
k, which is fraction c of the wage, times the number of years of service.
Deposits made in earlier years will grow at the rate r due to compound
ing and will just keep up with the increase in the value of the contribu
tion to the pension, which is rising due to wage growth.
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The slope of the profile is given by

(2- 5)

-

c

for g not equal to r. For g equal to r, the slope is
dP, (k)
^ ©
dk
= P
Notice that when g = r, the proportionate change in the value of the
pension with increasing service is equal to the proportionate change in
service (!/(& -y)). In addition, the pension value grows with r. This
simply reflects the fact that the nominal value of the deposit is adjusted
in accordance with the interest rate for different base periods. 7
To compare the loss from mobility under a defined benefit and a
comparable defined contribution plan, it is necessary to discuss what
we mean by comparability. A defined contribution and defined benefit
plan are said to be comparable if they generate the same present value
at the retirement age specified by the defined benefit plan. Equating the
right-hand sides of equations (2.2) and (2.4) and setting k - R, equa
tion (2.6) solves for the generosity coefficient of the comparable
defined contribution plan, c*, which is
n(R- i\ M _^~r ^~^l /r

(2.6)

c* =

1
g~r

if r is different from g, or
*

M

c*= a [1 -e

-r(D-/f), /

]/r

ifr = g.
As noted, a convenient measure of the disincentive to mobility at
year k created by a pension is the present value of the comparable
defined contribution plan evaluated at time k minus the present value of
the defined benefit plan at time k.
(2.7)

Backloading = pdc (k) - Pdb (k) .
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To illustrate the orders of magnitude involved, and the path over
time of the disincentive to mobility created by pension backloading,
table 2.2 continues the example developed in table 2.1. This example
indicates the effect of backloading under the assumption that the plan
is a simple defined benefit plan with no special benefits at early retire
ment and does not use different formulas for those who qualify for
early or normal retirement. Comparable measures of backloading for a
nationally representative sample, with plans that most often do include
these features, are presented in the following discussion. Table 2.2
allows us to focus on the size of the effects of backloading that is a
result of the basic defined benefit formula. Generosity coefficients that
exceed 1 percent would lead to upward adjustments in the figures in the
table, while the presence of social security or other offsets would
require downward adjustments.
Column 2 calculates the increase in the present value (discounted to
year k) of the defined benefit plan between age k and age 62, the retire
ment age in the plan. This amount is the value of the pension if the
individual stays until the retirement age, discounted back to year k, less
the value if the individual were to quit working at the firm after year k.
Column 3 makes the corresponding calculation for the defined contri
bution plan.
Backloading, or pension capital loss, is the difference between these
two columns, as illustrated in column 4. Since the contribution percent
age for the defined contribution plan is chosen so that the two plans
have equal value at retirement, P^R) = P^c(/?), the backloading
amount simplifies to P^c(^) - Pdb(k}- Notice that pension capital loss
takes on an inverse U shape when it is related to tenure. According to
related examples in Petersen (1992), these patterns are also typical of
other plan formulas beside the basic, final-average-salary defined bene
fit plan.
The importance of backloading relative to the value of the future
pension accruals and relative to future compensation is indicated in
columns 5 and 6, respectively. The numbers in column 6 may be inter
preted as the wage increase that would be required to just offset the
pension capital loss that would occur if a worker changed jobs (assum
ing that both jobs had the same kind of pension).
These numbers show that backloading can have only a very small
effect on the mobility decisions of young workers. For those in their

Table 2.2 Pension Backloading: An Example
(2)
(3)
Future increase in Future increase in
present value of db present value of dc
plan
plan
(1)
1 P (R) 6
\M
\**-) £
Separation
db
dc
age
-P (k)]
-P (k)}
[k]
db
dc
26
$ 25,086
$24,088
30
33,756
27,492
35
48,143
31,756
40
66,809
35,488
45
88,597
37,679
108,145
50
36,612
55
109,909
29,454
60
55,112
11,627
62
0
0

(4)
Backloading
[Pdc (k)-Pdb (k)}
$

998
6,263
16,386
31,321
50,918
71,533
80,455
43,485
0

(5)
Ratio of
backloading to
future increase in
present value ofdb
plan
.040
.186
.340
.469
.575
.661
.732
.789
-

(6)
Ratio of
backloading to
present value of
future
compensation
.008
.011
.025
.042
.063
.088
.119
.156
-

NOTE: This example is based on equations (2.1), (2.2) and (2.3) and assumes a - 0.01, W0 = $20,000, g = 0.05, r = 0.08,;© = 25, k = 26, 27,..., 62, R =
62, and D = 80.
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first decade of employment, pension capital loss is minor and is easily
overcome by a modest raise on the new job. Even for an individual who
is 45 years old and has 20 years of experience, the required raise is
only 6.3 percent. Of course, as the retirement age is reduced, or as the
worker ages, the disincentive for mobility increases. Plans that are
more generous relative to the wage will have stronger effects. How
ever, these figures strongly suggest that pension backloading will con
stitute a noticeable fraction of compensation only for those within a
decade or so of qualifying for early or normal retirement benefits.
The foregoing examples set the stage for an examination of disin
centives to mobility in actual pension data. Such data will take into
account the wide variation in the features of pension benefit formulas,
the differences in requirements for early and normal retirement, and
the various special changes that often take place in pension plans at the
time that individuals qualify for early or normal retirement. These fac
tors raise the penalty for leaving a firm once an individual is covered
by a defined benefit pension plan. Accordingly, we now turn to mea
sures of pension backloading based on the pensions held by a represen
tative sample of the population.

Pension Accrual and Disincentives to Mobility

To this point, we have considered a numerical example of the disin
centive effects for mobility created by the backloading of defined bene
fit plans. The disincentive effects result from the use of the standard
final average salary formula. As previously noted, pension plans also
discourage mobility by providing additional special benefits only to
those who stay until qualifying for early or normal retirement.
In actual data on pension plans, there is wide variation in the formu
las, in the ages of eligibility for early and normal benefits, and in the
special benefits. It is therefore useful to examine the pension accrual
profiles and related mobility incentives for a representative sample of
the population.
At the date of writing, there was only one population survey the
1983 Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) that provided detailed,
employer-supplied, descriptions of pension benefit formulas and earn-
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ings histories. All of the statistical analysis of the pension-mobility
relationship in this book will make use of the pension provider infor
mation from the 1983 SCF. Specifically, the SCF information will be
used to determine the incentives for mobility that are facing workers in
pension-covered jobs.
Table 2.3 summarizes the pension accrual profiles that would be
experienced by the population of male pension-covered workers in the
1983 SCF. To understand the variability in the plans, the figures in the
table suppose that all workers were hired at age 25. The table illustrates
the average incentives and the variability of incentives at different ages.
The patterns in the table would be similar for workers hired at other
ages, although the exact figures would vary.
To obtain the results presented in the table, we considered a sample
of pension-covered individuals. We used the individual©s reported cur
rent wage and projected this wage forward and backward over time on
the basis of the experience and tenure coefficients from a standard
wage equation. This wage stream was then matched to pensions in the
1983 SCF on the basis of industry, occupation, firm size, union status,
and wage level. 8 The wage stream is applied to these pension plans to
calculate the path of accumulation of pension rights.9 In these calcula
tions it is assumed that any nominal amounts in the plans are adjusted
upward with the general level of wages. Post-retirement benefits are
increased by 38 percent of the inflation rate, conforming to results
found in Alien, Clark, and Sumner (1986). 10 The results are weighted
and aggregated to form the results reported in the table.
The first block of results in the table indicates the ratio of the value
of discounted accumulated pension benefits (pension wealth) to the
value of discounted cumulative wages (wage wealth) for individuals
(all presumed hired at age 25) who have reached various ages. The
middle column of data indicates the median ratios, and the first and
third columns provide the first and third quartiles as measures of vari
ability. As expected, all ratios grow at an increasing rate up to about
age 55, after which the growth rate declines and they flatten out or
decline slightly. It is interesting to consider the variability of the ratios.
At age 55 the value for the third quartile (13.5 percent) is over two and
a half times the value for the first quartile (5.2 percent). At age 65, by
which time everyone in the sample should be eligible to collect full
normal retirement benefits, the third quartile value is almost twice the
first quartile value.
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Table 2.3 Pension Accruals and Wealth for Defined Benefit Plans from
the 1983 Survey of Consumer Finances (Assuming Age of Hire is 25)
First
Third
quartile Median quartile
Pension wealth / wage wealth
By age:
1.1%
1.7%
3.1%
35
1.6
2.5
4.2
40
2.1
3.4
5.7
45
3.1
5.1
8.7
50
5.2
9.1
13.5
55
6.2
9.5
12.7
60
5.4
8.7
10.5
65
By age:
Pension accrual / annual wage
1.6%
2.6%
5.8%
35
2.5
4.3
7.0
40
45
3.9
6.7
10.6
6.2
10.3
16.8
50
-1.0
5.9
15.3
55
-9.8
.7
9.7
60
-36.8
-20.6
-10.5
65
Relative to plan retirement ages:
6.4
11.1
17.5
Pre-retirement
For those with early retirement
13.3
26.8
114.9
Spike at early retirement age
3.3
10.5
18.2
Early retirement to normal retirement
-2.1
8.0
20.6
Spike at normal retirement age
For those without early retirement
Spike at normal retirement age
106.5
190.9
229.2
-22.0
-10.3
-5.3
Post-retirement
Plan retirement ages
Early retirement age
55
55
55
Normal retirement age
60
62
65
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The second block of results in table 2.3 measures the pension
accrual rate, or the ratio of the annual change in pension wealth to the
annual change in wage wealth. The numerator of these ratios is simply
the increase in the expected value of the pension due to working
another year, excluding that part of the increase attributable to interest
and to having survived the year. Future values are multiplied by sur
vival probabilities, which increase at a given future age as the individ
ual lives longer. The denominator is the wage that is received from
working that year. Negative entries reflect the situation in which the
value of the pension is actually lowered by working another year, prin
cipally because the worker is already eligible for benefits and will give
up a year©s benefits if he or she keeps working. In the table, the median
plan reaches a peak at age 50, when pension accruals reach 10.3 per
cent of wages. At age 55, accruals in the median plan drop to 5.9 per
cent of wages that year. Age 55 is when a worker hired at age 25 will
have achieved 30 years of experience at the firm, and many plans offer
either full normal retirement benefits or early retirement benefits for
workers who reach age 55 or who have 30 years of service.
In all quartiles, the marginal pension incentives to remain at a firm
rise very rapidly up to age 50, which is before most individuals are eli
gible for early retirement benefits. After individuals become eligible
for early retirement benefits, the marginal incentives drop up to age 65
almost as rapidly as they previously rose. At age 65 and thereafter,
when all individuals are eligible for full normal retirement benefits, the
marginal incentives drop precipitously. Again, the plans exhibit a great
deal of variation in their incentives. At age 45 and earlier, the third
quartile value is almost three times the first quartile value, and after
that the variability is even more striking. By age 60 the bottom quarter
of the plans are significantly penalizing employees for further work,
while the top quarter are rewarding employees almost as much as ever.
The third block of results in table 2.3 highlights evidence of discrete
jumps in pension values at the ages of early and/or normal retirement,
similar to findings reported by Kotlikoff and Wise (1987a). The
"spikes" in the table refer to the increase in pension value, relative to
wages, that occurs in the year the individual first reaches eligibility for
early or normal retirement benefits. Preretirement refers to the three
years immediately prior to the early retirement spike year (or normal
retirement spike year, if the plan does not provide for early retirement).
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The row labeled "early retirement to normal retirement" refers to the
years immediately before the normal retirement spike year but after eli
gibility for early retirement; postretirement refers to the three years
immediately following the normal retirement spike year.©© For exam
ple, in the year of work that results in eligibility for early retirement,
the value of the median pension jumps by an amount equal to 26.8 per
cent of the wage earned in that year.
The table shows that the majority of plans yield a substantial incre
ment in pension value upon eligibility for early retirement, with the
median equal to 26.8 percent of the annual wage. In many cases these
gains are enormous. For a quarter of all plans, the increase in pension
value exceeds the value of the wage in the year of early retirement eli
gibility. Moreover, among plans that do not provide for early retire
ment, the spikes at normal retirement are very large and highly
variable. The first quartile shows an increase in pension value that is a
little bit larger than the wage in the year of normal retirement; for the
third quartile, the increase in pension value is more than double the
value of the wage.
The final two rows of the table report the early and normal retire
ment ages found in these plans. For a majority of the plans, including
the first and third quartiles, eligibility for early retirement benefits
begins at age 55 for an individual hired at age 25. There is somewhat
more variation in the age of eligibility for normal retirement benefits,
with the median at 62 and the first and third quartiles at 60 and 65,
respectively.
Table 2.4 gives pension values for defined contribution plans in the
1983 SCF. 12 There is little evidence that defined contribution plans are
sufficiently backloaded to create major disincentives to mobility. While
defined contribution plans can theoretically be backloaded (Turner
1993), in practice backloading of defined contribution plans does not
appear to be severe.
The calculations underlying table 2.3 clearly indicate that defined
benefit pension plans may provide substantial rewards to continued
work in the years just before the early retirement age. Moreover, even
standardizing completely for the date of hire, the incentives vary con
siderably among the plans. This is especially true of the spikes, which
provide particularly strong and variable incentives for retirement not
captured in any currently available household-based data set except the
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SCF. 13 In addition to affecting retirement decisions, the large accruals
in the years just before early retirement may also affect mobility at pre
vious ages; an individual who leaves the firm early for any reason gives
up the opportunity to earn these accruals. The question is whether the
magnitude of this incentive is enough to deter mid-career and younger
workers from moving.
Table 2.4 Pension Accruals and Wealth for Defined Contribution Plans
for the 1983 Survey of Consumer Finances (Assuming Age of Hire is 25)
Third
First
quartile
Median
quartile
Pension wealth / wage wealth

By age:
35
40

7.8%

8.8%

14.5%

8.7

9.7

15.0

45

8.7

10.5

15.1

50

8.7

10.5

15.2

55

10.6

60

8.7
8.7

15.5
15.4

65

8.7

35

12.4%

40

By age:

10.6

10.6
15.6
Pension accrual / annual wage
13.1%

17.6%

8.7

13.1

17.0

45

8.7

10.9

15.4

50

8.7

10.9

15.3

55

8.7

10.9

15.3

60

8.7

10.9

15.3

65

8.7

10.6

15.3

To answer this question, we calculated the size of the disincentives
to mobility created by pension backloading for the sample of 31- to 50year-olds in the SCF in 1978. This is the base period we will use for
mobility analysis using the SCF data. The examples analyzed in the
second section of this chapter suggested that there is a very small disin-
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centive to mobility for individuals in this age range created by the
backloading of the basic pension formula. The following discussion
shows that this result is also reflected in the actual data from a repre
sentative population sample, even when special early retirement bene
fits are included.
Table 2.5 attempts to decompose the 1978 average job compensa
tion into primary components due to the wage, to the pension benefit
under an equivalent defined contribution plan, and pension backload
ing. 14 This table examines pension capital loss, including the effects of
special benefits for those who stay until qualifying for early retirement,
calculated from the employer Pension Provider Survey of the SCF,
which is a nationally representative survey of prime-aged pension-cov
ered workers.
Table 2.5 Decomposition of Average Hourly Compensation Until
Retirement for Those with Defined Benefit Plans
Compensation
Percent of
level
compensation
Amount due to:
Wage
$12.58
87.1
Pension without backloading
10.3
1.49
2.6
Backloading
.38
Total
14.45
100.0
SOURCE: Authors© calculations of 1978 base period earnings using the 1983 Survey of
Consumer Finances.

Compensation is calculated as the average per hour amount of (dis
counted) wages plus increases in (discounted) pension values between
1978 and either the individual©s expected date of retirement from fulltime work or the normal retirement age specified in the individual©s
pension plan, whichever is earlier. If the individual did not provide an
expected retirement age, the terminal date for the compensation calcu
lations is taken to be the normal retirement age in the pension plan.
Real wages are imputed on the basis of a wage profile similar to the
one used for table 2.3. The rationale for calculating the average com
pensation between the current date and retirement is as follows. To
avoid the pension capital loss and reap the high accruals just before
retirement, the worker must remain at the current firm until retirement.
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However, the financial incentives to remain with the current firm are
not just the pension accruals but also the wages that will be earned over
the period.
The first column of data in table 2.5 divides the total hourly com
pensation until retirement for pension-covered workers into three com
ponents: the wage, the value of the pension from working until
retirement under an equivalent defined contribution plan, and the value
of backloading. The first figure in the column sums up the discounted
wages until retirement and divides by the number of hours until retire
ment. The second figure in the column asks the question: What would
the portion of compensation until retirement that is due to the pension
have been if the pension amount over the lifetime of the job had been
held the same, but the pension value had accumulated in the fashion of
a defined contribution plan? Again, the resulting number is divided by
the number of hours until retirement. The third figure, pension backloading, is the pension loss that occurs because actual pension plans
accumulate value disproportionately at the end of the job rather than
smoothly over the life of the job. The backloading total is also divided
by the number of hours until retirement. The figures in the table are
averages over the samples of pension-covered individuals in the SCF.
The loss amount due to pension backloading, amortized over the
time until retirement, is less than 3 percent of compensation. Because
the individuals in this sample have over 22 years until retirement, how
ever, the lump-sum value of the loss is still substantial. The typical
worker in a pension-covered job would suffer approximately a $17,000
pension loss if the individual were to leave that job. On the other hand,
there are over 22 years in which to make up this loss in the new job. At
2,000 hours per year, the new job would have to pay about 38 cents
more per hour, or a relatively small raise of about 2.6 percent of com
pensation, in order to make up for the pension loss. This amortization
appears to be the appropriate procedure to use in determining what a
new job must pay in order to equal the earnings if the individual were
to continue in the present job. The dollar value of the pension loss may
look sizable, but it is only a relatively small component of the value of
the job. More sizable is the value of the pension itself. Over the life of
the job, the nonbackloaded portion of the pension contributes about
10.3 percent of compensation.
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The loss amounts do not appear to be very sensitive to the interest
rates used to evaluate the losses. To illustrate, consider the worker
whose pension is shown in table 2.2. This worker joins the firm at age
25 and plans to retire at 62, which is typical of pension-covered work
ers in this sample. Recall that the pension pays benefits equal to 1 per
cent of the final salary times years of service. Assuming an interest rate
of 8 percent and a nominal wage growth of 5 percent, the pension capi
tal loss for the worker is equal to 65.6 percent of the annual wage at
age 45. Raising both the interest rate and the wage growth rate by 4
percentage points to an interest rate of 12 percent and a nominal wage
growth of 9 percent, the capital loss is 69.4 percent of the annual wage
at age 45. Evidently the increase in capital loss due to the greater
spread between current and retirement wages in the second case is
essentially offset by the increased erosion of postretirement benefits
due to the nominal nature of those benefits. In both of these examples,
the loss would be only about 4 percent of compensation until retire
ment.
In sum, the data from the Pension Provider Survey attached to the
SCF confirm the finding that the spikes in the pension accrual profile
are large and variable at the early retirement age. The data also strongly
confirm the implications from analyzing pension benefit formulas in
the abstract: defined benefit plans do not create large disincentives to
mobility from the option value of the pension. For the sample of pen
sions covering prime-aged workers in the SCF, the cost of mobility to
pension-covered workers from the backloading of pension plans
amounts to less than 3 percent of compensation. Only a modest raise
on the new job is needed to offset the disincentive to mobility created
by backloaded pension plans, taking account of the disincentives
derived from the backloading of the basic defined benefit formula and
from the special benefits offered at early retirement.

Appendix to Chapter 2
Methodology for Calculating Pension Backloading
This appendix compares the measure of backloading developed in chapter
2 with the measures used in leading studies by Ippolito (1986) and Lazear and
Moore (1988). It shows that the measure of pension loss from mobility de
scribed here is a generalization of "capital loss" measures used in the other
studies.
To review, our backloading calculation begins by determining the contribu
tion rate that would be required for a defined contribution plan to achieve the
same value as the actual plan at the projected retirement date. Next, the current
value of this hypothetical defined contribution plan is calculated, by measuring
how much value the actual plan would have accrued were it not backloaded.
The difference between this value and the current value of the actual plan is a
measure of the backloading loss.
This measure of backloading is equal to Ippolito ©s calculation of capital loss
for the standard defined benefit plan he examines. For the more complicated
plans occasionally encountered in the SCF, our generalized measure of capital
loss is more appropriate than Ippolito© s.
Consider a simple defined benefit plan that calculates benefits by multiply
ing a generosity factor times years of service times final salary. For such a pen
sion, Ippolito defines capital loss L as the loss in value of the pension if the
current wage is used in the formula rather than the wage at retirement, holding
years of service at its current value. Using the notation developed earlier in the
chapter:
D
(2.8)
L = ^a(WR -Wk)Tke~r(t © k) dt
R

where a is the generosity factor of the plan, Tk and Wk are tenure and the wage,
respectively, at age k, and R is the retirement age. 15
If wages grow at the same rate as the interest rate, this expression can be ma
nipulated as follows:
D
D
(2.9)
L =

j
R
where j is the age at hire. The first term in the last of the equalities in equation
(2.9) is the current value of a defined contribution plan with a contribution rate
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c*, and the second term is the present value of the defined benefit pension. Note
that c* satisfies the relationship
o
R
(2.10)

-r(t-R)
-r(t-R)
\aWR TRe~r(t
- R) dt,, = $f c**W,f
(t ~ R) dt

R

which is to say that the values of the defined benefit and defined contribution
plans are equal at age R. This can be algebraically manipulated to yield

\aWR TRe r
J
= c*W D T R
r

©jaWR Tke

-r(t-k)

*
dt = c*WRe

-r(k-R)

= fc*Wkdt

The last line of this condition enables us to move from the first line in equa
tion (2.9) to the bottom line. Since the top line of equation (2.9) is Ippolito©s
definition of capital loss, and the bottom line is the measure of capital loss used
in this study, the two definitions are equal for the type of plan considered by
Ippolito.
This approach of comparing the current values of a defined benefit plan with
that of a comparably valued (at retirement) defined contribution plan can be ex
tended to more complicated pensions as well. For example, a pension may cal
culate benefits as equal to 1 percent of final salary times years of service of up
to 20 years plus 1.5 percent of final salary times years of service past 20 years.
In this kind of pension, simply plugging the wage at retirement into the formula
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yields an understatement of the extent of backloading. Alternatively, many
pensions make a more favorable formula available to individuals who work
with the firm until retirement. Again, simply plugging the retirement wage into
the currently applicable formula understates backloading for individuals below
the retirement age. In both of these cases, comparing the current value of the
pension with that of a defined contribution pension reaching the same value at
retirement will yield a better measure of the backloading.
The pension values (inclusive of backloading losses) used in this study are
also related to the pension "option values" used by Lazear and Moore (1988).
Lazear and Moore effectively define the option value of a pension at time k as
.R*-k

(1+r)

where P(f) is the present value of future benefits should the worker leave at
year t, k is the current age, R* is the retirement age that maximizes the preced
ing expression, and r is the discount rate. The option value is simply the differ
ence between the pension value at the optimal retirement age, discounted back
to the current age, and its current value. It is important because the value of
many pensions jumps a sizable amount when eligibility for early retirement is
reached and because part of the value of current employment is the opportunity
to continue working and to realize this increment in pension value. Calculated
at the same age of retirement, the option value is the equivalent to the pension
part of future compensation used in this study.
One difference between our measure of the pension portion of future com
pensation and the option value may be noted. The measure used here computes
the pension as of the age at which the individual intends to retire. The option is
often calculated at the age at which P(t) is maximized in value. The advantage
of using the intended age of retirement in calculating the worth of the pension
is that the option has value only to the extent that the individual intends to ex
ercise it.
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NOTES
1. The following discussion incorporates material from Gustman and Steinmeier (1989a). A
number of the basic relationships discussed here have been analyzed by Barnow and Ehrenberg
(1979), Bulow (1981, 1982) and Kotlikoff and Wise (1985, 1987a).
2. To be more specific about the derivation of equation (2.2),
D
i/ r -r(t-k) .

D
= f aWQe

u/

= aWQe
Note e

-r(t-k)

is the product or e

-r(t-R)

(k-j)e

kS f ,

dt

-\ -r(R-k)

(k-j)e

and e

[1 - e

-r(D-R)

]/r

-r(R-k)

In the empirical results in the third section and in the remaining chapters, the benefits are mul
tiplied by the probability of living to collect them. However, since none of the theoretical points in
this chapter is affected by the existence of uncertainty about the length of life, the formulations
use a certain lifespan in order to avoid undue complexity.
3. More specifically, the second derivative of the pension accrual rate with respect to k is posi
tive because wage growth and service growth are interacting. See also Kotlikoff and Wise (1985,
1987a).
4. For k > R, benefits commence upon retirement, and the lower limit of the integral in equa
tion (2.2) becomes k instead of /?. As a result, the present value of the pension as of year k is
Pdb(k) = a W0ek8 (k -j) [1 - e-«D ~ *>]/r.
For the case where the individual works past normal retirement age, and credit is given for such
work, the pension accrual rate is given by
dPdh(k)ldk-rPdh(k) = Pdb(k) {g + \l(k-j)-rl[\ -e^-*>]}.
In this expression, the last term in the brackets reflects the fact that once the individual quali
fies for retirement benefits, benefits are foregone when retirement is postponed. If this loss is suf
ficiently large, the value of the pension may begin to decline as soon as the normal retirement age
is reached. In any case, the relative importance of this loss increases with k. This implies that
eventually the value of the pension must begin to decline and will do so at an accelerating rate.
5. The formula simply dates the pension contribution by the employer, which is a fraction c of
the wage at time /. It then provides interest from whatever time the pension contribution was made
until the time k, when the amount in the pension fund is totaled. Integrating this expression yields
the equation in the text.

f ..,

gt -r(t-k) ,

= )cWQ es e

dt.
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6. In this case, the formula in the previous footnote simplifies to
k

1. Note once again that there is no explicit allowance here for the effects of mortality, although
these effects are included in the empirical work in the next section and in all subsequent chapters.
8. Experience with the 1989 SCF suggests that the pension wealth and incentive distributions
are approximately the same whether pensions are matched on an individual basis or by this proce
dure.
9. More specifically, real wages each year are imputed on the basis of a regression of log
wages on experience, experience squared, tenure, tenure squared, interactions of both experience
and tenure with education, union status and firm size, and a set of other standard explanatory vari
ables including dummy variables for marital status, race, sex, health status, union status, whether
the firm size exceeded 100 employees, SMSA residence, industry (eight variables), and region
(four variables). A wage profile is created by extrapolating the observed wage before and after
dates on the basis of the estimated coefficients for the experience and tenure variables in the wage
equation. Pension values are calculated by applying the resulting wage profile to the individual©s
own pension. These calculations assume an interest rate of 6.3 percent, nominal wage growth of
5.1 percent, and an inflation rate of 4.0 percent, roughly corresponding to the Social Security IIB
scenario at the time of the observed mobility behavior (Social Security Trustees Annual Report
1988). All compensation amounts are discounted to 1983 and expressed in 1983 dollars.
10. Slightly higher pension adjustments with inflation are found in Gustman and Steinmeier
(1993a), but both estimates are relatively close.
1 1 . It should also be noted that these profiles are somewhat different from those that would be
observed today. Pension plans must now continue to credit work beyond the normal retirement
age. As a result, the negative accrual rates reported at age 65 and for the post-retirement period are
considerably more muted.
12. These are plans that did not have any defined benefit component.
13. The message on the variability of pension incentives among plans has been particularly
emphasized by Kotlikoff and Wise (1985, 1987a). An implication is that there is a great deal of
room for error in studies that match pension incentives on the basis of plan characteristics. Further
evidence on this point is provided in Gustman and Steinmeier (1989a), where we examine the
relationship of pension incentives to plan characteristics.
14. Comparable results are obtained for pensions in the 1983 base period, that is, for the pen
sions that will be used to impute the incentives affecting mobility decisions of participants in the
SIPP and PSID surveys.
15. Again, the effects of an uncertain lifetime could be introduced by multiplying the benefit
amounts times the appropriate survival probabilities. Such a change would have no effect on the
points being made in this section, so the simpler notation is used.

The Literature Relevant to the
Pension-Mobility Relationship
This chapter highlights and discusses results from the literature on
pensions and mobility. The first section highlights the findings in the
literature, while the second section evaluates these findings. Each sec
tion begins with a discussion of the evidence on the penalty to mobile
workers created by pension backloading. The discussion next briefly
reviews explanations of why firms might value the ability to influence
mobility. Third, there is a discussion of reduced form results that indi
cate a negative association between pension coverage and mobility.
Fourth is a review of a more recent effort to relate an explicit measure
of pension backloading to mobility. Fifth, some additional findings are
discussed. A final section discusses a number of unresolved issues
from the literature on wage determination. 1

Evidence from the Literature
Pension Backloading and Disincentives to Mobility
A fundamental reason why pensions might discourage mobility is
that under the defined benefit plan, benefits accrue disproportionately
in the later years of employment. As seen in chapter 2, backloading
arises because the defined benefit plan bases yearly pension benefits on
final earnings and years of covered employment. Both annual earnings
and years of covered employment increase with tenure on the job, but
when a person leaves the firm, the pay figure used in calculating the
pension benefit is frozen. Moreover, there are special benefits for those
who stay with the firm until qualifying for early retirement. Conse
quently, pensions received by terminated, vested workers are dispro
portionately reduced in value from the pension that would have been
received had the worker remained with the firm until qualifying for
retirement benefits. The backloading of defined benefit plans makes it
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more costly to leave a pension covered job.2 To the extent that pensions
increase the cost of moving, they would reduce the likelihood of
mobility.
Researchers of pensions have been well aware of the phenomenon
of pension backloading. Some relate backloading directly to mobility.
Often, however, the discussion of backloading focuses on its ramifica
tions for implicit contracts. A central concern is to determine the extent
of the firm©s pension liability, or how that liability varies with worker
tenure. 3 Studies also focus on the question of pension adequacy in
retirement. Backloading reduces pension incomes for workers who
have held many jobs. Researchers have also focused on the relationship
of mobility to the replacement rate, the ratio of the yearly benefit to the
final wage or some average wage (Turner 1993). Those with a strong
interest in the determination and adequacy of retirement incomes look
primarily at the effect of mobility on pension benefits received, rather
than focusing on the effects of pension provisions and backloading on
mobility.
It is useful to consider some examples of pension backloading from
the literature. For comparison, the pension backloading we calculated
in table 2.4 represents a little over $17,000 in 1983 dollars. Since the
wage was $12.58 per hour (table 2.5), or about $25,000 for a 2,000hour year, the backloading represents about 70 percent of a year©s
wages.
The first example is from Ippolito (1986), who presents an example
of pension capital loss from mobility. His illustration is for a worker
hired at age 35, with normal retirement at age 65, an annual real wage
of $10,000 and a real interest rate of zero (the interest rate equals infla
tion). Nominal wages are presumed to grow at the same rate as infla
tion. To simplify the annuity calculation, Ippolito assumes that, with
retirement at 65, there is a lump-sum payment of 15 percent of the
wage times years of service. Given these assumptions, the data in table
3.1 are generated.
The last two columns report the loss in the pension as a fraction of
the yearly wage ($10,000). These losses are a somewhat larger percent
age of the wage than are the amortized amounts of pension losses dis
cussed in the paragraphs following table 2.5. There are a number of
reasons for these differences. One factor is that a later age of retirement
is assumed in Ippolito©s example than is apparent in the Survey of Con-
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sumer Finances (SCF) data underlying table 2.5. Also, Ippolito
assumes a lump-sum settlement of 15 percent of the wage times years
of service, so that higher inflation does not erode the pension after the
individual retires.4 In addition, the pension assumed by Ippolito is
somewhat more generous than are the pensions found in the SCF. 5 Nev
ertheless, despite the fact that we are comparing a theoretical example
with real data, and that a number of assumptions in Ippolito©s example
tend to exaggerate pension backloading, the conclusions as to the
likely penalty to mobility from pension backloading are of comparable
magnitudes.
Table 3.1 An Example of Loss from Pension Backloading (Ippolito)
Percent of
Pension loss as
Interest Real pension
pension lost
a percent
rate
wealth3
from quitting
of wage
Age
45
55
45
55
45
55
Service
10
20
10
20
10
20
.025
$15,000 $30,000
39.3 22.1
59.0 66.3
.050
15,000 30,000
63.3 39.3
94.5 117.9
.100
15,000 30,000
86.4 63.3
129.6 189.9
SOURCE: Ippolito (1986, p. 143, table 8-3).
NOTE: Workers at age 45 have 10 years of service, and workers at age 55 have 20 years of
service.
a. This is pension wealth as measured by projected liability.

A number of researchers concerned with the effects of pension
backloading on benefit replacement rates examine the impact of work
ers moving between jobs and of holding more than one pension. In
chapter 4 we show that for movers from pension-covered jobs, only a
third have a new pension one year later, and just over a half have a new
pension after five years. Thus pension losses from mobility are under
stated when it is assumed that all workers who had a pension with their
initial job find a pension on their new job. Nevertheless, it is of interest
to ask what these studies conclude about the likely pension losses due
to mobility from jobs offering backloaded pensions, on the assumption
of continuous pension coverage.6
Turner (1993, p. 53) cites results from a Hay/Huggins Study (1988),
which took the basic turnover rates from the SCF by imputing turnover
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behavior from the tenure and pension coverage distributions. This
study defines portability loss as the difference between 100 percent and
the ratio, expressed as a percentage, of:
the actual retirement benefit that the worker will receive
from all employers, to
the retirement benefit that the worker would have received
if all years of covered employment had been credited under
the last pension plan that covered the worker. (Hay/Huggins 1988, p. 4)
The study considers only the primary pension and assumes coverage
by a comparable plan on subsequent jobs. The findings include pension
portability losses of 14.8 percent for all workers and losses averaging
23.3 percent for workers with a loss. For a worker with 25 years of
covered experience who has a pension of median generosity, this 23.3
percent loss translates to about 52 percent of wages.7
The Congressional Budget Office (1987, p. 35) has made analogous
calculations of the effect of multiple job holding on replacement rates.
As can be seen in table 3.2, at a 3 percent inflation rate, a pension pay
ing 1.5 percent per year of service on the average of the last 5 years©
salary results in a replacement rate of 46.5 percent for an individual
who has 9 years of service in the first pension-covered job and then
spent the next 31 years in a job offering the same pension. A second
employee who spent 20 years in each job has a replacement rate of
41.1 percent, and an employee who spent 40 years in a single job has a
replacement rate of 60 percent. If each dollar of annual benefits has an
annuitized value of $12, then the annual loss of around 15 percent of
final salary (the rough average of employees A and B) has a present
value of about 1.8 times final salary (12 times 15 percent). This is an
extreme example, though, because the 1.5 percent is higher than aver
age and because the typical pension-covered worker will have consid
erably less than 40 years of covered experience at retirement. 8
Of those who have calculated the pension loss from mobility, Alien,
Clark, and McDermed employ an approach closest to the one we have
taken in chapter 2. Recall that the pension backloading in table 2.4 rep
resents a little over $17,000 in 1983 dollars. In comparison, Alien,
Clark, and McDermed (1987) find an average loss for 35-44 year olds
(our sample is 31-50 year olds) of $6,530 in 1974 dollars; that trans-
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lates to $12,000 in 1983 dollars. All things considered, the findings of
the two studies appear to agree reasonably well as to the general order
of magnitude of the pension loss.9
Table 3.2 Effect of Length of Service on Defined Benefit Pensions
(An Example)
Years of service,
first job

Years of service,
second job

Replacement rate
on final five-year
salary average
(percent)

31

46.5

B

9
20

20

41.1

C

40

0

60.0

Employee
A

SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office (1987, p. 35, table 6).

Other studies have also calculated pension backloading. As dis
cussed, the focus is more often on the effects of mobility on pension
replacement rates when there are defined benefit plans or on the effects
of mobility on the implicit promise made by the employer, than on the
impact of pension backloading on mobility. Nevertheless, there have
been a number of studies that have looked directly at the effects of pen
sion backloading on mobility. Several other studies have assumed that
the negative relationship between pension coverage and mobility must
reflect backloading.
Hypotheses Explaining Why Firms Might Use
Backloaded Pensions to Reduce Mobility
One possible explanation as to why firms might use pensions to
reduce mobility is rooted in human capital theory. Some firms invest in
workers by paying substantial hiring and training costs. Hence, these
employers need to regulate turnover so as to guarantee a long enough
payback period to warrant the investment in human capital. A negative
pension-mobility link may be due to the efforts of the firm to reduce
mobility incentives among those already employed.
A related hypothesis explaining adoption of defined benefit pensions
is also motivated by the firm©s desire to economize on hiring and train-
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ing costs. Alien, Clark, and McDermed (1993) argue that firms use
defined benefit pensions to influence self-selection by workers, with
the aim of encouraging applications by those who are least likely to
leave by virtue of their own preferences. If some workers are likely to
be "stayers" while others are likely to be "movers," it will pay the firm
to discriminate among these different types, sorting out those workers
who, by preference, are movers. A bonus that is conditional on longterm attachment is worth less to a mover and will achieve the desired
goal (Salop and Salop 1976). Thus, a desire to avoid the additional hir
ing and training costs associated with turnover may have motivated the
firm to adopt backloaded pensions that impose a capital loss on those
who leave the firm. This approach would discourage those on board
from leaving and encourage those who are considering a job not to take
it unless they intend to stay.
The pension capital loss may also be used to screen workers for
other desirable characteristics, such as a willingness to work. A recent
extension of the sorting theory by Ippolito (1993 and forthcoming b)
posits that some workers have a higher time preference than do others
and thus more heavily discount payments to be received in future peri
ods. Low time-preference workers are also presumed to have some
characteristic that is unobservable ex ante but valuable to the firm, such
as higher productivity or lower turnover rates. If capital markets are
imperfect and workers are on the margin of borrowing through the rel
evant period, low time-preference workers will value pensions even
though they transform a portion of compensation into future income.
Under these circumstances, a sharp difference in the imputed values of
pensions will emerge between low and high time-preference workers.
The difference in the valuation of a defined benefit and defined contri
bution plan will also be sharper in this situation because firms are less
likely to cash out a defined benefit plan with any significant value than
a defined contribution plan, for which a lump-sum settlement can often
be obtained. This will also discourage high time-preference workers
from seeking such jobs. Once a delayed payment mechanism is found
to be appropriate, either for economizing on costs or for encouraging
increased work effort, the pension, with its tax-deferred status,
becomes an attractive vehicle for inducing the desired behavior.
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Evidence on the Relationship of Pension Coverage to Turnover
There are two types of studies that have analyzed the relationship of
pensions to turnover. One, which represents the majority of studies,
examines the relationship of turnover or tenure to pension coverage on
the job. A second type, discussed in the following section, attempts to
estimate directly the effects of pension capital loss on turnover.
Table 3.3 presents results from probit analyses taken from one
of the turnover equations estimated in Mitchell (1982, p. 295, table 3).
Standard errors are reported in parentheses. The results, which are
based on data from the 1973 and 1977 Quality of Employment Survey,
show that there is a strong and significant negative relationship between
pension coverage and turnover. The coefficient for males, which is the
group analyzed in our mobility analysis, translates into a 20 percentage
point difference in the mobility rates between individuals who are cov
ered by a pension and those who are not.
Table 3.3 Relationship between Pension Coverage and Job Change for
Males as Reported by Mitchell (1982)
Males
Females
-0.700a
-0.5 19a
Coefficient on pension coverage variable in
multivariate probit equation
(0.155)
(0.190)
SOURCE: Mitchell (1982, p. 295, table 3).
NOTE: Asymptotic standard errors are in parentheses.
a. Indicates a t statistic of 1.96 or better.The equations include race, education, union membership,
experience, tenure, and wage as independent variables.

The differences in turnover for workers who are and are not covered
by pensions has been known for many years. 10 It is well established that
turnover is lower for workers covered by pension plans. 11 Turnover
among workers with pension coverage is about half the rate for work
ers without pensions. 12 In 1983, length of service was 8.8 years for
employees in the Current Population Survey whose employers pro
vided a pension, while it was 4.1 years for workers in other jobs. 13
Alien, Clark, and McDermed (1991) survey a number of the studies in
this area and emphasize that in the studies they review, "pension cover
age has been the strongest correlate of mobility and length of service."
They also present their own analysis, in which they find that turnover is

46 The Literature Relevant to the Pension-Mobility Relationship

negatively related to pension coverage, while reported job tenure is
positively related to pension coverage, other variables constant.
Direct Analyses of the Relationship of Pension
Backloading to Mobility
In addition to studies that focus on the relationship of pension cover
age to turnover, there have been attempts to estimate directly the rela
tionship of the pension capital loss to employee turnover. Alien, Clark,
and McDermed (1993, p. 476) conclude that pension capital losses
account for about 40 percent of the turnover difference between those
with and without a pension.
They specify and estimate three equations using the 1975-82 Panel
Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), with information on pension capi
tal loss computed from a separate Employee Benefit Survey and
matched to the PSID observations on the basis of occupation and
industry. One equation, a selection equation, estimates the probability
of being covered by a pension as a function of the probability of turn
over from the pension-covered job. In another version of that equation,
the probability of coverage is a function of a variable interacting the
likelihood of the worker leaving a pension-covered job with a measure
of pension capital loss. These specifications are meant to relate cover
age to the expected cost of leaving the pension-covered job. The cover
age equation also includes other controls. A second equation estimates
the probability of leaving a pension-covered job in the seven-year
period from 1975 to 1982 as a function of pension capital loss. The
controls in this equation include a measure of hourly compensation
that incorporates the prorated value of the accrued (stay) pension, i.e.,
a measure of pension value computed using the wage at retirement
instead of the wage in the current period. The third equation estimates
the probability of leaving a job that does not offer a pension as a func
tion of a set of controls, including the wage. These equations are esti
mated jointly, and relationships among the unobservables from each
equation are also considered. 14
Alien, Clark, and McDermed©s findings include the following:
1. A $1,000 increase in pension capital loss reduces turnover by 1.8
percentage points, so that the overall capital loss observed in the sam-
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pie would account for 41 percent of the difference in turnover between
those with and without pensions.
2. Workers with low odds of turnover self-select into pension-cov
ered jobs, but they do so on the basis of observable rather than unobservable characteristics. Unobservables in the pension coverage
equation are not correlated with either of the turnover equations.
3. The expected capital loss has little effect on the odds of being in a
job with a pension. Neither the probability of turnover nor the interac
tion of the probability of turnover with capital loss is significant in the
pension coverage equation.
It is important to emphasize that the correlations among the error
terms are insignificant. Also, there is no significant effect of expected
pension capital loss on pension coverage. This means that any selection
into pension-covered jobs can be accommodated by estimating mobil
ity equations without worrying about bias from selection into a pen
sion-covered job, as long as the exogenous variables in the mobility
equation include those observables that are associated with choosing
pension-covered jobs. Consequently, Alien, Clark, and McDermed feel
free to examine the effect of pension capital loss on quits and layoffs in
a single equation mobility model.
Other Relevant Findings on the Pension-Mobility Relationship
In addition to the findings from basic pension-mobility studies, there
are more detailed results germane to the pension-mobility relationship.
Three are noted here. First, as emphasized by Alien, Clark, and
McDermed (1993, p. 476), the strength of the estimated relationship
between pensions and mobility declines with years of service. Second,
as noted by Mitchell (1982) and as confirmed by Alien, Clark, and
McDermed and others, pensions are more strongly related to layoffs
than to quits, and thus are more strongly related to overall turnover
than to quits. Moreover, when layoffs and quits are related to a measure
of pension backloading by Alien, Clark, and McDermed, layoff proba
bilities fall by 1.3 percentage points for each $1,000 increase in capital
loss, but the effect of a $1,000 capital loss is to reduce quits by less
than one-half of 1 percentage point. Third, as recently found by Even
and Macpherson (1992), the negative pension-mobility relationship
holds up in large firms, but not in small firms, suggesting indirectly
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that the defined benefit plans more prevalent in larger firms are inhibit
ing mobility.

Questions About the Literature Findings
We now consider questions raised by the research that has been dis
cussed. Specifically, we explain our doubt that backloaded defined
benefit pensions account for a large part of the differences in mobility
found between those who hold jobs offering pensions and those who
hold jobs that do not.
Pension Backloading and Disincentives to Mobility
Despite the existence of a pension capital loss associated with backloading and special early retirement benefits, we doubt that pensions
create sufficient incentives to account for the level and patterns of
mobility observed. In our previous work (Gustman and Steinmeier
1987 and 1993b), and as emphasized by the calculations in chapter 2,
we have noted that the disincentive to mobility created by defined ben
efit pensions is small enough to be easily overcome by a raise of a few
percentage points on the new job.
Why Firms Might Use a Backloaded Pension to Reduce Mobility
The analysis in chapter 2 also shows that the pattern of penalties to
mobility induced by defined benefit plans is not consistent with a
hypothesis emphasizing the importance of reducing hiring and training
costs. Larger penalties are created for those with greater experience.
Yet those with fewer years on the job are precisely the workers the firm
would like to discourage from moving, since early mobility on their
part will create the least return to training and hiring costs. The small
penalty to mobility for those who have just started on the job suggests
that the firm probably does not count on the pension to reduce mobility
in the years immediately after hiring and training costs are incurred.
It has also been argued that vesting is responsible for reduced turn
over from pension-covered jobs. However, there are a number of unan
swered questions about the relationship between vesting and mobility.
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Before regulation from the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
of 1974 (ERISA), the vesting period was quite long, often extending
for a number of decades. This suggests that whatever its current pur
pose, vesting was not initially used by firms as a tool for offsetting
training and hiring costs by reducing mobility of workers who were
within the first decade of employment. Even now, the effect on mobil
ity is likely to be small, although vesting rules do create a discontinuity
in compensation accrual as the vesting period approaches. That is,
given limitations on the vesting period under current law, which
requires 5-year cliff vesting or graded vesting centered around the 5year period, pension accruals are small enough at the time of vesting so
that losses due to turnover during the first years of employment are
likely to be slight (Kotlikoff and Wise 1985, 1987a). Direct calcula
tions of the effects of a reduction in vesting from 10 to 5 years also
suggest that recent changes in vesting rules, and related requirements
for crediting work at young ages, are unlikely to affect incentives for
turnover substantially (Gustman and Steinmeier 1989b).
The Relationship of Pension Coverage to Turnover
As noted, an important reason why researchers believe that pensions
reduce mobility is that there is a strong correlation between pension
coverage and measures of mobility or tenure. The fundamental ques
tion to be addressed is whether this correlation reflects causality, or
whether important causal factors that generate the correlation have
been omitted. Much of our work in this book addresses the question of
what omitted variables might explain the correlation between pension
coverage and mobility.
One candidate for the omitted variable has been suggested by the
research of Alien, Clark, and McDermed. Their finding that pension
backloading has a greater effect on layoffs than quits, along with
Mitchell©s earlier findings to the same effect, suggests that causality
may run from the implicit contract, whatever its form and value, to
mobility and pension design, rather than directly from pension backloading to mobility. That is, the implicit contract, and the productivity
or rent-sharing arrangement underlying that contract, may be the omit
ted factor. Such an arrangement may lead to payment of a compensa
tion premium on pension-covered jobs. That source of bias has been
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analyzed in our earlier work (Gustman and Steinmeier 1987, 1993b)
and will be examined extensively in this book.
Direct Analyses of the Relationship of Pension Backloading to
Mobility
The evidence in Alien, Clark, and McDermed (1993), that pension
backloading is substantially responsible for the lower mobility from
pension-covered jobs, is also characterized by a number of anomalies.
The findings are not internally consistent and suggest the possibility of
specification error in the model. In particular, the results imply that an
additional dollar of pension capital loss would have over 20 times the
effect on turnover as would an additional dollar of compensation. But
why should an extra dollar realized in the form of pension backloading
be so much more influential in reducing turnover than a dollar realized
in the form of higher wages?
According to Alien, Clark, and McDermed, "The impact of a $1,000
increase in the capital loss is a 1.8 percentage point reduction in the
odds of turnover" (1993, p. 476). They also find that "a one dollar
increase in before-tax compensation is associated with a 1.8 percentage
point decrease in the odds of turnover..." (p. 477). A flow of $1 per
hour in wages translates into a present value of $20,000 to $30,000 in
the 15-to-20 years until retirement. Accordingly, their findings suggest
that a one-dollar pension capital loss has about 20 to 30 times the
impact of one extra dollar received as wages. On the face of it, this
result is implausible. It is likely that some omitted factor is correlated
with their measure of pension backloading and with mobility. A com
plete specification of the model should produce results in which an
extra dollar of compensation has a comparable effect on mobility, no
matter what the source. 15
Alien, Clark, and McDermed also find that all of the sorting into
pension-covered jobs is based on observables, not on unobservables,
and that "the expected magnitude of capital loss has little effect on the
sorting of workers by pension coverage" (p. 476). This finding is puz
zling since Alien, Clark, and McDermed believe that sorting would be
a good candidate for the omitted variable that causes an overestimate
of the correlation between pension backloading and mobility. 16 More
over, simultaneous equations bias, proceeding from occupational
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choices and resulting characteristics associated with mobility, to pen
sion backloading, might provide a plausible explanation for the differ
ences in some mobility equation estimates. These differences would
exist between the coefficients on pension backloading on the one hand
and the measured effects of other differences in compensation on the
other. However, their findings also rule out an effect of pension backloading on job choice.
In sum, there are a number of anomalies in the Alien, Clark, and
McDermed studies of the relationship of pension backloading to
mobility. These issues lead us to question a conclusion that backload
ing accounts for a substantial part of the reduction in mobility from
pension-covered jobs.
Other Relevant Findings Suggested in the Literature on the PensionMobility Relationship
The finding in Alien, Clark, and McDermed (1991) that pension
capital loss reduces mobility more for younger than for older workers
accords with a model that emphasizes the importance of the pension as
a device for reducing hiring costs. This finding does not, however,
mesh with the time pattern of disincentives to mobility created by the
standard plan formula, or by relevant results from pension surveys.
Petersen (1992) and the evidence examined in chapter 2 suggest that
the pattern of disincentives has a basic inverted U shape, rather than a
declining pattern with age. The net effect is that the disincentives to
mobility created by pensions are higher a decade or two after hiring
than in the first few years after the date of hire. If the special early
retirement benefits are considered, the pattern of disincentives may
even be uniformly increasing with age. In this case, mobility should
fall with tenure until the early retirement age, as found by Stock and
Wise (1990). 17 Given the very weak penalty to mobility in early years,
it is hard to rationalize an effect of pensions on mobility that is very
large for workers with low tenure. 18
The next questions for consideration are raised by findings that pen
sion capital loss reduces turnover almost exclusively through its effect
on (perhaps, correlation with) layoffs. Firms would have no reason to
employ backloaded pensions to decrease mobility by reducing layoffs,
since layoffs can be determined directly. It is possible to rationalize the
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relationship of pensions to layoffs as evidence for an implicit contract,
in that there may be a linkage between pension capital loss and the
firm©s reluctance to break the contract and engage in layoffs. However,
if this is true, the purpose of the implicit contract must be something
other than reducing worker quits; otherwise, we would expect to see a
decrease in the quit rate as well. For instance, firms might be using the
implicit contract to reduce shirking or encourage more effort, and a
diminished layoff rate may be necessary in order for workers to believe
that they will get the expected future payoffs if they cooperate. This is
no longer a story of pensions causing lower mobility; it is a story of
pension and layoff policies being used together by the firms for a
broader goal.
A related possibility is reverse causality, as firms shape pensions to
meet turnover expectations for their covered workers. That is, selection
of plan coverage or plan type may be a result, not only of the decisions
of the workers, as in a mover-stayer model, but of the firm©s efforts to
provide a desirable vehicle for savings. It may be that at firms where
turnover is likely to be higher, plans are arranged to accommodate the
pattern of turnover. We know that this is a likely explanation for the
prevalence of defined contribution plans in higher education, for exam
ple. Accordingly, while Alien, Clark, and McDermed find that
expected turnover does not account for pension coverage, it still may
be that those workers in jobs characterized by high rates of turnover are
more likely to be covered by defined contribution plans, or defined
benefit plans designed specifically to impose a lower penalty for turn
over. 19
A finding in favor of the hypothesis that pensions are used directly
to reduce mobility is that the pension-mobility relationship persists in
samples of large, but not in samples of small, firms. This is especially
the case because pensions are more likely to be defined benefit in
larger firms, and so they are more likely to be characterized by a signif
icant pension capital loss with turnover. 20 Still, the fact that compensa
tion and work conditions are so different between large and small firms
(Brown and Medoff 1989) leaves open the possibility that there also is
important omitted variable bias.
Further insight into the pension-mobility relationship might be
gained by a more careful specification of the mobility equation, a spec
ification that distinguishes among alternative explanations for mobil-
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ity: changing information on the quality of a match, asymmetric
information, changing demand patterns, reverse causation, or other
reasons. The current models of the pension-mobility relationship have
not yet specified equations that carefully model these separate factors.

Unresolved Issues
A number of issues in the literature on wage determination remain
unresolved and, as a consequence, leave in doubt the relationships
determining compensation and employment that underlie our findings.
On the conceptual level, we know that wages and pensions are jointly
determined, together with employment and worker costs and quality,
where by quality we mean factors affecting various dimensions of pro
ductivity including skill and effort. Also to be considered are determi
nants of noncompensation costs, such as turnover. But we do not have
a very good fix on how these various elements of firm labor demand
are determined.
Some of the relevant relationships are suggested by standard consid
erations that arise from demand analysis in spot labor markets, but
most of the considerations that would allow us to fully understand the
determination of labor compensation, quantity, and quality in a model
that incorporates pensions requires an analysis in the context of longterm job attachment between the worker and the firm. Institutions arise
for influencing and adjudicating terms of employment, including but
not limited to unions. With long-term job attachment, markets need not
clear at each moment in time. Moreover, with long-term job attach
ment and property rights in the job, it becomes more reasonable to sup
pose that if there are any rents accruing to the firm, there is some
possibility of workers capturing a portion of the rents.
With long-term attachment, there must be provision for changes in
the economic environment. This has led to the idea of an implicit
employment contract that would establish expected responses to the
most common economic changes. Such arrangements may include, but
are not restricted to, responses to various contingencies, ranging from
the business cycle to the long-run success of the firm.
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In addition, there may be special considerations that have shaped the
role of the pension in the implicit employment contract. These unique
influences include unions, a changing regulatory environment, the rise
and spread of a true labor market innovation in the form of the pension,
and economies of scale in the provisions of certain benefits.
Considerable uncertainty persists about the terms of these arrange
ments, however, either in a steady state environment or in one that is
changing over time. As a result, there is uncertainty about what under
lies the relationship between mobility, pensions, and the associated
compensation changes that we are observing. We will find that workers
who leave firms that offer pensions experience a compensation decline
significantly larger than the wage decline experienced by those who
leave jobs that do not offer pensions, but this finding remains subject to
a number of interpretations.
One possibility is that jobs that offer pensions pay higher compensa
tion than jobs that do not offer pensions. There is a long literature dat
ing back to Slichter (1950) and his students that relates interindustry
wage differentials to the presence of market power and rents received
by firms. Certain jobs are "good jobs," providing individuals with rela
tively higher wages. This literature, which is summarized by Segal
(1986), does not require that compensation differences be equalizing.
Rather, the idea is that, in the face of imperfect competition, it is possi
ble for wages not to be equalizing. Some of these differentials may
constitute rents that exceed any compensation differentials intended to
raise worker productivity.
The literature on dual labor markets (Cain 1976) has addressed in
some detail the question of whether there are good and bad jobs. Tests
of the dual labor market hypothesis analyze whether wage differentials
reflect compensating wage differentials or unmeasured ability and
whether only certain work rewards formal on-the-job training.
An additional step required, if it is to be established that wage pre
miums are more likely to accrue to pension-covered workers, is that
high-wage jobs must have a higher propensity to offer pensions. The
literature on pension coverage, and on coverage by defined benefit
plans, does suggest that these plans are more likely to be offered to
those in union jobs, in jobs in large firms, and in jobs in particular
industries. (See Gustman and Mitchell 1992 and Gustman, Mitchell,
and Steinmeier 1994 for surveys of the relevant evidence.)
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A related literature, efficiency wage studies, argues that wage premi
ums are paid in certain industries and by certain firms as a method for
increasing productivity. Thus, firms pay higher wages than the individ
ual can obtain elsewhere as a way of maintaining worker discipline and
work effort. In this case the worker does receive a wage premium over
and above compensation on the next best job. At least some, and per
haps all, of the higher wage results from a compensating wage differ
ence.
Some of the controversy about the payment of wage premiums has
addressed the question of the optimal arrangement for structuring
incentive pay. Lazear©s work (1979, 1983) provides a basis for many
discussions of incentive pay models where monitoring is costly, and it
has the advantage of incorporating an explicit role for pensions. At
issue is whether it is necessary to pay greater compensation in order to
increase work effort, or whether it is sufficient to structure compensa
tion so that at the time of hire workers post a bond and are repaid the
value of the bond over the course of the employment arrangement.
Akerlof and Katz (1989) argue, for example, that efficient bonding
schemes are not possible and that the use of an up-front age-earnings
profile as a mechanism for bonding is not fully efficient, so that in the
presence of monitoring costs it will pay to offer efficiency wages. 21
According to the traditional view on the supply side of the labor
market, the payment of higher wages with tenure is explained by the
presence of job-specific training (Becker 1964; Mincer 1974). Topel
(1990) has attempted to estimate the size of wage loss when turnover
causes forfeiture of specific human capital. Other forms of investment
that might result in a wage loss with turnover include the effort in
obtaining an optimal job match (Jovanovic 1979a and b). Although it is
clear that specific investment should raise the post-training wage of
those who have engaged in such activity, it is not clear why specific
training should raise the value of lifetime earnings net of costs. If the
costs and benefits from such training are shared, a worker of a given
quality should receive the same lifetime compensation as would be
received in other employment that did not involve specific training.
In order to better understand the wage determination process, and
the reasons for wage differences with turnover, we need to improve our
comprehension not only of the determination of compensation differ
ences among jobs, but of the relationship between compensation and
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tenure on a given job. The question of what underlies the wage tenure,
or compensation tenure, profile is fundamental to understanding how
compensation is determined over the period of job attachment. This is
an unsettled issue. Some argue that apparent seniority premiums that
have been attributed to specific training are really the result of selection
bias. Relevant references to this debate include Abraham and Farber
(1985, 1987), Altonji and Shakotko (1987), and Topel (1986, 1990).
An obvious question is whether those who appear to be receiving a
wage premium are really being paid for some unobservable dimension
of higher quality. There have been a number of efforts to determine
whether those who are receiving higher wages are more desirable to
the firm. One basic idea is to look at job movers and to see whether
those who appear to be receiving a wage premium actually receive a
higher wage in alternative employment. Refinements of this idea have
been developed in studies analyzing the differences in wage changes
for those who leave their old jobs for various reasons (Gibbons and
Katz 1989, 1991). None of the relevant studies has been able to explain
the wage differentials observed for employees in particular industries,
or at larger firms, by resorting to unmeasured individual characteris
tics. That is, workers from particular industries and large firms typi
cally categorized as high-wage employers do experience larger wage
declines than do workers from low-wage industries or smaller firms,
even controlling for the reason for job change.
Ippolito (forthcoming b) has used the idea of worker heterogeneity
to explain pension backloading. He theorizes that the firm uses the
backloaded pension to sort out workers with different degrees of time
preference and that time preference of workers is correlated with other
worker characteristics, which are then related to turnover. The direct
evidence we have discussed finds no relationship between turnover and
unmeasured worker characteristics, and there is as yet no empirical
support for Ippolito©s conjectures on the relationship of pensions to
such characteristics.
Studies of compensating wage differentials are directly germane to
the question of how pensions relate to compensation. That literature
has not been especially successful in isolating compensating wage dif
ferentials for job conditions (Brown 1980). There also have been spe
cial efforts to isolate compensating wage differentials for pensions.
Most studies find a positive relationship between pension coverage and
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wages (Gordon and Blinder 1980), and between pension values and
wages (Gustman and Steinmeier 1989a). Recent work has attempted to
apply hedonic techniques to isolate the pension-wage tradeoff. It sug
gests that if productivity is held constant, a negative tradeoff between
pensions and wages might be generated. However, identification of
exogenous instruments has been a real problem. Thus, the leading
work in this area, Montgomery, Shaw, and Benedict (1992), for exam
ple, uses pension characteristics as instruments in the estimation. The
pension plan features are jointly determined with the wage and pension
level, however, and are thus endogenously determined.
It might be argued that older job changers face special disadvan
tages. Barnow and Ehrenberg (1979) show that one consequence of
backloaded pensions is that a firm©s pension costs are greater when it
hires older workers. It has also been argued that firms are unwilling to
invest in the specific training for older workers that they are willing to
provide for younger workers. Older workers are attached to the firm for
fewer years, and thus the firm has less time to recapture its investment
(Hutchens 1986). Because workers who share in the returns to specific
investment are also expected to invest in specific training, it is not clear
why the net present value of older job losers© compensation streams
should necessarily be reduced as a result of the firm©s unwillingness to
invest in their training. Indeed, if the older job mover were being
trained upon initial hire, shared investment activities would depress
rather than increase the observed wage. A possible explanation is that
workers are valuable to the firm only if the firm can also invest in their
specific training. Alternatively, there must be something else about the
relationship between the net wage paid to the worker and the type of
job that accounts for the decline in wages observed with turnover of
older workers.
There are interactions among these various models. The specific
training literature focuses our attention on job training at the beginning
of the period of employment (Oi 1983). However, as we will continue
to argue, it is unlikely that pensions create incentives that would allow
the firm to economize on hiring and training costs at the time of initial
hire. Others, such as Ippolito in the studies noted previously, argue that
training takes place throughout the period of job attachment. Thus,
pensions that discourage turnover among more mature workers are,
nevertheless, economizing on training costs. While new CPS data have
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become available on training activity by workers and there is useful
data from the National Longitudinal Surveys of Labor Market Experi
ence (NLS), we have no consensus on the distribution of specific train
ing over the course of job attachment. 22
In sum, the research has not yet clearly explained compensation dif
ferences in the labor market, particularly those differences between
jobs offering pensions and jobs without pensions. A better understand
ing of this phenomenon is needed in order to determine what mecha
nism accounts for the decline in compensation with turnover from
pension-covered jobs. The outstanding questions are fundamental to
labor economics, and we are not able to resolve them here.
In the remainder of the book we will present evidence that there is
an important omitted factor from studies of the relationship of pension
incentives to mobility. Further, the evidence suggests the omitted factor
is a compensation premium paid on pension-covered jobs. This chapter
has laid a foundation for that finding. It has suggested a number of
problems with the current literature on the pension-mobility relation
ship, and also indicates that payment of a wage premium on pensioncovered jobs is consistent with other findings in labor economics.
NOTES
1. The analysis in this chapter draws heavily on our own previous published work, Gustman
and Steinmeier 1993b, as well as on studies we have completed with Olivia Mitchell (Gustman
and Mitchell 1992 and Gustman, Mitchell, and Steinmeier 1993 and 1994).
2. There are other benefit formulas, such those typical in the union sector, in which a flat dollar
payment is given for each year of service. These dollar amounts are increased from one contract
to the next, so that the plans mimic pensions in which benefits are based on final average salary or
lifetime earnings. Workers who leave such plans early also suffer the analog of a pension capital
loss.
3. A central question is whether the firm©s pension liability should be the legal liability, in
which case the benefit accrued to date is the pension amount owed on the assumption that today is
the worker©s last day of employment. Alternatively, the pension liability could be calculated
assuming the worker continues employment at the firm; the pension liability would be evaluated
using the wage projected at the time of retirement. Under current actuarial practice, the projected
liability is used. Bulow (1982) argues for use of the legal liability concept, while Ippolito (1986)
argues for use of the projected liability and the existence of an implicit employment contract. For
calculations of the differences in the liabilities, which are a direct reflection of pension backloading, see Gustman and Steinmeier (1989a).
4. That is, the assumption that pensions are paid as a lump sum at the beginning of the retire
ment period, and that the equivalent of the lump-sum payment determined by a given wage his
tory does not vary with the inflation rate, is tantamount to assuming that benefits are fully indexed
after retirement. The evidence suggests that between one-third and one-half of benefits in retire-
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ment have been indexed (Alien, Clark, and Sumner 1986; Gustman and Steinmeier 1993a). The
data in chapter 2 are based on the assumption of partial indexing of benefits after retirement.
5. In the example, the individual would receive $45,000 (15 percent of $10,000 times 30)
upon retirement at 65. The present value of wages would be $300,000 (30 times $10,000). Thus,
the pension amounts to 15 percent of the value of his wages over the period, which would place
this individual at almost the 75th percentile among the actual SCF pension-covered workers in
table 2.3.
6. As we also note, some of those who did not have a pension on their initial job do find a pen
sion on their new jobs. For that reason, compensation gain is missed when it is assumed that pen
sion status remains unchanged with mobility.
7. According to table 2.3, median pension wealth for individuals in the 55-65 age range is
about 9 percent of wage wealth. This means that an individual with 25 years of covered employ
ment would have pension wealth equal to about 2.25 times annual earnings (.09 times 25). Thus a
loss of 23.3 percent of pension wealth would result in a loss of about 52 percent of annual earn
ings (.233 times 2.25).
8. Given these figures, the total value of the pension would be equal to 7.2 years of earnings
(12 times the 60 percent replacement rate if the worker does not leave the firm), or about 18 per
cent of the earnings over the working life (7.2 of 40 years). This compares to a median value of 9
percent for 55-65 year-old workers in table 2.3. For a worker who has been on the job for 15 years
and has another 15 years to go until retirement, the replacement rate would be 45 percent if the
worker continues in the same job until retirement and 36.75 percent if he or she changes jobs.
This produces a benefit loss of only 8 percent versus the considerably larger losses shown in table
3.2.
9. The estimates of backloading by Alien, Clark, and McDermed (1987) involve some under
statement. Specifically, their procedure does not catch the spikes in the accrual profile, which we
found in table 2.3 to be sizable. It also seems likely that pension generosity increased to some
degree between 1974 and 1983.
10. See Ross (1958) and the U.S. Department of Labor (1964).
1 1 . See also Ippolito (1987), among others.
12. For example, in the sample from the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP)
that we examine, one-year mobility rates were about 20 percent for those without pensions and 6
percent for those with pensions. Five-year mobility rates were 57.8 and 32.4 percent, respectively,
in the PSID.
13. Alien, Clark, and McDermed (1993).
14. To be more specific, the three equations estimated by Alien, Clark, and McDermed are as
follows, in the original notation:

TNi=$3l ^3i +£3(

where P* is a latent variable indicating the odds that a particular worker will be covered by a pen
sion; T*j and TN* are latent variables indicating the odds of leaving a job with a pension (P) and
without a pension (AO; X),-, A^,- and X^, are vectors of control variables; and TPi = Prob (Tpt > 0)
(Alien, Clark, and McDermed, 1993, p. 467). The error terms are normally distributed, with non
zero covariances between EJ/ and 82(- and between ej/ and £3/ , but, with zero covariance between
e2, and e3/.
15. It would be appropriate to adjust for differences in risk among sources of compensation,
but, due to unexpected turnover, potential income from backloading of pensions appears to be a
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highly risky element of compensation. Accordingly, failure to adjust for risk should lead to an
overstatement rather than an understatement of the importance of pension backloading as an influ
ence on mobility.
16. If this finding is accepted, a direct implication is that a single-equation mobility model
may be applied to an analysis of mobility from pension and nonpension jobs without causing bias.
This conclusion is consistent with the approach of Alien, Clark, and McDermed in examining the
relationship of pensions to quits and layoffs. The only requirement is that observable variables
associated with selection into pension-covered jobs be held constant.
17. In the Alien, Clark, and McDermed (1991) study, covering the 1975 to 1982 period, the
mean pension capital loss from turnover is $821 for those under age 25, $2,926 for those between
25 and 34, $6,526 for those between 35 and 44, and $8,503 for those 45 to 54.
18. Alien, Clark, and McDermed (1991) suggest that the negative effect of pensions on mobil
ity of younger workers is due to selection, in which stayers are more likely to accept pension-cov
ered jobs because they defer earnings, and that the effect of this self-selection is more likely to
show up at younger ages. This implies that young workers who are stayers must impute great
value to the expected pension, despite the very small cost of leaving the firm in the first few years
of employment. However, their own results show that expected pension capital loss has no effect
on selection into pension-covered jobs This suggests that if selection is important, it works when
those with the observable characteristics of stayers choose pension-covered jobs, whatever the
incentives from backloading.
19. Consistent with this view, Dorsey (1987) finds that, among manufacturing industries, the
probability of coverage by a defined contribution plan is positively related to the layoff rate in the
industry. This conclusion is also consistent with a view that firms reduce layoffs where there is an
obligation under the implicit contract.
20. Estimates of the relationship between coverage and turnover, even when standardizing for
plan type, provide only limited information about causality. Thus, in analyzing variation in the
pension-mobility relationship with firm size, Even and Macpherson (1992) conclude that"... once
the type of pension plan is controlled for, the effect of pensions on tenure varies less systemati
cally with employer size, though there is weak evidence that DB plans have a greater effect at
larger employers." More precise findings require use of direct information on plan incentives.
21. Related references on the efficiency wage controversy include Krueger and Summers
(1987, 1988), Dickens and Katz (1987), and Katz and Summers (1989).
22. For a recent survey of what is known from the NLS data about training over the life cycle,
see Light (1994).

Descriptive Data
and Multivariate Analyses
This chapter presents some basic descriptive findings pertaining to
the relationship between pensions, job mobility, and wages. These
results take the form of cross tabs and simple multivariate analyses and
suggest the following conclusions:
Workers on pension-covered jobs exhibit lower turnover than those
on nonpension jobs.
Workers with pensions have higher wages and thus even higher
compensation than those without pensions.
Wage losses are greater for movers from pension-covered than
from nonpension jobs.
Movers from jobs with pensions are more likely than movers from
jobs without pensions to locate a pension on their new jobs. Never
theless, when pensions are considered, they increase the relative
compensation loss for movers from pension jobs and raise the com
pensation gain for movers from nonpension jobs.
Defined contribution plans, which are not backloaded, have the
same negative association with mobility as do defined benefit
plans, which are backloaded.

The Data
The data used in this chapter are from three surveys: (1) the 1983
Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF), which has retrospective data to
analyze mobility between 1978 and 1983; (2) the Survey of Income
and Program Participation (SIPP), which has panel data covering
mobility over the period from 1984 to 1985; and (3) the Panel Study of
Income Dynamics (PSID), which has panel data on mobility from
1984 and 1989. 1
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The data available in the three surveys are not comparable along a
number of dimensions. The SCF is the only one of the surveys to have
a matched employer-provided description of the pension plan attached
to the survey responses of covered workers. These were obtained by
asking the survey respondent the name of the employer and by then
writing to the employer or searching U.S. Department of Labor files
for the plan description. For the SIPP and PSID data, plan descriptions
are matched on the basis of job characteristics from the sample of SCF
plan descriptions. All three surveys indicate whether the individual is
covered by a pension; however, the SCF and SIPP are the only surveys
to contain usable self-reported information on plan type, along with
other pension characteristics as described by the covered individual.
The PSID collected information on plan type and other details of the
pension from covered individuals, but it did so only for those age 45
and over. As a result, self-reported pension information is missing for
most of the age range of interest for our mobility analysis. On the other
hand, information on the reason for separation is available for the full
sample in the PSID, but it is only selectively available in the other sur
veys, if at all.2
The SCF observations are based on interviews in 1983, which
obtained retrospective information on job history. The base period was
1978. The survey asked about the wage and other characteristics of the
1978 job only if that job involved a pension or if it was the individual©s
longest prior job. Given this format, information on the wage and char
acteristics of the 1978 job is unavailable for some individuals. Accord
ingly, some of the simple base-period descriptive relationships can be
calculated only for the true panels (SIPP and PSID) and not for the
SCF data. Although censoring limits the availability of descriptive sta
tistics for the retrospective SCF data, the structural analysis corrects
for this problem econometrically and thus allows consistent estimation
of compensation and its components on the 1978 job.
For the SIPP sample, the first interview was in 1983. The 1983 panel
was interviewed every four months for two and a half years. The fourth
and seventh interviews, conducted one year apart in 1984 and 1985,
contain topical modules with questions pertaining to the individual©s
pension. Those interviews are the ones used here. For all individuals in
the survey, the fourth interview covers a period in 1984, and the sev-
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enth covers a period in 1985. Some supplementary information from
the third, fifth, and sixth interviews is also utilized.
The PSID sample works with information that was collected pri
marily in 1984 and 1989, although again some use is made of informa
tion collected in the intervening years (such as the reason for leaving
the 1984 job, if that occurred). The 1984 and 1989 interviews provide
information on current pension coverage, which is not available for
any of the intermediate years.
Males were selected in each sample who were 31-50 years old at the
beginning of the sample period. 3 To be eligible for selection, individu
als had to be employed for at least 30 hours per week in private sector,
nonagricultural firms at the beginning of the period. The study exam
ines the mobility of prime-aged workers. 4 It does not consider the
mobility of younger workers who are in the early stages of job search,
nor does it consider the age range in which job change may be related
to retirement or contemplation of retirement.
Four potential sources of differences among the surveys may be
noted. First, the surveys cover different years. There is evidence that
mobility at the end of the 1980s was different from mobility in earlier
years.5 The data are not sufficient for us to separate the effects of the
survey year on the outcomes of interest, but it may be that differences
in the results between the PSID and the two other surveys are partly a
reflection of differences in the year of the survey. 6 Second, the period
over which mobility is measured is shorter in the SIPP sample. Less
mobility is observable over a shorter period, and those workers with
multiple separations receive more weight in a shorter than in a longer
period.7 Third, SCF job change information is based on retrospective
data, while for the PSID and SIPP, true panel data are available. 8
Fourth, the employer-provided pension information, which is not dis
cussed in this chapter but is used in the structural analysis of chapters 6
and 7, is obtained from the individual©s employer in the SCF but must
be matched on the basis of other reported characteristics in the PSID or
SIPP.9
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The Findings
Turnover
Table 4.1 presents descriptive data on mobility, wages, and pensions
using information from the three surveys. 10 Relative mobility from nonpension jobs is considerably higher than it is from pension jobs in each
of the surveys, but the differences in mobility rates are much larger in
the retrospective SCF data than they are in the panel data sets. The
descriptive statistics from the SCF presented in table 4.1 suggest that
males 31-50 years old without pensions are over six times as likely to
move as those with pensions (59.1 percent versus 8.6 percent). SIPP
data indicate that individuals initially without pensions are over three
times more likely (19.5 percent versus 6.1 percent) to move from the
1984 job than are individuals with pensions. The PSID data exhibit
turnover rates of 57.8 percent for those in a nonpension job and 32.4
percent for those in a pension job over a five-year period, indicating a
slightly less than two-to-one ratio of mobility rates in accordance with
pension status.
The relative differences among surveys in mobility rates of those
without pensions are not large, considering that the SCF and PSID both
cover five-year periods, while the SIPP covers only a one-year period.
They are particularly close between the PSID and SCF samples, which
calculate mobility over a five-year period. Differences in the relative
mobility rates among pension-covered workers are more substantial. It
is possible that differences in the time periods covered may account for
some of the discrepancies. An alternative explanation is that the SCF
asked specifically about any previous job with a pension. If the job his
tory did not include 1978, the individual was presumed to have been
working in a nonpension job at that time. If individuals who left pen
sion jobs held in 1978 did not report those jobs (this question was at
the tail end of a job history section), the mobility rate from pension
jobs would be biased downward.
Table 4.2 presents estimates of the relationship between pension
coverage and mobility from multivariate equations relating turnover to
pension coverage." These equations allow us to standardize for the
effects of observable differences among individuals that may be corre-
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Table 4.1 Mobility, Wages, and Pension Data for Males 31 to 50 Years
Old, from the SCF, SIPP, and PSID
Pension in initial
No pension
in initial job
job
Survey
Stayers Movers Stayers Movers

1978-83 SCFa
Number of movers and stayers
Percent movers
Mean wage in 1978 (initial job)
Mean wage in 1983
Percent with pension in 1983
1984-85 SIPPb
Number of movers and stayers
Percent movers
Mean wage in 1984 (initial job)
Mean wage in 1985
Percent with pension in 1985
Primary 1984 plan was defined
benefit
1984-89 PSIDc
Number of movers and stayers
Percent movers
Mean wage in 1984 (initial job)
Mean wage in 1989
Percent with pension in 1989

153
106
59.1 %
$8.93
$8.19
$9.11
d
38.6%
d

338

32

$11.91
d
d

8.6%
$12.63
$10.30
43.8%

195
803
19.5%
$7.72
$8.71
$8.23
$8.86
13.8%
d

107
6.1%
$11.88 $11.22
$11.89 $10.52
35.8%
d

d

d

118
79
57.8%
$9.35
$9.19
$9.12
$9.95
37.0%
d

1,646

64.3%

63.6%

126
263
32.4%
$12.92 $11.85
$13.09 $10.59
53.2%
d

a. Data from the SCF are based on the authors© computations. Wages are indexed to 1983 by the
Index of Hourly Earnings (1988 Economic Report of the President, table B-44).
b. SIPP figures are from Gustman and Steinmeier (1993b, table 1), and from our own
computations. Wages are indexed to 1984 by the Index of Hourly Earnings (1988 Economic

Report of the President, table B-44).
c. Data from the PSID are based on the authors© computations. Wages are indexed to 1984 by the
Wage and Salary Employment Cost Index (1991 Economic Report of the President, table B-45).
d. Not applicable.
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lated with pension coverage and account for some of the observed dif
ferences in mobility between workers with and without pensions. As
can be seen, the relationship between pension coverage and mobility is
significant in all three probits. According the SCF retrospective data,
those workers with pensions are 57 percent less likely to show turnover
than those without pensions. The SIPP data indicate that the difference
in turnover is 9 percent at the means for the one-year period covered.
In the PSID panel, the turnover rate is 21 percent lower for pensioncovered workers. Thus, the negative relationship of pension coverage
to turnover is much stronger in the retrospective SCF data.
Table 4.2 Effects of Pension Coverage in Reduced Form Mobility
Equations
1978-83 SCF
1984-85 SIPP
1984-89 PSID
_____(10.90)___________(6.50)___________(4.24)_____
NOTES: Dependent variable is 1 if the individual separates and is 0 otherwise. Entries are probit
marginal effects of the probability of separation for males age 31-50 in the initial year. Absolute
values of asymptotic t statistics are given in parentheses. Other independent variables in the
equations are indicated in appendix table 4.3.

Wages and Compensation
Line 3 of each panel of table 4.1 indicates the wages for movers and
stayers, classified by pension coverage on their initial jobs. The results
based on SCF data suggest that, in their initial jobs, stayers with pen
sions earned about 45 percent more than did stayers without pensions.
In the SIPP data, stayers with pensions earned 36 percent more than
stayers without pensions in their initial jobs, while in the PSID data
they earned 41 percent more. Movers from pension-covered employ
ment earned 45 percent more in their initial jobs than movers from
nonpension jobs in the SIPP, and 27 percent more in the PSID. In the
SCF data, the differential was 41 percent. Were the pensions evaluated,
as they are in later chapters, and the value of the pension added to the
wage differential, the resulting compensation margin in favor of pen
sion-covered workers would be even wider.
There is an obvious question about the wage differentials between
those workers with and without pensions. Are these wage differentials
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due to individual characteristics that enhance productivity, or do work
ers in pension-covered jobs receive wage premiums that may affect
mobility? That is, to what extent, if any, will the higher wages of pen
sion-covered workers on their initial jobs carry over into their opportu
nities on alternative jobs?
Suppose that the entire compensation differential between workers
with and without pensions were due to individual characteristics, such
as unmeasured ability. In this circumstance, the compensation on any
alternative job would be identical to the compensation on the current
job. We should not find, as we do, that pension workers face worse
alternatives (relative to their current jobs) than nonpension workers.
Consider the other extreme. Suppose that compensation on the cur
rent job were entirely a reflection of the job rather than the person.
Equivalent workers would be paid more on some jobs (e.g., pension
jobs) than on others (e.g., nonpension jobs), either as a result of rent
sharing or because of some productivity-enhancing scheme that calls
for above-market wages. 12 In this case, the compensation difference
between the pension and nonpension workers would indicate the dif
ference in mobility disincentives among otherwise identical workers.
Indeed, in a mobility equation the compensation level on the current
job would standardize appropriately for any difference in mobility
incentives facing workers on different jobs. 13
It is possible, of course, that the compensation of workers on their
current jobs is due to a mix of both explanations, unmeasured individ
ual characteristics and differences in the compensation offered to oth
erwise identical workers. To isolate the incentive for mobility between
the current job and other jobs, one would need an explicit estimate of
all the factors shaping differences between the current and the opportu
nity wage. Information on the current wage alone would not be suffi
cient to control for the compensation differential associated with
moving.
Tables 4.3 and 4.4 present estimates of standard wage equations for
the initial period in the two panel data sets. 14 The first two equations are
for workers in nonpension and pension jobs, respectively, and the final
equation is for the whole sample. The coefficients for the pension vari
ables in the two data sets indicate that workers in pension jobs receive
over 16 percent more in wages in the SIPP, holding observable charac-

Table 4.3 Estimates of Wage Equations from the SIPP Data

Variable
Job characteristics
Pension
Union
Firm size > 100
Industry
Mining
Construction
Nondurable manufacturing
Transportation, communication & public
utilities
Wholesale trade
Retail trade
Finance, insurance & real estate
Services
Personal characteristics
Experience (x 0.01)
Experience squared (x 0.001)
Tenure (x 0.01)

Jobs
without pensions

Estimate (t statistic)
Jobs
with pensions

All jobs

0.173
0.023

(3.29)
(0.68)

0.001
0.060

(0.05)
(2.39)

0.164
0.060
0.044

(8.00)
(2.85)
(2.19)

0.039
0.048
0.009

(0.24)
(0.76)
(0.15)

0.078
0.307
-0.068

(1.03)
(7.16)
(2.44)

0.066
0.175
-0.042

(0.92)
(5.00)
(1.56)

0.000
-0.038
-0.238
0.062
-0.165

(0.00)
(0.57)
(4.31)
(0.79)
(3.13)

0.037
-0.053
-0.206
0.055
-0.137

(1.22)
(1-39)
(5.75)
(1.26)
(3.95)

0.031
-0.035
-0.217
0.071
-0.113

(1.06)
(1.04)
(7.23)
(1.81)
(4.98)

0.910
-0.179
3.744

(0.85)
(1.41)
(2.43)

0.103
-0.044
0.147

(0.14)
(0.54)
(0.18)

0.417
-0.087
1.531

(0.70)
(1.26)
(2.20)

a

a

Tenure squared (x 0.001)
Education (xO.l)
Education squared (x 0.01)
Experience * education (x 0.001)
Tenure * education (x 0.001)
Married
Poor health
Black
Region
North Central
South
West
Constant
R2
Number of observations

-0.649
-0.434
0.494
0.503
-1.278
0.090
0.024
-0.168

(2.09)
(1.36)
(4.50)
(0.70)
(1.23)
(2.26)
(0.34)
(2.60)

-0.368
-0.261
0.245
0.433
1.318
0.066
-0.194
-0.187

(2.55)
(1.33)
(3.60)
(0.94)
(2.62)
(2.45)
(4.48)
(4.86)

-0.425
-0.204
0.307
0.441
0.273
0.074
-0.115
-0.182

(3.25)
(1.22)
(5.25)
(1.13)
(0.62)
(3.29)
(3.07)
(5.40)

-0.041
-0.044
0.057
1.533

(0.86)
(0.99)
(1.13)
(5.74)

-0.040
-0.026
0.036
2.045

(1.62)
(1.01)
(1.25)
(11.69)

-0.038
-0.040
0.047
1.639

(1.68)
(1.76)
(1.85)
(11.30)

0.262
870

0.262
1,677

0.315
2,547

NOTES: Absolute t statistics are in parentheses. Dependent variable is natural log of the hourly wage. Durable manufacturing is the omitted industry.
a. Not applicable.

Table 4.4 Estimates of Wage Equations from the PSID Data

Variable
Job characteristics
Pension
Union
Industry
Mining
Construction
Transportation, communication & public
utilities
Trade
Finance, insurance & real estate
Services
Personal characteristics
Experience (x 0.01)
Experience squared (x 0.001)
Tenure (x 0.01)
Tenure squared (x 0.001)
Education (xO.l)
Education squared (x 0.01)

Jobs
without pensions

Estimate (t statistic)
Jobs
with pensions

All jobs

0.362

(2.98)

-0.001

(0.04)

0.143
0.050

(4.24)
(1.40)

0.096
0.259

(0.48)
(2.73)

0.146
0.138

(1.07)
(1.97)

0.105
0.179

(0.94)
(3.30)

0.065
-0.101
0.239
-0.069

(0.65)
(1.23)
(1.49)
(0.78)

0.105
-0.171
-0.096
-0.196

(2.51)
(3.32)
(1.13)
(3.63)

0.111
-0.153
-0.008
-0.137

(2.86)
(3.55)
(0.11)
(3.00)

3.000
-0.699
-1.861
0.046
-1.457
0.966

(0.86)
(1.55)
(0.67)
(0.10)
(1.17)
(2.36)

0.943
-0.167
1.194
-0.129
-0.901
0.617

(0.52)
(0.68)
(0.83)
(0.66)
(1.49)
(3.16)

1.166
-0.203
1.525
-0.184
-0.681
0.596

(0.72)
(0.94)
(1.30)
(1.04)
(1.27)
(3.45)

a

a

Experience * education (x 0.001)
Tenure * education (x 0.001)
Married
Poor health
Black
Region
Northeast
South
West
SMSA
Constant
R2
Number of observations

0.194
1.993
-0.015
0.160
-0.271

(0.11)
(1.04)
(0.21)
(1.35)
(1.86)

0.479
-0.094
0.013
-0.193
-0.215

(0.48)
(0.10)
(0.24)
(3.04)
(3.13)

0.353
-0.188
0.020
-0.120
-0.207

(0.42)
(0.24)
(0.47)
(2.13)
(3.32)

0.093
-0.118
-0.099
0.165
2.042

(1.08)
(1.55)
(1.07)
(2.73)
(2.00)

0.058
-0.063
0.059
0.086
2.260

(1-39)
(1.57)
(1.25)
(2-59)
(4.50)

0.064
-0.091
0.022
0.096
1.819

(1.68)
(2.55)
(0.51)
(3.28)
(4.04)

0.488
193

0.392
477

0.442
670

NOTES: Absolute t statistics are in parentheses. Dependent variable is natural log of the hourly wage. Manufacturing is the omitted industry,
a. Not applicable.
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teristics of the individual and the job constant, while for the PSID the
comparable figure is over 14 percent. These figures are fairly typical
for wage regressions of this type. It is, of course, an open question as to
whether the higher wage for pension-covered jobs is economic rent or
is compensation for unobservable worker characteristics not correlated
with the observable variables.
These wage equations, along with analogous equations estimated
for 1983 for the SCF, provide the experience and tenure coefficients
needed to project wages. This projection, in turn, provides the basis for
the compensation amounts used later in the analysis (and previously in
the descriptive tables 2.3 and 2.4). For the SIPP, standard statistical
tests indicate that the wage equations for workers with and without
pensions are significantly different from one another, so separate equa
tions are used in the later analysis. For the PSID, the test for differ
ences between the equations for those with and without pensions is on
the margin at 5 percent significance, and further tests indicate that the
interaction terms between experience, tenure, and education are not
jointly significant. 15 In view of the relatively small number of observa
tions in the equation for workers without pensions, the combined equa
tion is (without the interaction terms) employed to obtain the
compensation amounts.

Wage Changes for Movers
We now turn to the data on wage changes for movers. The fourth
line in each panel in table 4.1 indicates the wages at the end of the
period, and a comparison of these figures with the third line yields the
wage changes over the period. 16 Figure 4.1 depicts the changes in the
wages for movers from pension and nonpension jobs in all three sur
veys, as calculated from the data in table 4.1.
Movers from pension jobs in all three surveys experience losses,
while there are gains to movers from nonpension jobs in the SCF and
the SIPP, and much smaller losses to movers from nonpension than
pension jobs in the PSID. (Stayers in the two panel data sets, both
those initially with and without pensions, experience small wage
gains.) Relative to the wage in their old jobs, movers from nonpension
jobs fare 8.1 percentage points better than movers from pension jobs in
the PSID. In the SIPP, they fare 12.8 percentage points better, while in
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the SCF, they fare a whopping 20.4 percentage points better. These
descriptive data certainly suggest that those who leave pension jobs
fare relatively worse than do those who leave nonpension jobs.
Figure 4.1

Wage Changes for Movers

1978-83 SCF

1984-85 SIPP

From jobs without pensions

1984-89 PSID

From jobs with pensions

Pensions and Compensation Changes for Movers
An additional outcome of interest is the relative success of movers
from pension-covered employment and of movers from jobs that did
not initially offer a pension in securing new jobs that provide a pen
sion. From the fifth row of each of the panels in table 4.1, it can be seen
that 36 to 53 percent of those who left a pension job located new
employment that included a pension. This means that about half of
those who left a pension job lost pension coverage on their new job. On
the other hand, 14 to 39 percent of those who left a nonpension job
gained a pension coverage. The net effect of considering pensions in
compensation change is to increase the relative compensation loss for
movers from pension jobs and the compensation gains for those who
left nonpension jobs.
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Calculations from the 1983 SCF suggests that pensions are worth an
average of 12.9 percent of compensation until retirement. In the SIPP,
13.8 percent of movers from jobs without pensions found pensions on
their new jobs. The effect is to increase the size of the average compen
sation gain by 1.8 percentage points (13.8 percent of 12.9 percent). As
compared to the wage gain of 6.6 percent, the compensation gain is 8.4
percent. Analogously, 35.8 percent of those who left a pension job
locate a pension on their new job, which means that 62.4 percent do
not. For these workers, consideration of pensions widens a wage loss
of 6.2 percent to a compensation loss of 15.5 percent (6.2 percent plus
64.2 percent of 12.9 percent). For the PSID, movers from jobs without
pensions have a compensation gain of 2.3 percent (-2.5 percent plus
37.0 percent of 12.9 percent), while workers who leave a pension job
suffer a compensation loss of 16.6 percent (-10.6 percent minus 46.8
percent of 12.9 percent). For the SCF, the two figures are a 7.0 percent
gain and a 29.6 percent loss for movers from jobs with and without
pensions, respectively. For both the SIPP and the PSID, the effect of
pensions approximately doubles the differential between pension and
nonpension movers in the PSID and the SIPP.
Multivariate results for success in finding pensions in the new job
tell much the same story. For those who have changed jobs, the partial
relationships from multivariate equations between pension coverage on
the initial job and on the new job are reported in table 4.5. 17 These
Table 4.5 Effects of Pension Coverage in Initial Job on Pension Coverage
in New Job
Estimate (t statistic)
1984-85
1984-89
____________________SIPP___________PSID_____
Pension coverage
0.117 (1.79)
0.121 (1.61) ~
NOTES: Table entries are marginal effects from probit estimates. Absolute values of asymptotic
t statistics are in parentheses. Dependent variable is 1 if the individual has a pension in the final
year and is 0 otherwise.

results indicate the difference in net outcomes associated with having a
pension on the original job. They suggest that, in both the SIPP and the
PSID data, a person who moved from a pension job was only about 12
percent more likely to have obtained a new job that offered a pension. 18
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The comparable differences in table 4.1 were 22 percent (35.8 percent
minus 13.8 percent) in the SIPP data and 16 percent (53.2 percent
minus 37 percent) in the PSID data. Since the multivariate results sug
gest that movers from pension jobs have marginal effects of 12 percent
relative to movers from nonpension jobs in finding new employment
with pensions, the gap calculated in the previous few paragraphs would
be, if anything, understated.
Association of Defined Contribution Plans with Mobility
For the SIPP panel data, the fraction of pension-covered workers
whose initial pension is a defined benefit plan, the most common type
of primary plan, is reported in the last row of the middle section of
table 4.1. 19 In that data set, almost two-thirds of the primary plans for
those initially covered in 1984 are defined benefit.
Table 4.6 further examines descriptive data from the SIPP. It disag
gregates the results for pension-covered workers according to whether
the coverage was by a defined benefit or defined contribution plan.
Because the SIPP question sequence on plan type is atypical, two sets
of results are included for defined contribution plans. Respondents
were first asked, "Is _©s (basic) retirement plan a profit-sharing plan?"
If they responded no, they were then asked, "Are the retirement bene
fits of _©s (basic) pension plan determined by years of service and pay
or by the amount of contributions to the plan?" In the first set of
defined contribution results, respondents are classified as having
defined contribution plans if they answered yes to the initial question
or chose the second alternative of the second question. Another set of
defined contribution results is limited to only those respondents who
had nonprofit-sharing defined contribution plans (i.e., those who
responded no to the first question and chose the second alternative to
the second question). These plans comprise only about 10 percent of
the total plans, and hence should be relatively uncontaminated by misclassified defined benefit plans.
According to the SIPP data in table 4.6, workers with defined contri
bution plans are slightly more mobile than workers with defined benefit
plans (6.2 percent or 6.9 percent versus 6.0 percent), but the differ
ences are not significant. In terms of wages, the patterns of workers
covered by defined benefit and nonprofit-sharing defined contribution
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plans are very similar, with movers suffering around a 10 percent wage
loss in both cases. For workers under profit-sharing plans, the pattern is
slightly different. Movers from these plans appear to come from lower
levels in the wage distribution and do not suffer any wage loss in their
new jobs. However, this group has the lowest mobility rate of all (5.9
percent for the profit-sharing plans only), indicating that just a small
number of these workers found better alternative jobs.
Table 4.6 Wages, Pensions, and Mobility by Pension Status and Plan
Type in the Initial Survey: SIPP
Movers

Stayers

Pension type
Defined benefit pension in 1984 job

(1,126)

a

a

6.0%

Mean wage in 1984

$11.95

(960)

$11.94

(58)

Mean wage in 1985

$11.94

(960)

$10.81

(58)

a

a

42.9%

(63)

Percent movers

Percent with 1985 pension

Defined contribution pension in 1984 job (including profit-sharing plans)
a

a

6.2%

(627)

Mean wage in 1984

$11.73

(530)

$9.94

(30)

Mean wage in 1985

$11.82

(530)

$9.96

(30)

a

a

21.9%

(32)

Percent movers

Percent with 1985 pension

Defined contribution pension in 1984 job (excluding profit-sharing plans)
(174)

a

a

6.9%

Mean wage in 1984

$11.53

(149)

$12.03

(8)

Mean wage in 1985

$11.44

(149)

$10.70

(8)

a

a

22.2%

(9)

Percent movers

Percent with 1985 pension

NOTES: Figures in parentheses are numbers of observations. Wages are indexed to 1984 dollars
by the Index of Average Hourly Earnings (1989 Economic Report of the President, table B-44)
and are included in the means only if valid wage observations are available in both years. Means
are geometric means (i.e., antilogs of mean log wages). Wages less than $1 or greater than $50
are excluded from the analysis,
a. Not applicable.

Table 4.7 presents estimates of the relationship of plan type to
mobility in the context of a probit equation formulated with SIPP data.

Table 4.7 Pension Effects from Mobility Equations Using SIPP Panel Data
Estimate (t statistic)
Pension explanatory variables
Equation 1
Equation 2
Equation 3
Pension coverage
-0.090
(6.50)
Defined benefit pension
-0.092
-0.092
(5.86)
(5.87)
Defined contribution pension
-0.087
(4.93)
Profit-sharing pension
-0.090
(4.51)
Nonprofit-sharing pension
-0.080
(2.70)
Log-likelihood
-748.34
-748.25
-748.31
Number of observations
2,545
2,545
2,545
NOTES: The dependent variable is job separation. Entries are marginal responses in probit estimates. Numbers in parentheses are absolute values of
asymptotic t statistics. Additional explanatory variables are age, education, experience, years until expected retirement, with binary variables for
manufacturing, white collar, management, union status, firm size over 100, race, marital status, children under 18, home ownership, and residence in a
Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area (SMSA).
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Analogous results are presented in table 4.8 for the retrospective SCF
data. The first column in each table gives the marginal effect of the
pension coverage variable in a probit equation that also relates mobility
to personal and job characteristics.20 The job characteristics in the SIPP
data refer to the initial job; in the SCF data, they refer to the longest
job. In the SIPP data, union status and work experience are as of the
end of the period covered by the third interview, while the other vari
ables pertain to the beginning of the period covered by the fourth inter
view.
Table 4.8 Pension Effects from Mobility Equations Using SCF
Retrospective Data
Estimate (t statistic)
Pension explanatory variables
Equation 1
Equation 2
Pension coverage
-0.57
(10.90)
Defined benefit pension
-0.61
(10.23)
Defined contribution pension
-0.69
(3.77)
Log-likelihood
-242.21
-239.85
Number of observations
581
581
NOTES: The dependent variable is job separation. Table entries are estimated marginal effects
of a probit model. Numbers in parentheses are absolute values of asymptotic i-statistics.

The marginal effect of a simple pension coverage variable is highly
significant in this equation. Indeed, the pension variable has by far the
most powerful impact on mobility behavior of any of the variables
considered. In the case of the SIPP data, evaluated at the means, pen
sions are associated with a 9 percentage point reduction in one-year
mobility rates, which is two-thirds of the pension/nonpension mobility
differential. For the five-year mobility rate in the SCF data, pension
coverage is associated with a 57 percentage point difference in mobil
ity.
The second columns of data in tables 4.7 and 4.8 report marginal
effects from an equation that separates the pension variable according
to whether the pension is defined benefit or defined contribution. To the
extent that the impact of pensions on mobility operates through backloading, defined contribution plans should not exhibit any effect since
they are not backloaded (see table 2.4). Nevertheless, in both data sets,
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the coefficients of the defined benefit and defined contribution vari
ables are each highly significant and are almost identical in magnitude,
and a formal test of the hypothesis that they are equal is not rejected at
almost any level of significance.
The third column appears only in table 4.7, which is for the SIPP
data. That column refers to results separating the defined contribution
variable into profit-sharing plans and nonprofit-sharing plans, as dis
cussed previously. Again, there is little evidence of a strong differential
effect of defined benefit and defined contribution plans on mobility.
These results are not what one would expect if backloading were an
important factor in the differential mobility rates from pension versus
nonpension jobs, and they raise further questions about the cause of
any relationship found between pension backloading and mobility.

Overview of Descriptive Results
Cross tabs and simple multivariate analyses from three surveys
point to the conclusions that wages are higher on jobs offering pen
sions than on jobs that do not offer pensions, that compensation differ
ences are even wider, and that there are systematic relationships
between pension coverage, compensation level, and mobility. Movers
from pension jobs experience large losses in wages and larger losses in
compensation. In contrast, movers from nonpension jobs experience
wage gains in two of the three surveys and a small wage loss in the
third, with compensation gains in all three surveys. Contrary to the pre
dictions of models in which pension backloading accounts for the dif
ference in mobility between workers who are covered by pensions and
those who are not, defined contribution plans are just as likely to be
associated with reduced mobility as are defined benefit plans. Thus, the
results suggest both that compensation is higher on pension-covered
jobs and that it is the higher compensation, rather than pension backloading, that is associated with lower mobility from these jobs.
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NOTES
1. When we analyzed the panel data from the 1986 SCF in a report to the U.S. Department of
Labor (Gustman and Steinmeier 1990), we found the attrition bias from the survey to be severe
and systematic, so as to affect the reliability of the resulting analysis. The panel from the 1989
SCF was not available at the time of writing this book.
2. Analysis with the SIPP data indicated that the subsample for which the reason for turnover
was available was not representative of the full sample. See our report to the U.S. Labor Depart
ment (Gustman and Steinmeier 1990).
3. The data analysis in this book is confined to males in order to avoid the complicating effects
of career interruptions.
4. Mobility is considered to have occurred for an individual if there was a separation from the
initial job and a new job was started by the beginning of the last period covered in the survey. In
the SCF, this occurred if the individual©s current job (or last job, if not currently employed) began
after 1978. In the SIPP, it occurred if, in the intervening interviews, the individual clearly indi
cated that he had stopped working at one job and had started another. (The SIPP provides job
numbers, but these are unreliable indicators as to whether or not jobs in two different interviews
were the same.) In the PSID, mobility occurred if the current job as of 1989 began after 1984 or if
the individual reported that he separated from his previous employer in any of the intervening sur
veys. For all of the surveys, individuals who did not hold jobs in the initial year were dropped
from the sample.
5. Farber (1993) finds that there is some evidence that job displacement was different between
the late and the early 1980s. In the later period, displacement was more likely to affect those in
nonmanufacturing and to affect older workers with less tenure.
6. In an attempt to provide a comparable analysis with the PSID and SIPP data, we also esti
mated the mobility model for a two-year period with the PSID data. However, with fewer observa
tions on mobility, the estimating procedure does not converge for the shorter period.
7. Thus, the SCF and PSID data will be used to calculate mobility over a five-year period.
Given the limited number of observations in the SCF and the PSID and the availability of pension
information in the PSID only for 1984 and 1989, it is not practical to analyze mobility for either
survey over the shorter, one-year period analyzed with the SIPP data. On the other hand, the SIPP
data are not available for the longer period.
8. Another potential source of differences in outcomes is attrition. Attrition equations are pre
sented for the panel data from the SIPP and PSID in the appendix to this chapter. Major differ
ences in attrition are not apparent. However, there is no attrition in the retrospective survey,
although there is censoring of some data in the base period, which is discussed in this chapter.
9. As the discussion in chapter 3 indicates, previous studies of mobility that estimated pension
backloading and related backloading to mobility also did not have direct measures of pension
backloading available. These studies had to match pension incentives to individuals on the basis
of industry and other characteristics reported by the respondent.
10. Further descriptive statistics for the SIPP and PSID are in appendix tables 4.1 and 4.2.
Because not all initial jobs are observed in the retrospective SCF, a corresponding table cannot be
calculated for that data set.
11. The full results underlying table 4.2 in the text are reported in appendix table 4.3.
12. To the extent that additional compensation reflects a reward for additional effort, the dis
utility of the additional effort should be netted out of current compensation.
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13. Alien, Clark, and McDermed (1991) attempt to standardize for the opportunities facing
different workers on alternative jobs by including the current wage and human capital indicators
in the mobility equation.
14. Given the censoring of some wage observations in the initial period for the retrospective
SCF data, a simple estimate of a wage equation is not presented.
15. The F statistic for the hypothesis that the coefficients of the two equations are equal is
1.88, which is almost exactly the same as the 5 percent critical value of 1.89 for F(20,628). The F
statistic for excluding the two interaction terms in the combined equation is 0.09.
16. In the retrospective data, wage changes are observable only for movers; even then, there is
some censoring of observations for those who moved during the period. Accordingly, in evaluat
ing these descriptive numbers, it must be remembered that the data are not fully representative and
are not adjusted for selectivity bias and censoring, as are the compensation estimates made while
fitting the full econometric models in chapter 6.
17. The full multivariate results are reported in appendix table 4.4.
18. Referring now only to the SIPP data, the pension figures for the new job are limited to
individuals who report participation in a pension plan at the time of the 1985 survey. Including
those who are not participating because they "have not worked for the employer long enough"
raises to 20.6 percent the share of movers from nonpension jobs who gained pensions in their new
jobs and reduces to 55.8 percent the proportion of movers from pension jobs who lost their pen
sions.
19. Again, the PSID data do not indicate plan type for the age range covered by the study.
20. The full results for the first equations of both tables are presented in appendix table 4.3.
The other equations use the same explanatory variables, except that the pension variable is split as
indicated.
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Appendix Table 4.1 Descriptive Statistics for SIPP Movers and Stayers
Estimate (Observations)
No pension in 1984
Pension in
Variable
Stayers
Stayers
Movers
Wages and pensions
1984 log wage
2.164 (654)
2.474 (1,490)
2.044 (133)
1985 log wage
2.182 (654)
2.108 (133)
2.476 (1,490)
1985 pension
0.0 (803)
13.8 (160)
100.0 (1,646)
a
1984 defined benefit plan
64.3 (1,646)
a
a
a
1984 defined contribution plan
35.7 (1,646)
a
a
1984 multiple plans
8.8 (1,646)
a
a
1985 defined benefit plan
54.5 (22)
a
a
1985 defined contribution plan
45.5 (22)
a
a
1985 multiple plans
13.6 (22)
Personal characteristics
Black
7.,5 (803)
6.,7 (195)
7.0 (1 ,646)
Age
38.4 (803)
37, 6 (195)
39.8 (1 ,646)
Experience
20.4 (1 ,608)
17,,7 (186)
18,,8 (773)
Expected retirement age
64,,2 (264)
(757)
64, 9 (53)
62.3
Education
12,,7 (195)
13.3 (1 ,646)
12,,7 (802)
Married
77..8 (803)
75. 9 (195)
85.7 (1 ,646)
Children
63, 1 (195)
66.6 (1 ,646)
60,,8 (803)

1984
Movers
2.418 (88)
2.353 (88)
35.8 (95)
63.6 (107)
36.4 (107)
9.3 (107)
73.5 (34)
26.5 (34)
5.9 (34)
2.8
39.3
18.8
63.3
13.3
89.7
67.3

(107)
(107)
(101)
(41)
(107)
(107)
(107)

Job characteristics
Firm size: < 25 employees
25-99
100+
Union
SMSA
Blue collar
White collar
Management & professional
Mining
Construction
Durable manufacturing
Nondurable manufacturing
Transportation, communication, and
public utilities
Wholesale trade
Retail trade
Finance, insurance & real estate
Services

37.4
20.9
41.7
11.9
52.6
49.6
10.6
39.9
1.1
9.5
18.6
9.7

(803)
(803)
(803)
(731)
(803)
(803)
(803)
(803)
(803)
(803)
(803)
(803)

39.5
21.0
39.5
8.9
60.0
57.4
11.8
30.8
0.5
20.0
20.0
10.3

(195)
(195)
(195)
(168)
(195)
(195)
(195)
(195)
(195)
(195)
(195)
(195)

8.1
9.7
82.3
35.1
54.6
45.0
11.4
43.6
1.4
5.2
29.4
16.9

(1,646)
(1,646)
(1,646)
(1,591)
(1,646)
(1,646)
(1,646)
(1,646)
(1,642)
(1,642)
(1,642)
(1,642)

9.3
20.6
70.1
35.0
52.3
41.1
13.1
45.8
3.8
17.9
17.9
17.0

(107)
(107)
(107)
(100)
(107)
(107)
(107)
(107)
(106)
(106)
(106)
(106)

9.6
8.1
15.8
6.1
21.5

(803)
(803)
(803)
(803)
(803)

8.2
3.6
15.9
4.6
16.9

(195)
(195)
(195)
(195)
(195)

13.9
7.4
8.7
5.6
11.5

(1,642)
(1,642)
(1,642)
(1,642)
(1,642)

8.5
8.5
9.4
4.7
12.3

(106)
(106)
(106)
(106)
(106)

NOTE: Number of observations for each cell is in parentheses,
a. Not applicable or no observation.

Appendix Table 4.2 Descriptive Statistics for PSID Movers and Stayers
Estimate (Observations)
Pension in 1984
No pension in 1984
Movers
Stayers
Movers
Stayers
Variable
Wages and pensions
2.472 (78)
2.236 (53)
2.559 (221)
2.218 (59)
1984 wage
2.36 (78)
2.572 (221)
2.211 (53)
2.298 (59)
1989 wage
53,.2 (126)
85 .6 (263)
37.0 (108)
31 .6 (79)
1989 pension
Personal characteristics
17.4 (125)
18 .9 (261)
18.8 (102)
18 .2 (77)
Experience
,7 (126)
37,
38 .5 (263)
37.9 (108)
37 .3 (79)
Age
14,,1 (125)
13 .1 (263)
13.1 (108)
12,.7 (78)
Education
4,.8 (126)
5 .3 (263)
1.9 (108)
7,.6 (79)
Black
87..3 (126)
92.0 (263)
78.7 (108)
82,.3 (79)
Married
73,
,8 (126)
75 .7 (263)
74.1 (108)
70 .9 (79)
Children
73,,8 (126)
88 .2 (263)
73.1 (108)
79,.7 (79)
Home ownership
52,.4 (126)
60 .8 (263)
48.1 (108)
59 .5 (79)
Spouse employed
Job characteristics
36,,5 (126)
48 .3 (263)
20.4 (108)
24,.1 (79)
Manufacturing
35,.7 (126)
52,.5 (263)
46.3 (108)
46,.8 (79)
Blue collar
16,.7 (126)
6 .1 (263)
12.0 (108)
16,.5 (79)
White collar
47..6 (126)
41 .4 (263)
41.7 (108)
36 .7 (79)
Management & professional

Union
10.1 (79)
4.6 (108)
36.3 (262)
16.7 (126)
SMSA________________45.6 (79)______55.1 (107)______51.5 (262)______56.3 (126)
NOTE: Number of observations for each cell is in parentheses.

Appendix Table 4.3 Probit Estimates of Reduced Form Mobility Equations
Marginal effects (t statistic)
1984-1985
1978-1983
SIPP
SCF
Variable
Personal characteristics
Years of experience
Years of education
Years until expected retirement
Black
Age
Married
Children under 18
Home ownership
Spouse employed
Job characteristics
Manufacturing
White collar
Management/professional
Union
Firm size > 100 employees
Pension coverage

0.02
0.01
0.01
-0.18
-0.01
-0.02
0.07
-0.23
0.00b

(2.46)
(1.17)
(1.71)
(1.87)
(0.79)
(0.26)
(1.25)
(4.03)
(0.01)

(1.32)
0.07
(1.14)
0.10
(0.11)
0.01
0.00b (0.06)
(0.53)
0.03
-0.57 (10.90)

o.oob
o.oob
o.oob
-0.07

o.oob
0.01
0.01
-0.05

(1.21)
(0.17)
(1.44)
(2.15)
(1.22)
(0.64)
(0.83)
(0.27)

a

(0.71)
(0.00)
-0.02 (0.96)
0.00b (0.13)
-0.01 (0.98)
-0.09 (6.50)

-0.01

o.oob

1984-1989
PSID

o.oob
0.03
a
-0.14

(0.08)
(2.33)

0.01
-0.02
0.07
-0.21
-0.05

(1.31)
(0.22)
(0.21)
(1.06)
(3.45)
(1.03)

-0.04
0.05
-0.05
-0.19

(0.82)
(0.69)
(0.84)
(2.91)

a

-0.21

(4.24)

SMSA
Log-likelihood
Number of observations

0.01 (0.25)
-242.21
581

0.01 (0.99)
-748.34
2,545

0.02 (0.54)
-340.39
561

NOTE: Absolute values of asymtotic t statistics are in parentheses. Dependent variable is 1 if the individual separates and is 0 otherwise.
a. Variable is omitted from this equation.
b. Coefficient is less than 0.005 in absolute value.
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Appendix Table 4.4 Probit Estimates of Final Pension Status for Those
Who Change Jobs
Marginal effects (t statistic)
1984-1989 PSID
1984-1985 SIPP
Variable
Personal characteristics
-0.01 (0.57)
o.oob (0.38)
Years of experience
0.00 (0.77)
0.01 (0.44)
Years of education
-0.15 (0.71)
-0.11 (0.58)
Black
0.01 (0.44)
o.oob (0.11)
Age
-0.01 (0.07)
0.08 (0.81)
Married
0.13 (1.20)
o.oob (0.06)
Children under 18
0.13 (1.46)
Home ownership
0.06 (0.89)
-0.13 (1.63)
Spouse employed
a
Characteristics of initial job
0.08 (1.24)
Manufacturing
0.11 (1.35)
0.04 (0.34)
0.18 (1.68)
White collar
0.17 (2.04)
Management/professional
0.05 (0.56)
0.26 (3.11)
Union
0.07 (0.55)
a
-0.03 (0.40)
Firm size > 100 employees
0.12 (1.79)
Pension
0.12 (1.61)
0.02 (0.35)
SMSA
-0.03 (0.40)
-108 .74
-145.65
Log-likelihood
226
Number of observations
232
NOTE: Absolute values of asymptotic t statistics are in parentheses. Dependent variable is 1 if
the individual has a pension after separation and is 0 otherwise.
a. Variable is omitted from this equation.
b. Coefficient is less than 0.005 in absolute value.
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Appendix Table 4.5 Probit Equations Analyzing Attrition Among Pension-Covered Workers
Marginal effects (t statistic)
1984-1989 PSID
1984-1985 SIPP
Nonpensioned
Pension-covered
Nonpensioned
Pension-covered
workers
workers
workers
workers
Variable
Personal characteristics
Years of experience
Years of education
Years until expected
retirement
Black
Age
Married
Children under 18
Home ownership
Spouse employment

(0.08)
(1.04)

(0.30)
(1.27)

-0.002
-0.003

(0.78)
(0.56)

0.001
0.011

-0.001 (0.23)
0.037 (1.07)
0.003 (0.77)
-0.030 (0.98)
0.003 (0.12)
-0.040 (1.58)

0.002
-0.081
0.002
0.021
-0.046
-0.038
a

(0.25)
(1.52)
(0.26)
(0.58)
(1.54)
(1.38)

a
-0.024 (0.31)
-0.001 (0.16)
0.026 (0.38)
-0.099 (2.38)
-0.030 (0.61)
-0.014 (0.35)

-0.001
0.005

a

o.ooob
0.001

(0.04)
(0.65)

a
0.102
0.001
0.049
-0.014
-0.012
-0.053

(0.74)
(0.06)
(0.47)
(0.16)
(0.17)
(0.88)

Job characteristics
Log wage
Manufacturing
White collar
Management/professional
Union
Firm size > 100 employees
SMSA
Log-likelihood
Number of observations

a
0.013 (0.71)
0.011 (0.34)
-0.041 (1.54)
-0.007 (0.32)
0.042 (1.68)
0.021 (1.15)
-1,081.04
2,134

a

-0.037 (1.29)
0.106 (2.59)
-0.009 (0.27)
0.026 (0.62)
0.025 (0.94)
0.023 (0.89)
-578.7
1,140

-0.006
0.027
-0.078
-0.037
0.038

(1.30)
(0.70)
(0.93)
(0.68)
(0.83)

a

0.038 (1.01)
-132.94
382

NOTE: Absolute values of asymptotic t statistics are in parentheses. Dependent variable is 1 for attrition and is 0 otherwise.
a. Variable is omitted from this equation.
b. Coefficient is less than 0.005 in absolute value.

0.000b (0.08)
0.034 (0.59)
-0.080 (0.83)
-0.158 (1.97)
a
a
-0.029 (0.51)
-41.93
148

5
Econometric Specification
of the Mobility
and Compensation Equations
Having discussed descriptive results relating to pensions, wages,
and mobility, we now turn to the specification of our econometric
mobility model. The model will be estimated in chapters 6 and 7. Three
versions of the model are considered.
The first version, estimated for the Survey of Income and Program
Participation (SIPP) and the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID),
starts with two equations for compensation in the current and next best
jobs. It adds a mobility equation in which mobility is a function of the
difference in compensation in these two jobs, with compensation in
both cases being measured over the remainder of the individual©s work
ing life. The model allows for the fact that we do not observe compen
sation in the next best job unless the individual moves.
The second version of the model, estimated for the 1983 Survey of
Consumer Finances (SCF), adds a selection equation since we do not
always observe the individual©s starting job in that data set. After esti
mating these models, we are able to simulate the effects of the compen
sation differential between the two jobs. Further, for pension-covered
workers, we can separate the part of the differential due to backloading
and simulate its effect on mobility. This will permit us to gauge the
importance of backloading as an impediment to mobility.
The third form of the model relaxes a constraint that is implicit in
the first two versions. In this case, the compensation differential in the
mobility equation is split into two parts: one due to pension backload
ing and the second due to other causes of compensation differentials
between the present and next best job. By allowing the coefficients on
separate variables measuring backloading and other compensation dif
ferentials to be estimated freely within the mobility equation, we create
a specification test for the model. If the model were completely speci
fied to incorporate all dimensions of behavior important to the turnover
decision, one would expect identical coefficients in the mobility equa-
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tion for the effect of the two parts of the compensation differential.
That is, in the absence of specification error, the effect on the prospects
for mobility from a dollar©s worth of compensation should be the same
whether it comes from pension backloading or from some other
source. 1 That model is estimated in chapter 7 with data from the SIPP
and the PSID. The PSID data are also used to estimate the latter ver
sion of the model with quits rather than total job separations as the out
come, implicitly assuming that layoffs are random.

The Basic Model
In the basic version of the model, mobility is indicated by the latent
variable M*,

(5.1)

M* = <x(lnCc -lnCfl )+X 1 p,+e 1 .

If mobility has occurred, M is positive; otherwise, it is negative. Cc is
compensation in the current job, and Ca is compensation in the alterna
tive job, with all compensation measured in dollars per hour until
retirement. The expectation is that a will be negative, as higher relative
compensation on the current job discourages mobility. X} is a vector of
explanatory variables, (3, is a vector of coefficients, and e, is a normally
distributed error term.
Compensation in the current job (Cc) is specified with the following
equation:
(5.2)

InC c =

where X2 is a vector of explanatory variables, (32 is a vector of coeffi
cients, and e2 is a normally distributed error term. Compensation in the
alternative job (Ca), which is observed only if the individual moves, is
given in a similar equation:

(5.3)

lnCa =
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where X3 is another set of explanatory variables, (33 is a vector of coef
ficients, and 83 is another normally distributed error term. Note that X3,
in theory, cannot contain job characteristics of the new job, since these
are only observed if an individual moves. In practice, the explanatory
variables in X2 and X3 are the same.
The compensation levels in each job include both the value of wages
and pensions. Cc and Ca are calculated as the average hourly amount of
wages plus pension accrual to each year of service from the start of the
period until retirement. Here, retirement is the earlier of the individ
ual©s expected retirement age or the age of normal retirement in the
individual©s pension plan (if the worker has one). The rationale is that if
an individual will ever find it advantageous to switch jobs before the
normal retirement age, it will be as soon as possible, given the positive
effects of tenure on wages and the typical backloading of pension ben
efits toward the end of the job. Hence, the appropriate comparison is
the total compensation in the two jobs from the current date until the
normal retirement age in the plan or until the individual©s expected
retirement date, if that is earlier.
To facilitate estimation, the term for Ca is substituted from equation
(5.3) into (5.1):
(5.4)

M* = oc(lnCc -X3 p 3 ) + X 1 P,+eJ©.

In this equation, £? = £,- ae3.
Equations (5.2), (5.3), and (5.4) and the correlation among the error
terms in the three equations are estimated jointly by maximum likeli
hood. The maximum likelihood procedures are analogous for estimat
ing the basic model, as specified in equations (5.2) to (5.4), and for
estimating the alternative versions of the model presented in the next
section. The details of the likelihood function and its estimation are
deferred to an appendix.
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The Basic Model as Modified for Censoring
of Wage Observations in the Initial Period
In the retrospective SCF, the 1978 job is not observed for some indi
viduals because of the manner in which the job history was collected.
Cc cannot be calculated for those individuals, and another equation is
required to describe whether or not the 1978 job, and hence Cc, is
observed.2 This selection equation uses the latent variable / :
(5.5)

/* = X4 p4 + £4
^j

where the 1978 job is observed if / is positive and is not observed oth
erwise. X4 is a vector of explanatory variables, (34 is a vector of coeffi
cients, and £4 is a normally distributed error term. For (5.5) to be valid
as a selection equation, X must include all the explanatory variables in
both the mobility equation (5.1) and the compensation equations (5.2)
and (5.3).3
The fact that we cannot always observe Cc means that we must also
substitute in for Cc in equation (5.4):

(5.6)

M* = a(X2 p2 -X3 p3 ) H-Xjpj+e*.

In this equation, £f = e, + a(e2 - £3).

The Mobility Equation with Pension Backloading and Other
Compensation Differences as Separate Independent Variables
The mobility equation to be estimated with the third version of the
model is given by

(5.7)

M* = oc^lnC^-lnCJ + cc2 (lnCn -

where, again, M is an indicator variable that is positive if the worker
changes jobs during the period and negative otherwise. Cc and Cn are
the compensation in the current job and the non-backloaded part of
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compensation in the current job, respectively, and Ca is compensation
in the alternative job, with all compensation measured in dollars per
hour until retirement. The first two terms on the right-hand side of the
equation are the backloaded and nonbackloaded parts of the compensa
tion premium, with OC] and a2 as their coefficients. As before, X, is a
vector of explanatory variables, and e, is a normally distributed error
term.
The equations for lnCa and InQ are as specified in equations (5.2)
and (5.3). To estimate the mobility equation, following the procedures
outlined earlier, we first substitute from equation (5.3).

(5.8)

M* = a!(lnCc -lnCn ) + a2 (lnCn -X3 |33 )

Once again, e^ = e, - a2£3. Since the error structure of this model is
exactly the same as in the first model, the set of equations (5.2), (5.3),
and (5.8) can be estimated by the same maximum likelihood proce
dures.
Having specified the econometric model, we now turn to its estima
tion. Chapter 6 discusses the estimation of the model in which mobility
is a function of the overall compensation differential between the ini
tial job and the next best alternative.

Appendix to Chapter 5
Derivation of the Likelihood Function
In this appendix, we will derive the likelihood function for the second mod
el. The likelihood functions for the other models are similar, except for the lack
of the selection equation and the integrals related to that equation.
To facilitate the presentation of the estimation procedure, a slight change in
notation will be convenient. We have denoted the compound error term from
the mobility equation (5.6) to be e*. To simplify notation, let e* be equal to e(.
for the remaining equations (5.2,5.3, and 5.5), and let the correlation matrix for
the e* as Z*. The correlation matrix Z for the original e( s can be derived from
Z* by straightforward calculations, if desired.
It is assumed that the error terms e( are statistically independent of the ex
planatory variables in the X vectors for the various equations. If so, the likeli
hood function for the model is simply the product of the probability
expressions for the individual observations. The form of these probability ex
pressions depends on which compensation values are observed. There are three
possible cases, as follows. First, consider the situation where the 1978 job is
included in the employment history and where the individual did change jobs
during the period, so that both compensation values are observed. The proba
bility density of this observation is given as
(5.9)

PR.= J J/(l*)<fc*<fe*
-M-l

where M and / are the deterministic parts of equations (5.5) and (5.6), respec
tively, and j indexes the individual, e* is a vector of the four e* s, with e* and
e* taking on the values solved from equations (5.2) and (5.3) using the ob
served compensation values and the values of the explanatory variables. This
probability expression integrates the probability density /(e*) of the error
terms over the region where the mobility indicator is positive (M > 0) and the
selection indicator is positive (/* > 0).
The second case arises if the 1978 job is not observed and the individual
changed jobs during the period. This implies that Cc the compensation value
for the 1978 current job, is not observed but that Ca, the compensation value
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for the alternative job, is observed. The probability density for the observation
for this case is

(5.10)

PRj = J J/(e* e*, £*)<fe*<fe* .

This equation is different in two respects from the expression in the previous
example. First, the limits in the second integral are changed to reflect the lack
of observation for the 1978 job. Also, the probability density /(e* , e* , e* ) has
been integrated out with respect to e| , the residual in the equation determining
the unobserved compensation value in 1978.
The third case occurs if the 1978 job is observed and the individual re
mained in the job over the period. Here, Cc is observed, but Ca is not. The prob
ability density of the observation is

(5.11)

PRj= J J

This is the same kind of integral as in the previous case, except for obvious
changes in the integration limits and the substitution of e|, which can be com
puted in this case, for e*, which cannot.
There is one data problem that is relevant to the estimation procedure. The
data necessary to construct wage information for a particular job are missing in
about 15 percent of the cases. An ideal solution would be to use separate selec
tion equations for these cases, but doing so would increase the dimensionality
of the cumulative normal to be evaluated by two dimensions and would make
the estimation procedure computationally much more difficult. Instead, we
make the assumption that the process inducing the omissions is statistically in
dependent to the explanatory variables and error terms in the various equations.
The likelihood function can then be integrated out with respect to the error
terms associated with missing wages. This would cause e.* or e*, depending
on which wage is missing, to be dropped from the appropriate probability den
sity formula for the observation. For example, suppose that the 1978 job is ob
served and a job change did occur, but that the 1978 wage is missing. The
probability density for the individual in this case would be
00

(5.12)

00

PR. = J J/(4e* ejjdejdfe* .

-to-1
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If instead the 1978 job is not observed, a job change did occur, and the alterna
tive job wage is missing, the probability density would be
00

(5.13)

-/

/>/?.= J J/(E*,eJ)«feX.

Having constructed the log-likelihood from the sum of the logs of the prob
ability expressions PRj of the individual observations, maximum likelihood es
timates are obtained by maximizing this function with respect to the parameters
in the model. These parameters include a, the 8s, and the elements of the cor
relation matrix £*. The maximization technique is a scoring algorithm with a
linear search along the indicated direction in combination with the BerndtHall-Hall-Hausman routine for evaluating the expected second derivative ma
trix (Berndt et al. 1974). This algorithm also provides asymptotic standard er
rors for the estimated parameters of the model.

NOTES
1. It would be unreasonable to expect precise agreement between the two estimated coeffi
cients. Important factors have been omitted, such as the risk associated with each form of com
pensation, or associated differences in effort that go unmeasured. Nevertheless, large
discrepancies in the estimated coefficients should point to major misspecifications that cause the
error term in the mobility equation to be correlated with pension backloading or with the remain
der of the compensation differential.
2. Note, however, that even though the retrospective SCF missed some 1978 jobs (which
necessitated the selection equation), it specifically asked about previous pension-covered jobs, so
that if the question were answered, the data should include all 1978 jobs with pensions.
3. As noted, Ca is not observed for individuals who remained in their 1978 jobs at least
through 1983. Normally, this would require another selection equation, but the selection equation
in this case is the mobility equation (5.1), which is already included in the model. Hence, an addi
tional equation is not required.

6
Econometric Estimates
with Mobility a Function
of Compensation Differentials
The distinguishing feature of the first two versions of the mobility
model developed in chapter 5 is that, in the mobility equation, there is
only a single measure of the compensation differential between those
workers on pension-covered jobs and those on jobs not offering pen
sions. That is, in the estimation of the mobility equation itself, the com
pensation differential is not decomposed into components attributable
to backloading and to other factors. That estimation is postponed until
chapter 7. Instead, the models in this chapter estimate the effect of the
total compensation differential on mobility. To isolate the effect of
backloading, we separate that part of the compensation differential and
infer its effects on compensation from the coefficient on the compensa
tion differential in the mobility equation. This coefficient is simply the
a in equation (5.4).
We begin by fitting the first version of the model, which is suitable
to panel data, to results from the Survey of Income and Program Partic
ipation (SIPP) and the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID). Then
we fit the second version of the model to the retrospective Survey of
Consumer Finances (SCF). Once these models are estimated and we
have parameter estimates for mobility and compensation equations, we
turn to simulation analysis. These simulations help to answer two ques
tions. First, can the compensation differentials between current and
best alternative jobs explain very much of the difference in mobility
between pension-covered and noncovered workers, or can the differ
ence be explained primarily by the other variables in the mobility equa
tion? Second, how much does pension backloading affect the
difference in mobility rates between these two groups? In these simula
tions, we maintain the underlying assumption that a one-dollar differ
ential in compensation, whatever its source, should have the same
effect on mobility.
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The empirical results in this chapter indicate that it is not the pen
sion capital loss from mobility that is primarily responsible for the neg
ative relationship between pension coverage and mobility. Those who
are covered by pensions receive a higher level of compensation on their
jobs than do those without pensions, and at least a part of this appears
to be a compensation premium over and above what these workers
could obtain elsewhere. It is this premium, rather than the pension loss
from moving, that accounts for the large difference in mobility
between pension-covered workers and those who are not covered by a
pension on their initial jobs.

Model Based on SIPP Data Estimates
This section estimates the first version of the pension-mobility
model described in chapter 5, using the data from the SIPP. 1 Job
changes are measured over the one-year period between the fourth and
seventh interviews in the SIPP. As before, a job change is considered to
have occurred when the individual leaves the position held at the
beginning of the period and takes one with a different employer.
Unlike the SCF, the SIPP does not have available an employer-pro
vided pension plan description. Instead, SIPP individuals are matched
with employer plan descriptions from the SCF with the same industry,
occupation, and union status. The wage profile of the SIPP worker is
applied to the detailed plan description for each of the SCF plans in the
industry/occupation/union status cell, and the pension amounts for the
SIPP worker are taken as the weighted average of the pension amounts
for the pensions in the cell. The matching process uses SIC three-digit
industries and three occupations; if there are no pension-provider
observations in that cell, cells are collapsed to two-digit or one-digit
industries, as required, until a filled cell is found. In no cases are union
plans used to impute nonunion plans, or vice versa. This procedure
allows the pension calculations to take account of the wide differences
in plans across industries, occupations, and union status.
In the SIPP estimates, the mobility equation is identified by exclud
ing the pension variable. With regard to the two compensation equa
tions, identification is achieved by excluding the household variables.
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Compensation is calculated as the average per-hour amount of
wages plus increases in pension values between the initial year and the
earlier of the individual©s expected date of retirement from full-time
work or the normal retirement age specified in the pension plan (if the
employee had one). If the individual did not provide an expected retire
ment age, the terminal date for the compensation calculations is taken
to be the normal retirement age in the pension plan for employees with
pensions and age 65 for employees without pensions. A real wage pro
file is created by using the observed wage and extrapolating to dates
before and after on the basis of the estimated coefficients of the experi
ence and tenure variables in the wage regressions reported in chapter 4.
This is converted to a nominal profile by taking into account the gen
eral growth of nominal wages. Pension values are calculated by apply
ing the resulting wage profile to the individual©s own pension. All
compensation amounts reported in this section are discounted to 1984
and expressed in 1984 dollars.
Table 6.1 presents estimates for this model. The estimates for the
mobility latent variable are in the left two columns of data, and the esti
mates for the compensation in the initial and alternative jobs are in the
remaining columns. For the mobility equation, only the measures of
the compensation premium and home ownership are significant at stan
dard levels. Home ownership lowers estimated mobility by 3.3 percent
age points, and a 10 percent larger compensation difference between
the initial and alternative job is estimated to decrease mobility by 2.9
percentage points (10 percent of 0.293).
The equation for compensation in the initial job exhibits coefficients
that are consistent with expectations. Compensation is significantly
and positively related to pension coverage, white-collar jobs, manage
ment and professional employment, union and large-firm employment,
level of education, and work in a Standard Metropolitan Statistical
Area (SMSA). Compensation is significantly lower for Blacks. In the
alternative compensation equation, coefficients are significant for
schooling and location in an SMSA, with some other estimated coeffi
cients near significance. Pension coverage in the job held in the base
period is associated with a compensation premium of about 22 percent,
the difference between the coefficients on the pension coverage vari
ables in the 1984 compensation equation and in the alternative job
compensation equation (0.343 minus 0.126).

Table 6.1 Estimates of the Model with Mobility Determined by a Single Measure of the Compensation Premium
Based on 1984-85 Data from the SIPP
Compensation in
Compensation in
Model component
Mobility equation
1984 job
alternative job
Marginal
effect
(t statistic)
Estimate (t statistic)
Estimate (t statistic)
Constant
1.430
(14.80)
(1.43)
0.939
Compensation premium (a)
-0.293
(2.58)
a
a
Pension coverage
0.343
a
0.126
(17.80)
(0.74)
Manufacturing
(0.17)
0.004
0.029
(1.45)
-0.006
(0.09)
White collar
0.024
(0.58)
0.073
(2.42)
-0.008
(0.07)
Management/professional
(0.37)
0.011
0.233
(10.28)
0.157
(1.57)
Union status
0.023
0.117
(0.63)
(4.79)
0.034
(0.32)
Firm size > 100
0.018
(0.65)
0.058
-0.038
(3.03)
(0.43)
Years of experience
-0.002
(0.75)
0.000b
0.002
(0.17)
(0.26)
Years until retirement
(0.32)
-0.001
-0.003
(1.37)
0.010
(1.03)
Age
0.002
a
(0.91)
a
Education
0.002
0.058
(0.45)
0.067
(16.66)
(4.19)
Race (Black)
0.059
-0.190
(0.63)
-0.551
(4.88)
(1.85)
Married
(0.61)
0.009
a
a
Children under 18
a
(0.75)
0.009
a
Home ownership
(2.06)
-0.033
a
a

SMSA

-0.024

Standard deviation of error terms
Correlation matrix of error terms

Log-likelihood
Number of observations

1.000

(0.98)

0.061

(3.40)

0.177

(2.43)

0.425

(92.53)

0.477

(7.62)

0.707
1.000

(2.40)

0.409
0.355
1.000

(1.03)
(4.33)
~

-2,304.57
2,545

NOTES: Numbers in parentheses are absolute values of asymptotic t statistics. See text for descriptions of the dependent variables. The job characteristics
in the alternative job equation refer to the characteristics in the initial job, not to the characteristics of the alternative job.
a. Variable is omitted from this equation.
b. Coefficient is less than 0.0005 in absolute value.
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To interpret the correlations reported in the table, it is important to
remember that they refer to the e* terms, that is, the composite errors
after substituting for the alternative wage into equation (5.4). The cor
relations for the original error terms can be found by using the standard
formulas for variances, covariances, and correlations. The resulting
estimated correlation matrix is as follows: 2
Mobility equation
1.000

Compensation
in 1984 job
0.413
1.000

Compensation
in alternative job
-0.414
0.355
1.000

Thus, although the estimated value of /?(£*, £2) is strongly positive at
0.707, the estimated value of p(£\, £2), which is the correlation
between the probability of mobility for unobserved reasons and the
level of compensation offered on the initial job for unobserved reasons,
is reduced to 0.413. The fact that the error terms in these two equations
are positively correlated follows the pattern of many of the observed
variables that are entered in both equations. For example, being in a
large firm raises initial compensation, and it also increases the proba
bility of mobility, holding the compensation premium constant.
Simulations
Simulations with the model allow us to do two things. First, we can
see how well the model fits the data, both for the whole sample and for
subgroups of particular interest. Second, the simulations can help us to
ascertain the degree to which the lower mobility of pension-covered
workers is due to pension backloading and the degree to which it is due
to the greater pay and benefits on pension-covered jobs.
These simulations are performed as follows. For each individual, the
nonstochastic part of equation (5.4) is calculated as M . If compensa
tion in either the current or alternative job is observed, it is possible to
calculate £2 and/or £3 from equations (5.2) and (5.3), given the coeffi
cient estimates and the values for the explanatory variables. It is then
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possible to calculate the probability that the individual would have
changed jobs in the one-year interval.3
Consider now how well the model predicts the actual mobility rate,
both for the sample as a whole and for important subgroups within the
sample. The simulations relevant for this question are presented in
table 6.2. The first column of data in the table gives the observed
mobility rate for the group in question during the one-year period,
while the middle column gives the mobility rate simulated by the
model using the explanatory variables for that particular group.
Table 6.2 Model Validation Simulations Based on 1984-85 Data from the
SIPP
Simulated
Sample
Number of
mobility
mobility
observations
(percent)
(percent)
Group
2,545
9.71
9.73
Full sample
Individuals with pensions
1,678
5.71
5.71
867
17.27
17.35
Individuals without pensions
Union members
692
7.16
6.91
10.64
Not union members
1,853
10.76

The simulations capture the disparities in mobility rates among very
different groups rather well. For example, the actual one-year job
mobility for the sample is about 11.6 percentage points higher for indi
viduals without pensions than for individuals with pensions, and the
magnitude of this differential is reflected in the simulated mobility
rates. This is particularly encouraging because pensions are not an
explicit explanatory variable in the mobility equation in the model. A
similar result holds, though less dramatically, when the mobility rates
are compared between union members and others. In this case, the
mobility rate among union members is 3.9 percentage points lower
than for individuals not in unions, and, again, the magnitude of this dif
ferential is reflected in the simulation results. Thus, the simulation
model does appear to do a good job of predicting differences in the
mobility rates of various groups, even of some groups not explicitly
represented in the mobility equation itself.
Next we would like to examine the role of pensions in affecting job
mobility. In order to assess the importance of backloading for mobility,
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it is necessary to consider the magnitude of the backloading as well as
the impact per dollar. This is done in table 6.3, which presents the
results of several simulations using sample members with pensions.
The results in the first column of data simply repeat the base simulation
reported in table 6.2. (The numbers do not match for various sub
groups, since table 6.2 represents all members of a subgroup and table
6.3 represents only members of the subgroup with pensions.) In the
second column, one part of the compensation premium is deleted. For
instance, in the first part of the table, the simulations exclude the backloaded part of the compensation premium and calculate the mobility
rate that would occur if only the nonbackloaded part of the premium
were present.4
Table 6.3 Simulations of Effects of Backloading and Other Changes in
Compensation on Mobility Based on 1984-85 Data from the SIPP
Original
Postchange
mobility rate mobility rate Number of
Group
(percent)
(percent) observations
Effects of eliminating pension backloading on
All individuals with pensions
5.71
6.39
1,678
46-50 year-olds
4.35
5.35
359
Union members
5.70
6.49
590
Not union members
5.72
6.34
1,088
Effects of dropping pension compensation entirely
All individuals with pensions
5.71
10.38
1,678
Effects of higher compensation in pension jobs, as measured by
compensation equation estimates
All individuals with pensions
5.71
14.39
1,678

The first four rows of the table analyze the effects of the backload
ing component of compensation for each of four populations of pen
sion-covered workers. Recall that the basic mobility rates for pensioncovered and noncovered workers were 5.7 percent and 17.4 percent,
respectively, in the descriptive data of table 6.2. The comparison
between the two data columns in the first row of table 6.3 suggests that
backloading accounts for about two-thirds of one percentage point of
mobility, or about 6 percent of the total difference in mobility rates
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between pensioned workers and nonpensioned workers. The impact of
backloading is somewhat larger for older workers. When the same
exercise is done in the second row for the 359 pension-covered workers
in the 46-50 age range, excluding backloading raises the mobility rate
from 4.35 percent to 5.35 percent, a full percentage point. This is half
again as large as the effect for the full age range, but it is still small rel
ative to the gap in mobility rates between pensioned and nonpensioned
workers. As seen in the third and fourth rows, the estimated effects of
pension backloading on mobility for subgroups categorized by union
status are also below 1 percentage point.
The fifth row of data in the table excludes the pension entirely from
the premium. As might be expected on the basis of the relative sizes of
pension values and backloading reported in table 2.2, the total effect of
the pension, at almost 4.7 percentage points, is substantially larger than
the effect of backloading alone. This is to say that most of the effect of
pensions on mobility occurs because of the basic value of the pensions
themselves, not because they are backloaded.
The final row in the table reports the effect of eliminating the entire
compensation premium associated with pension jobs. To estimate the
value of the premium, the effects of pensions in the two compensation
equations are compared. As reported in table 6.1, the coefficient of the
pension variable in the current compensation equation is 0.343, while
the corresponding coefficient in the alternative compensation equation
is 0.126 (with t statistics of 17.80 and 0.74, respectively). These esti
mates imply that pensions are associated with an increase of 0.217 in
the difference between log compensations in the current job and the
alternative job, where the difference is the compensation premium. The
simulation excludes this amount from the premium, with the result that
mobility would increase by about 8.7 percentage points. This is about
three-fourths of the total differential between the mobility rates of pen
sioned and nonpensioned workers in table 6.2. In comparison with the
much smaller reduction from backloading alone, it suggests that the
nonbackloaded part of the premium has more responsibility for the rel
atively low mobility rates among pension-covered workers. To put it
another way, restructuring pensions to be perfectly portable would
increase the mobility of pension-covered workers very little.
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Model Based on Data from the PSID Estimates
Table 6.4 presents the estimates of the mobility model for data from
the PSID. In the PSID, as with the SIPP, it is necessary to calculate
pension amounts based on a match with the employer pension plan
data from the SCF.
The results of this estimation are broadly consistent with the results
from the SIPP estimation in the previous section. In the mobility equa
tion, the compensation premium is one of two significant variables,
along with home ownership as the other. The result implies that a 10
percent gain in the compensation premium would decrease mobility by
6.4 percentage points. Once again, the amount of compensation in the
1984 job is positively and significantly influenced by pension cover
age, manufacturing employment, managerial and professional work,
union employment, higher levels of schooling, and work in an SMSA.
Blacks again receive significantly lower compensation. Consistent with
earlier findings, schooling is the dominant variable in the compensa
tion equation in alternative employment. Finally, the effect of pension
coverage in the initial job on the difference between the compensation
in that job and in the alternative job (30 percent) is a bit above the com
pensation difference found with the SIPP data (22 percent). 5
Analysis of Quits

In this section, the PSID provides the only data allowing analysis
that distinguishes quits from layoffs. Appendix table 6.1 presents the
results of the estimation of the three-equation model in which turnover
is defined as quits rather than as separations. These results are analo
gous to those in table 6.4 and indicate that, in the PSID data, there are
no significant differences in findings when quits are substituted for
separations. In particular, a very similar coefficient estimate is obtained
both for the marginal effect of the compensation premium (at -0.552
with a t statistic of 2.34, versus -0.648 with a t statistic of 2.29). The
other key result is the coefficient on the pension measure in the equa
tions for compensation on the 1984 job and on the alternative job. The
pension coefficients in the two equations are .276 with a t statistic of
7.61 and .013, with a t statistic of 0.09. The implication is that having a

Table 6.4 Estimates of the Model with Mobility Determined by a Single Measure of the Compensation Premium
Based on 1984-89 Data from the PSID
Compensation in
Compensation in
alternative job
1984 job
Mobility equation
Model component
Marginal
Estimate (t statistic)
Estimate (t statistic)
effect
(t statistic)
(10.40)
2.092
2.150
(60.28)
Constant
a
a
(2.29)
-0.648
Compensation premium (a)
(0.14)
-0.026
(7.58)
a
0.276
Pension coverage
(1.52)
0.191
(1.82)
0.069
(1.14)
0.111
Manufacturing
(0.59)
0.189
(1.08)
0.073
-0.063
(0.29)
White collar
(1.27)
0.243
(5.21)
0.240
(0.12)
-0.016
Management/professional
(0.89)
-0.156
(3.83)
0.202
0.102
(0.58)
Union status
-0.008
(0.67)
(0.16)
0.000
(0.19)
-0.002
Years of experience
a
a
(0.68)
0.007
Age
(3.44)
0.125
(7.94)
0.071
-0.022
(0.79)
Education
(0.65)
-0.291
(3.40)
-0.264
(0.23)
-0.070
Race (Black)
Married
Children under 18
Home ownership
Spouse employment
SMSA

0.000b
-0.010
-0.186
-0.025
0.043

(0.00)
(0.16)
(2.93)
(0.49)
(0.46)

a

a

a

a

a

a

a

a

0.087

(2.54)

0.086

(0.65)

Table 6.4 (continued)
Model component

Mobility equation
Marginal
effect
(t statistic)

Standard deviation of error terms
Correlation matrix of error terms

Log-likelihood
Number of observations

1 .000

Compensation in
1984 job

Compensation in
alternative job

Estimate (t statistic)
0.341
(32.78)

Estimate (t statistic)
0.519
(6.27)

0.531
1.000

(2.00)
--

0.479
0.322
1.000

(1.34)
(2.58)

-531.58
474

NOTE: Numbers in parentheses are absolute values of asymptotic t statistics. See text for descriptions of the dependent variables.The job characteristics
in the alternative compensation equation refer to the characteristics in the initial job, not to the characteristics of the alternative job. Firm size is unavailable
in the PSID, and years until retirement is omitted because it is reported only for those age 45 or older.
a. Variable is omitted from the equation.
b. Coefficient is less than 0.0005 in absolute value.
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pension on the current job raises compensation relative to the next best
opportunity by about twenty-five percent.
Simulations
Model validation simulations for the PSID data are presented in
table 6.5. In this case, the period for mobility is five years. Again the
simulated mobility rates capture the disparities in outcomes among the
groups. There is, however, more of an underprediction of mobility for
those without pensions than was evident with the SIPP data.
Table 6.5 Model Validation Simulations Based on 1984-89 Data
from the PSID
Simulated
Sample
Number of
mobility
mobility
observations
(percent)
(percent)
Group
Full sample
40.9
41.8
474
Individuals with pensions
331
33.3
32.1
64.2
Individuals without pensions
143
58.4
Union members
23.7
23.9
119
48.0
Not union members
46.9
355

Consider now the simulations examining the effects of pensions on
mobility, decomposing the effects into those associated with backloading and with the compensation premium on pension-covered jobs.
These simulations are presented in table 6.6. Again, the results in the
first column of data are for the base simulations using observed com
pensation in the mobility equation, while the results in the second col
umn are based on simulations that exclude some part of the
compensation premium.
As shown in the last row of the table, the total effect of the compen
sation differences associated with holding a pension-covered job is a
reduction in mobility from 54.1 percent to 33.3 percent. Thus, the com
pensation premium can account for most of the difference in mobility
rates between pensioned and nonpensioned workers (32.4 percent ver
sus 57.8 percent, from table 4.1). However, the portion of the differ
ence that is due to pension backloading is only 3.2 percentage points
(36.5 percent minus 33.3 percent), which is small compared to the
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effect of the full value of the pension, or of the compensation premium
on pension-covered jobs. For 46-to-50-year-olds, pension backloading
per se has almost twice the effect that backloading does for the full
sample, but it is still not the major reason that workers in pension jobs
have lower turnover rates than workers in nonpension jobs.
Table 6.6 Simulations of Effects of Backloading and Other Changes in
Compensation on Mobility Based on 1984-89 Data from the PSID____
Postchange
Original
mobility rate mobility rate Number of
(percent) observations
(percent)
Group
Effects of eliminating pension backloading
331
36.5
33.3
All individuals with pensions
50
33.0
27.5
46-50 year-olds
108
25.5
22.1
Union members
223
42.2
39.1
Not union members
Effects of dropping pension compensation entirely
331
43.2
33.3
All individuals with pensions
Effects of higher compensation in pension jobs, as measured by
compensation equation estimates
331
54.1
33.3
All individuals with pensions

Model Estimates Based on Retrospective Data from the SCF
This section presents estimates of the mobility model using retro
spective SCF data. As explained in chapter 5, the econometric method
ology is slightly modified from that developed for true panel data. All
versions of the model must deal with the lack of information on the
opportunity wage for those who stayed in the same job over the period
of observation. In addition, when estimating the model with retrospec
tive data, there is a lack of information on the base period job for some
of those who moved. The modification in methodology addresses the
problem of data that is missing for that reason.
Mobility is calculated on the basis of a job change in the five-year
period preceding the survey, that is, from 1978 to 1983. Basic descrip
tive information on job-changing behavior over this period has been
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presented in chapter 4. Once again, these data suggest that mobility is
significantly lower among pension-covered workers.
Several of the employment-related measures, including industry,
occupation, union status, and firm size, which are used as explanatory
variables in the model, refer to the longest-held job. This is necessi
tated because information on these variables for the 1978 job is not
available for everyone in the sample.6 Since the variables for the long
est-held job refer to a major labor force experience, they should be
fairly indicative of the 1978 job as well. The nature of the data set
imposes another temporal mismatch, which involves several of the
household variables, including marital status, the presence of children,
home ownership, and whether the wife was employed. The values of
these variables pertain to 1983, the year in which the data set was col
lected, although again it would be preferable to use values for 1978.
Before moving to the estimates for the model, one problem with
measuring pension values and pension incentives retrospectively in the
SCF should be noted. The pension-provider data in the survey are
available only for jobs held in 1983, not in 1978. Even then there are
some individuals who claim eligibility for pensions but for whom pen
sion-provider records are absent in the data set, and there are other
individuals for whom pension-provider records are available but are
seriously deficient in some critical regard. No pension-provider infor
mation at all is available for the small group of individuals who indi
cated having a pension in 1978 but who changed jobs before 1983.
Therefore, missing pension data are imputed using techniques
described in the first section of this chapter. In total, imputations are
made for about two-fifths (41 percent) of the pension values. Twentythree percent are imputed on the basis of three-digit industry cells and
7 percent and 9 percent on the basis of two-digit and one-digit industry
cells, respectively, all using the correct occupation category and union
status. The remaining 2 percent are imputed by collapsing cells across
occupations, with 1 percent using three-digit industry and 1 percent
using two-digit industry cells.
Table 6.7 presents the results of the maximum likelihood estimator
of the second version of the full model, as described in chapter 5. 7 With
this procedure, the maximum of the likelihood function is achieved at
the boundary defined by the requirement that the estimated correlation
matrix for the error terms (Z*) be positive definite. The standard errors

Table 6.7 Estimates of the Model With Mobility Determined by a Single Measure of the Compensation Premium
Based on 1978-83 Retrospective Data from the SCF
Compensation in 1978 job selection
Compensation in
Mobility
equation
1978 job
equation
alternative job
Model component
Marginal
effect (t stat) Estimate (t stat) Estimate (t stat) Estimate (t stat)
-1.164 (0.46)
1.248 (4.63)
0.786 (0.72)
Constant
(2.92)
d
d
Compensation premium (a)
-0.83
d
Pension coverage3

d

0.392

(5.02)

-0.362

(1.59)

d

0.12

(0.86)

0.074

(1.42)

0.055

(0.39)

-0.034 (0.14)

White collarb

-0.17

(0.78)

0.064

(0.78)

0.454

(1.85)

-0.500 (1.39)

Management/professional15

0.06

(0.47)

0.226

(3.59)

0.135

(0.97)

0.185 (0.64)

Union5

-0.15

(0.98)

0.110

(2.10)

0.304

(1.70)

-0.087 (0.32)

0.120

(2.14)

0.019

(0.19)

-0.279 (1.27)

Manufacturing13

Firm size > 100b

d

Years of experience2

0.02

(1.29)

-0.004

(0.93)

0.000e (0.02)

-0.028 (0.95)

Years until expected retirement3
Age3

0.01

(0.45)

-0.006

(1.35)

0.001

(0.07)

0.001 (0.03)

-0.01

(0.56)

d

Years of education3

-0.01

(0.48)

0.087

(8.07)

0.122

(4.16)

-0.005 (0.11)

Race (Black)c

0.08

(0.23)

-0.186

(2.12)

-0.513

(1.37)

0.287 (0.74)

Married0

0.08

(0.64)

d

0.037 (0.70)

d

d

0.010 (0.02)

Children under 18C

0.05

(0.62)

d

d

0.028 (0.10)

Home ownership0

-0.33

(3.90)

d

d

0.600 (2.34)

Wife employed0

-0.03

(0.44)

d

d

0.054 (0.22)

SMSAC

-0.08

(0.64)

0.109

Standard deviation of error terms
Correlation matrix of error terms

1 .00

Log-likelihood
Number of observations
NOTE: Figures in parentheses are absolute values of asymptotic t statistics.
a. Measured in 1978.
b. Job held longest.
c. Measured in 1983.
d. Variable is omitted from this equation.
e. Coefficient is less than 0.0005 in absolute value.

0.170 (0.80)

0.228

(1.86)

0.41 (26.91)

0.57

(9.00)

0.14

(1.01)

0.61

(3.14)

-0.95

1.00

--

0.45
1.00

(3.47)
--

0.03 (0.11)
-0.34 (0.11)
1.00

(2.32)

-597.99
558
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in table 6.7 are, therefore, the result of a constrained estimation. All of
the correlation parameters, except the correlation between the error
terms in the 1978 job selection and mobility equations, are treated as
free, with this remaining correlation calculated as the value necessary
to just meet the positive semidefiniteness requirement. As a conse
quence of this procedure, no standard error is estimated for this corre
lation, as indicated in the table, and the estimated standard errors for
the remaining correlations should be interpreted with this constraint in
mind.
In the mobility equation, only two of the variables are significant at
standard levels. As with the SIPP, one of these is home ownership and
the other is the compensation premium, which is of particular interest
to this study. Once again, the impact of the compensation premium
variable on mobility is by far the largest. The estimates imply that a 10
percent gain in this variable would result in an 8.3 percentage point
decrease in job mobility. This effect is about one-third larger than the
effect found over the comparable five-year period using the PSID data.
Among the remaining variables, union membership has the expected
negative effect on mobility and is sizable, but not significant.
In the 1978 job compensation equation, quite a few of the coeffi
cients are significant, and the significant coefficients all have the
expected signs. Compensation is positively and significantly related to
pension eligibility, management/professional occupations, union mem
bership, firm size, education, and SMSA residency, and is significantly
lower for Blacks. For compensation in an alternate job, education once
again has a clearly significant impact, in the positive direction. Other
variables close to significance include union membership, SMSA resi
dency, and white-collar occupations.
The one major difference between the results based on panel data
from the SIPP and PSID on the one hand, and the retrospective SCF
data on the other, is in the magnitude of the effect of pension coverage
on the current and alternative job. With data from all three surveys the
pension measure is significant only in the equation for compensation
on the current job, and the estimated difference in pension coefficients
between the current and next best job is only about half as large in the
SIPP and PSID data as in the SCF data.
The 1978 job selection equation suggests that average compensation
values are not much affected by the inclusion or exclusion of the 1978
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job from the job history. Only one variable, home ownership, is signifi
cant in this equation, and this variable is not a determinant of compen
sation. Nor are the correlations between the error term in the job
selection equation and the error terms of the two compensation equa
tions significant. The lack of correlation implies that the presence or
absence of the 1978 job from the job history does not greatly influence
compensation values through unobserved factors contained in the error
terms.
The other correlation estimates contain few surprises. The estimated
correlation matrix of the original error terms, calculated along the same
lines as in note 2, is the following:
Mobility
equation
1.00

Compensation
in 1978 job
0.34
1.00

Compensation
1978 job
in alternative job selection equation
-0.06
-0.27
0.45
0.03
1.00
-0.34
1.00

The correlation pattern among the first three error terms is similar to
that of the SIPP estimates, except that here the correlation between e,
and e3 is negligible. The correlations in the last column imply that the
error term in the 1978 job selection equation is negatively associated
both with the error term in the mobility equation and with the error
term in the alternative job compensation equation. The negative corre
lations are not surprising, since the 1978 job will not be missing in the
job history unless the individual changed jobs in the interim, and a low
alternative wage makes it less likely that the individual will have
changed jobs. The error terms in the two compensation equations are
moderately correlated at 0.45, and the correlation is significant.
Model Validation
Table 6.8 compares the actual mobility rate with the rate predicted
by the simulations, for the sample as a whole and for the indicated sub
groups within the sample. 8 Consider how well the simulations capture
the disparities in mobility rates among the different groups. The actual
five-year job mobility for individuals without pensions is about 47 per-
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centage points higher than for individuals with pensions, and this entire
differential is reflected in the simulated mobility rates. Once more, we
note that this is so despite the fact that pensions are not included as an
explanatory variable in the mobility equation in the model. Differences
in mobility between union members and nonunion members are also
predicted well. In this case, the mobility rate among union members is
about 12 percentage points lower than for individuals not in unions,
and again the whole differential is reflected in the simulation results.
Table 6.8 Model Validation Simulations Based on 1978-83 Retrospective
Data from the SCF
Simulated
Sample
Number of
mobility
mobility
observations
Group
(percent)
(percent)
558
29.8
Full sample
28.0
331
10.1
8.8
Individuals with pensions
227
58.4
Individuals without pensions
55.9
204
21.2
Union members
20.1
354
34.9
Not union members
32.5

Unlike the simulations based on estimates from the SIPP and PSID
data, the SCF simulations in table 6.8 are consistently one to two per
centage points higher than the actual data. The reasons for this are not
entirely clear but may be related to the likelihood of maximization
occurring along a boundary. In any case, this overestimation is quite
small when compared to the large-scale differences in mobility rates
among different groups, and it does not seem to have affected the abil
ity of the model to predict these differences among groups success
fully.
Simulations
We turn again to the role of pensions in affecting job mobility. Table
6.9 presents the relevant simulations. The top portion of the table
examines the effect of pension backloading on mobility, both for the
whole sample of individuals covered by pensions and for the specific
subgroups considered previously. For those with pensions, the simu
lated five-year mobility rate with the observed compensation is 10.3
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percent. Eliminating backloading, the mobility rate rises only to 11.6
percent. This small effect reflects the fact that backloading in the sam
ple for table 6.7 amounts to only about 3 percent of compensation (as
calculated according to note 4) between 1978 and the expected retire
ment age.
Table 6.9 Simulations of Effects of Backloading and Other Changes in
Compensation on Mobility, Based on 1978-83 Retrospective Data from
the SCF______________________________________
Postchange
Original
mobility rate mobility rate Number of
(percent) observations
(percent)
Group
Effects of eliminating pension backloading
286
11.6
10.3
All individuals with pensions
54
12.3
9.8
46-50 year-olds
143
13.3
11.8
Union members
143
9.8
8.9
Not union members
Effects of dropping pension compensation entirely
286
15.7
10.3
All individuals with pensions
Effects of higher compensation in pension jobs, as measured by
compensation equation estimates
286
52.3
10.3
All individuals with pensions

Again, the effect for the older individuals in the group, who are
closer to the retirement ages specified in the plans and for whom the
incentive impacts of backloading should be greater, is indeed larger.
However, the increase in these workers© mobility rates is only about
2.5 percentage points over the five-year period. This is still very small
when compared to the nearly 50 percentage point difference in the
mobility rates of those with and without pensions (table 6.8). The
effect of backloading is also not very large among either union or non
union members as a group, as indicated by the next two rows in the
table.
When we simulate the effect of eliminating pensions, with no com
pensating adjustments in wages or other benefits, thereby removing the
effects of the pension backloading as well as of the pension value
itself, the impact on mobility is over four times as large as that of sim-
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ply eliminating backloading. Nevertheless, the effect is still relatively
small compared to the total differential in mobility between those with
and without pensions.
In the last line of the table, we analyze the effects of changing the
compensation premium measure in the mobility equation by the
amount the estimated pension coefficients indicate in the compensation
equations. The estimates of the compensation equations in table 6.7
suggest that a pension in the 1978 job reduces lnCa, the alternative job
compensation, by 0.362 and increases lnCc, the compensation in that
job, by 0.392. Hence, the effect of a pension on the difference between
lnCc and lnCa, which is the compensation premium associated with
current employment on a pension-covered job, is 0.754. (Again, this is
about twice the difference found with the SIPP and PSID data.) To sim
ulate the effect of this change, the value of M in the simulations is
increased by 0.754 times the coefficient of the compensation premium
variable. The results of this simulation are indeed striking. Job mobility
would increase to 52.3 percent were the compensation premium abol
ished, which is very close to the measured mobility for those without
pensions.
This outcome is sensitive to the estimated difference in pension
coefficients in the two compensation equations, and these coefficients,
particularly in the alternative job equation, are not precisely estimated.
The estimated difference of 0.754 is comparable to the actual differ
ence of 0.568 in the mean log compensation between pensioned and
nonpensioned workers in the sample for table 6.7. Further, even if the
difference and its associated impact on job mobility were cut in half, it
would be very difficult to avoid the conclusion that mobility in pension
jobs is low mostly because these jobs pay a high compensation pre
mium. Only a relatively minor role appears to be played by the backloading of pensions, whereby benefits are concentrated toward the end
of the job.

Other Issues in Specification
In the model specification, the assumptions have generally tended to
bias the results toward showing larger effects of pension backloading
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than in fact exist. First, the pension variable is omitted completely from
the mobility equation. This omission forces the large pension effect in
the reduced form equation to work entirely through the compensation
gain measure, likely biasing the coefficient upward. The bias would
occur if pensions do have a direct effect on mobility or if they are prox
ies for other variables that should enter the mobility equation. Second,
the model has treated a dollar©s worth of expected pension benefits as
having the same value as a dollar of earnings. In fact, most people
would argue that, because of the greater uncertainty regarding the
eventual receipt of pensions, these benefits should be valued at some
lesser amount. This would mean that even more of the effect of pen
sions on mobility should be attributed to the wage premium and even
less to pensions and backloading than our results would indicate.
Finally, we have not included the possibility that individuals in pen
sion-covered jobs have a lower inherent propensity to change jobs. The
impact of backloading would be overstated to the extent that mobility
actually due to heterogeneity is instead attributed to pension-related
factors.9 Hence, we conclude that our estimates of the small impacts of
pension backloading on mobility are, if anything, likely to be an over
statement of the true effects.

Summary and Conclusions

This chapter has shown that a model consisting of a mobility equa
tion and equations for compensation on the current job and compensa
tion on the next best job may be used to determine the likely effects on
mobility from pension backloading and from compensation differen
tials between the current and next best job. The model assumes that all
sources of compensation differences have the same effect on workers©
mobility decisions. Accordingly, mobility has been expressed as a
function of the compensation difference between the current job and
the next best alternative. In the process of estimating the mobility
equation, we have allowed for the fact that compensation in the next
best employment is not observed for stayers.
Econometric estimates have been obtained from three different data
sets. These estimates indicate that compensation differences vary
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directly with pension coverage. Pension-covered workers receive
higher future compensation on their current jobs due to backloading of
their pensions, due to the contribution of the pension to compensation,
and because the pension benefit is not offset by lower wages, but
instead is accompanied by higher wages.
The examination of compensation on current and alternative
employment suggests that, on pension-covered jobs, the compensation
premium constitutes a much more important fraction of the loss from
job termination than does backloading of pension benefits. Simulations
with the mobility equations confirm that it is not backloading, but the
wage premium that explains the large difference in mobility between
workers with pension-covered and noncovered jobs. These differences
in mobility have been broken down into components reflecting the
effects of pension backloading and the other sources of compensation
differences for employment with and without pensions. In each case,
the findings in tables 6.3, 6.6, and 6.9 suggest that pension backloading
accounts for no more than about 10 percent of the difference in mobil
ity between those workers on pension-covered jobs and those holding
jobs that do not offer pensions.
NOTES
1. This section incorporates material from our article (Gustman and Steinmeier 1993b), which,
in turn, is based on a report to the U.S. Department of Labor (Gustman and Steinmeier 1990,
under contract No. J-9-P-8-0098.)
2. Recalling that the variance of e* is normalized to unity, and using the standard formula for
correlation (p )2 = a^/CiC^), the covariance matrix of the composite error terms (the e*) can be
calculated as:
1.000
0.300
0.195
0.181
0.072
0.228
Since the relation between £ l and e* is £] = £*+ oe3 , Var(E)) = Var(ef ) + 2aCov(e* , e3) +
a2Var(e3), Cov(ei, e2) = Cov(e!f, e2) + ocCov(e2, e3), and Cov (ei, e3) = Cov(e* , e3) + <xVar(e3).
Evaluating these formulas yields the following covariance matrix of the original error terms:
1.005
0.176
-0.198
0.181
0.072
0.228
Applying the standard formula for correlations gives the correlation matrix in the text.
3. This probability is
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which is the integral of the probability density for e* above the value of -M . If either the com
pensation in the current or alternative job is unobserved so that e2 or £3 cannot be calculated, the
density function/is integrated out with respect to those error terms. The simulated mobility rate
for the sample is the sample weighted average of the mobility probabilities for the individuals in
the sample. In the results presented in table 6.2, the simulated mobility rates are weighted aver
ages, but runs with unweighted averages gave very close to the same results.
4. The effect of pension backloading is computed in accordance with the discussion in chapter
2. For each individual in a pension covered job, we calculate the value of the pension rights should
the individual remain until retirement. We then make a calculation for a defined contribution plan
of the same value at retirement, which serves as the counterfactual plan with the elimination of the
backloading that typically occurs in a defined benefit plan.
5. The correlation matrix among the original error terms, calculated along the lines of note 2,
is:
1.000
0.260
-0.407
1.000
0.322
1.000
These figures are approximately the same as for the SIPP estimates, with the exception of the
correlation between E! and e2, which is only about two-thirds as large.
6. The SCF did not collect a full work history for all respondents. In particular, information is
reported for the current and longest-held job, which for some individuals who moved after 1978
may not be the job held in 1978.
7. Some additional details of the estimation are as follows:
Agricultural employment and self-employment are screened on the basis of the individual©s
longest-held job, since information on these characteristics is not always available for the 1978
job.
If the individual was unemployed in 1983, he or she was considered to be a mover if the previ
ous job began after 1978, and a stayer if the previous job began before 1978. This effectively mea
sures mobility as the taking of a new job and not as the separation (which may or may not be
temporary) from an old job.
The general growth rate of nominal wages used in the calculations is the 30-year average from
1953-83, and the discount factor is equal to the general growth rate of nominal wages.
By the construction of the data set, all 1978 jobs with pensions are observed. Hence, the pen
sion coefficient in the 1978 job selection equation has an implied value of + and is not esti
mated.
Also note that in the mobility equation, an additional year of experience is accompanied by
another year of age and by a reduction in the number of years until expected retirement. All three
coefficients must be considered to determine the total effect on mobility of becoming another year
older, which is close to nil.
8. Simulations with the retrospective SCF involve slightly different calculations than the sim
ulations with the panel data. For each individual, the nonstochastic parts of equations (5.5) and
(5.6) in Chapter 5 are calculated as / and M , respectively. Also, if compensation in either the
current or alternative job is observed, it is possible to calculate the values e2 and/or e3 from equa
tions (5.2) and (5.3). If the 1978 job is observed, it is possible to calculate the probability that the
individual would have changed jobs in the one-year interval as

PR; = J / (e*| e2, e3, £4 > -/) de]
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If the 1978 job is not observed, the probability is

PRj = J/(e*|e2, e3, e4 <-/
In both cases, the probability is the integral of the conditional probability density for Ef above the
value of -M . Note that if the 1978 job involved a pension, / is infinitely positive, since the SCF
specifically asked about previous pension jobs. As before, if either the compensation in the current
or alternative job is unobserved so that £2 or £3 cannot be calculated, the density function f is inte
grated out with respect to those error terms. The simulated mobility rate for the sample is the aver
age of the mobility probabilities for the individuals in the sample.
9. The effects of self selection of stayers into pension covered jobs remains in doubt. We have
included in the mobility equation those observables which Alien, Clark and McDermed (1991)
find are correlated with selection into pension covered jobs. Moreover, Alien, Clark and
McDermed conclude that unobservables do not play an important role in the selection process.

Appendix to Chapter 6: PSID Results with Quits Only as the Dependent Variable
and with a Single Measure of the Compensation Premium
Appendix Table 6.1 PSID Model Estimates with Quits Only as the Dependent Variable
Compensation in
1984 job
Mobility equation
Model component
Marginal
Estimate (t stat)
(t stat)
effect
(59.61)
2.150
Constant
a
(2.34)
-0.552
Compensation premium (a)
(7.61)
0.276
a
Pension coverage
(1.83)
0.069
(1.95)
-0.169
Manufacturing
(1.08)
0.074
(0.71)
-0.155
White collar
(5.16)
0.241
(0.24)
0.031
Management/professional
(3.87)
0.202
(0.14)
-0.024
Union status
Years of experience
Age
Education
Race (Black)
Married
Children under 18
Home ownership

-0.000b
0.001
-0.011
-0.240
0.056
-0.001
-0.175

(0.02)
(0.06)
(0.43)
(0.74)
(0.58)
(0.01)
(2.56)

0.000b

(0.16)

Estimate
2.181

(t stat)
(18.75)

a

0.013
0.227
0.205
0.244
-0.097

(0.09)
(1.80)
(0.60)
(1.29)
(0.58)

-0.006

(0.55)

a

a

0.071
-0.264

Compensation in
alternative job

(7.90)
(3.47)

0.122
-0.310

a

a

a

a

a

a

(3.65)
(0.66)

Appendix Table 6.1 (continued)
Model component

Spouse employment
SMSA

Mobility equation
Marginal
(t stat)
effect
(0.40)
0.020
(0.31)
0.028

Standard deviation of error terms
Correlation matrix of error terms

Log-likelihood
Number of observations

1.00

Compensation in
1984 job
Estimate

(t stat)

Compensation in
alternative job
Estimate

(t stat)

a

a

0.087

(2.54)

0.073

(0.55)

0.341

(33.12)

0.505

(14.49)

0.574
1.00

(2.29)

0.317
0.346
1.00

(2.16)
(4.27)
-

-433.8
474

NOTES: Numbers in parentheses are absolute values of asymptotic t statistics. See text for descriptions of the dependent variables. The job characteristics
in the alternative compensation equation refer to characteristics in the initial job, not to the characteristics of the alternative job.
a. Variable is omitted from this equation.
b. Coefficient is less than 0.0005 in absolute value.

7
Econometric Estimates with Separate
Backloading and Compensation
Premium Variables
A further modification of the mobility model is analyzed in this
chapter. Specifically, we estimate the model with the mobility equation
discussed in the last section of chapter 5, and specified in equation
(5.7). Recall that Cc is compensation in the current job, including backloading, Cn is the current job compensation, excluding backloading,
and Ca is compensation in an alternative job. (If the current job does
not have a pension, Cc will be equal to Cn.) Equation (5.7) divides the
compensation premium between the current and alternative jobs into
two parts, (InQ - InQ) and (lnCn - lnCa), representing pension backloading and the remainder of the compensation difference, respec
tively, between the current and alternative jobs. The coefficients of
these two parts, which are oq and (X2, respectively, are permitted to be
free. If the specification captures all of the major influences on mobil
ity, one would expect the coefficients on the pension backloading and
compensation premium measures to be similar. The model is estimated
with data from the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP)
and from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID). 1

Results Based on SIPP Data
Table 7.1 presents results from estimating the mobility model with
the SIPP data. As the estimates in the columns for the mobility equa
tion indicate, when the parameters for backloading and for the com
pensation premium are allowed to be free, they are estimated to be
fairly close in value. Comparing the log-likelihood values between the
constrained version of the model as reported in chapter 6 and the
unconstrained version of the model, the hypothesis of equality of these
two coefficients is not rejected at any reasonable level of significance.
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Table 7.1 Estimates of the Model with Mobility Determined by Separate Measures of Pension Backloading and the
Compensation Premium Based on 1984-85 Data from the SIPP
Compensation in
Compensation in
alternative job
1984 job
Mobility equation
Model component
Marginal
Estimate (t statistic)
Estimate (t statistic)
(t statistic)
effect
(1.43)
(14.79)
0.955
1.430
Constant
Backloading ((Xj)
a
a
-0.354
(1.68)
Compensation premium (o^)
a
a
-0.304
(2.48)
(0.81)
(17.77)
0.143
0.342
a
Pension coverage
(0.09)
(1.45)
-0.007
0.029
(0.20)
0.005
Manufacturing
(0.01)
-0.002
(2.41)
0.073
0.009
(0.52)
White collar
(1.48)
(10.25)
0.150
0.232
0.008
(0.46)
Management/professional
(0.21)
0.023
0.117
(4.78)
0.012
(0.71)
Union status
(0.40)
(3.04)
-0.036
0.058
0.012
(0.68)
Firm size > 100
(0.23)
(0.17)
0.002
0.000b
-0.002
(0.67)
Years of experience
(0.98)
(1.38)
0.009
-0.003
-0.001
(0.40)
Years until retirement
a
a
0.002
(0.82)
Age
(4.15)
0.067
0.058
(16.65)
-0.002
(0.48)
Education
-0.552
-0.189
(1.85)
(4.86)
0.066
(0.67)
Race (Black)
a
a
0.009
(0.61)
Married
a
a
0.009
(0.76)
Children under 18

Home ownership
SMSA

-0.032
-0.027

Standard deviation of error terms
Correlation matrix of error terms

Log-likelihood
Number of observations

1 .000

(1.81)
(1.02)

(3.41)

a
0.179

(2.41)

0.426

(92.35)

0.480

(8.14)

0.734
1.000

(2.32)

0.406
0.364
1.000

(1.06)
(4.56)
-

a
0.061

-2,304.45
2,545

NOTE: Numbers in parentheses are absolute values of asymptotic t statistics. See text for descriptions of the dependent variables. The job characteristics
in the alternative job equation refer to the characteristics in the initial job, not to the characteristics of the alternative job.
a. Variable is omitted from this equation.
b. Coefficient is less than 0.0005 in absolute value.

134

Econometric Estimates

This means that, when estimating the model with SIPP data, once a
proper measure of the compensation premium is included in the mobil
ity equation, there is no evidence that pension backloading has any
greater impact per dollar on mobility than does any other component of
the premium.
Comparing the other coefficients in the mobility equation and in the
compensation equations to those found in table 6.1, there are no impor
tant differences for the constrained version of the model. Notably, the
estimate of the compensation differences between pension and nonpension jobs is similar whether or not the compensation differential for
work on the current and next best job is decomposed into a measure of
backloading and a residual.

Results Based on PSID Data
Table 7.2 presents the analogous results to table 7.1 using data from
the 1984-89 PSID. In the mobility equation in table 7.2, the coefficient
on the measure of pension backloading(-6.518) is almost one hundred
times the size of the coefficient on the remainder of the compensation
premium for the pension-covered job (-0.066). The specification is
clearly not adequate for fully explaining mobility in the PSID data.
These findings are in sharp contrast to the results obtained with the
SIPP data.2
There are some obvious differences between the PSID and SIPP
samples that might account for these variations in findings. One
straightforward approach to determining the reason for these differ
ences is to reestimate the PSID results using a one- or two-year mobil
ity period, covering 1984 to 1985 or 1986. We tried to fit the model to
this shorter period using the PSID. Such an estimate would reveal any
difference in behavior between the earlier and later period or any dif
ferences in the pension-mobility relationship between shorter and
longer periods. During longer time spans, observed mobility is more
often associated with repeated job changes, thereby affecting the
observed mobility relationship. However, the estimates for the shorter
period would not converge. A probable cause of the problem is that

Table 7.2 Estimates of the Model with Mobility Determined by Separate Measures of Pension Backloading and the
Compensation Premium, Based on 1984-1989 Data from the PSID
Compensation in
Compensation in
alternative job
1984 job
Mobility equation
Model component
Marginal
Estimate (t stat)
Estimate (t stat)
effect
(t stat)
2.191 (12.46)
2.150 (61.75)
Constant
Backloading (o^)
a
a
-6.518
(5.76)
Compensation premium (<X2)
a
a
(0.21)
-0.066
(0.21)
0.027
(6.69)
0.237
a
Pension coverage
0.215
(1.68)
(1.67)
0.062
(0.10)
-0.007
Manufacturing
(0.60)
0.189
0.060
(0.89)
0.079
(0.70)
White collar
(1.32)
0.245
(5.16)
0.235
(0.20)
0.015
Management/professional
(0.75)
-0.125
0.189
(3.66)
(0.66)
-0.095
Union status
(0.66)
-0.007
(0.96)
-0.003
(0.43)
-0.005
Years of experience
a
a
(1.49)
0.020
Age
0.122
(3.50)
(8.02)
0.070
(0.52)
0.011
Education
-0.305
(0.69)
-0.266
(3.48)
(0.70)
-0.086
Race (Black)
a
a
(0.02)
0.002
Married
a
a
(0.17)
0.014
Children under 18
a
a
-0.041
(0.66)
Spouse employment
a
a
-0.211
(2.93)
Home ownership

Table 7.2 (continued)
Model component

SMSA

Mobility equation
Marginal
(t stat)
effect
(0.77)
0.044

Standard deviation of error terms
Correlation matrix of error terms

Log-likelihood
Number of observations

1 .000

Compensation in
1984 job

Compensation in
alternative job

Estimate (t stat)
(2.66)
0.090

Estimate (t stat)
(0.61)
0.080

0.334

(32.39)

0.502

(14.43)

0.084
1.000

(0.30)

0.094
0.359
1.000

(0.21)
(4.19)
~

-500.60
474

NOTES: Numbers in parentheses are absolute values of asymptotic t statistics. See text for descriptions of the dependent variables. The job characteristics
in the alternative job equation refer to the characteristics in the initial job, not to the characteristics of the alternative job.
a. Variable is omitted from this equation.
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with the fewer observations in the PSID, there is not enough mobility
in the data over the shorter period.
Violation of the constraint that coefficients o^ and oc2 should be
close in value may also suggest the existence of some omitted factor in
the analysis that is correlated with the measure of pension backloading.
The work by Alien, Clark, and McDermed suggests that the omitted
factor is not unmeasured worker preference for pension-covered jobs.
An obvious question is why the effects of an omitted factor should be
evident in the PSID data but not in the SIPP data.
Whatever the reason for the difference in the estimated values of o^
and oc2 in the PSID sample, it means that the story is not finished. The
constraint that a marginal dollar of compensation, regardless of its
source, should have the same effect on mobility of the compensation
difference is based on strong a priori reasoning. Moreover, if the
requirement were violated, one would expect the source of the inequal
ity to be liquidity constraints and risk differentials. Both of these fac
tors should cause the effect of a dollar of pension backloading to be
weaker than the effect of a marginal dollar of compensation from
another source. The data strongly suggest that it is not pension backloading per se that holds the individual on the job and accounts for
lower turnover on pension-covered jobs. One cannot rule out the possi
bility that there may be some other factor related to the implicit con
tract that is correlated with the measure of pension backloading;
however, as we have seen, such an omission is not strongly influential
in shaping the results from the SIPP data.
NOTES
1. To estimate this model with data from the Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF), it would be
necessary to divide equation (5.2) into two parts: one for the backloading and one for the rest of
the compensation differential. Both equations would have to be substituted into equation (5.4) to
yield an equation analogous to (5.6), and this specification would require two good instruments in
order to estimate it. Given that the maximization of the likelihood for the version of the model
estimated in chapter 6 occurred along a constraint, it is doubtful that there is sufficient information
to allow a satisfactory estimation of the version of the model in which backloading and compensa
tion differential appear as separate arguments.
2. The finding that the pension capital loss variable has a substantially larger coefficient than
does a measure of compensation is consistent with results based on the PSID in Alien, Clark, and
McDermed (1993), discussed in chapter 3.

Appendix to Chapter 7: PSID Results with Quits Only as the Dependent Variable
and with Separate Measures of the Backloading and Compensation Premiums
Appendix Table 7.1 PSID Results of Model with Separate Backloading and Compensation Premium Variables
Using Quits as the Dependent Variable
Compensation in
Compensation in
Model component
alternative job
Mobility equation
1984 job
Marginal
effect
(t stat)
Estimate (t stat)
Estimate (t stat)
Constant
(19.02)
2.15
(61.21)
2.176
Backloading (oq)
-6.423
(6.29)
a
a
Compensation premium (0.2)
0.100
(0.31)
a
a
a
Pension coverage
0.018
0.237
(6.68)
(0.15)
-0.065
(0.82)
0.062
Manufacturing
(1.67)
0.222
(1.80)
-0.069
White collar
0.209
(0.52)
0.060
(0.89)
(0.62)
0.061
(0.81)
Management/professional
(5.12)
0.246
0.235
(1-32)
-0.246
(1.57)
Union status
(3.75)
-0.111
0.190
(0.67)
-0.004
Years of experience
(0.28)
-0.003
(0.99)
-0.007
(0.66)
0.012
Age
(0.88)
a
a
0.026
(1.23)
0.120
0.070
Education
(7.97)
(3.63)
-0.339
-0.266
Race (Black)
-0.317
(1.67)
(3.62)
(0.67)
0.069
Married
a
(0.55)
a
0.018
(0.22)
Children under 18
a
a
-0.207
(2.62)
a
Home ownership
a
0.019
(0.29)
a
Spouse employment
a

SMSA

0.028

Standard deviation of error term
Correlation matrix of error terms

Log-likelihood
Number of observations

1 .000

(0.48)

0.090

(2.65)

0.079

(0.61)

0.334

(32.85)

0.501

(14.34)

-0.023
1.000

(0.07)

0.150
0.358
1.000

(0.61)
(4.53)
-

-408.16
474

NOTES: Numbers in parentheses are absolute values of asymptotic t statistics. See text for descriptions of the dependent variables. The job characteristics
in the alternative job equation refer to the characteristics of the initial job, not to the characteristics of the alternative job.
a. Variable is omitted from this equation.

8
Pension Policies and Their Effects
Overview
Backloaded pensions have recently come under scrutiny as possible
targets for legislation. A major goal of such reform would be to alter
the distribution of payments and incentives in favor of groups of work
ers who have been shortchanged by backloaded pensions. These
include workers whose jobs are terminated through no fault of their
own, such as those laid off from pension-covered jobs; women who
may leave a pensioned job for family considerations; and possibly indi
viduals who are unable to continue working for health reasons.
Another goal of proposed legislation is to insure retirement income for
these groups. If workers with typical defined benefit pensions switched
jobs midway through their careers, they will have less income during
retirement because of the backloading in the first pension. The policy
concern is that this reduced income will result in a substantial cut in the
standard of living and may even make it more likely that individuals
will need public assistance. A third goal is to make it easier for workers
to move from declining fields toward more promising growth areas. By
providing incentives for workers to stay with their current firms, backloaded pensions can place burdens both on waning industries, which
are forced to offer additional incentives to induce workers to leave, and
on growing industries, which may have to raise their wages to attract
the people they need.
Several policies have been contemplated or enacted to increase the
portability of pensions by reducing backloading.© For example, the Tax
Reform Act of 1986 specifies that, with the exception of multiemployer
plans, the period of time for cliff vesting can be no longer than 5 years,
as opposed to the previous 10-year maximum. However, since that did
not address other pension provisions that cause backloading, the act by
itself did not increase portability considerably, except for workers who
were hired in their late forties and fifties. Even after 10 years, the value
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of the pension is only a small fraction of its eventual value for most
workers.
To illustrate, recall the figures in table 2.1, which pertain to a worker
who is hired at age 25 and retires at age 62. By reducing the vesting
period from 10 to 5 years, a 30-year-old worker with 5 years of tenure,
who previously would not have been eligible for a pension at all, now
qualifies. However, that pension has less than 3 percent of its eventual
value, and the present value of the pension is equal to only a couple of
weeks© wages. Reducing the vesting period for young workers
decreases the size of the backloading to some degree, but a substantial
amount of backloading remains. For workers hired closer to retirement,
however, the reduction in the vesting period is more important, since
there is much less time before the workers begin to collect the pension.
Another policy to enhance the pension values of early leavers is to
require that pension benefits be paid on the basis of the projected wage
at normal retirement rather than the actual wage at the time of separa
tion. This potential reform has been analyzed by the Congressional
Budget Office (1987, pp. 116-17), but as of yet it has not been enacted
into law. It would prevent erosion in the value of the calculated benefit
that occurs due to inflation between the time workers leave the firm and
the time they actually begin to collect the pension.
This policy would also make the vesting period more important.
Consider again the worker illustrated in table 2.1. If the required period
for vesting is 10 years, then a 30-year-old worker with 5 years of ten
ure would not have any pension regardless of whether the pension val
ues were calculated based on projected wages or actual wages. With a
5-year vesting period, however, the worker would be eligible for a pen
sion equal to 14 percent (5/37) of its final value if projected wages are
used in the calculation, versus 3 percent if actual wages are used. 2 This
suggests that the vesting period is a more important issue if pensions
are awarded based on projected wages rather than on actual wages.
Still another policy to reduce backloading would be to shift pensions
toward defined contribution plans. To some degree, this has already
been accomplished, although not intentionally. In 1979, legislation was
passed that introduced 401(k) plans, and clarification of their tax status
in the early 1980s made these plans very attractive. As a result, the late
1980s and 1990s witnessed an explosive growth of 401(k) plans. Many
were added as secondary plans, but a substantial number were intro-
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duced as primary plans. It is possible that future legislation will force
employers to offer 401(k) or similar plans to their employees. A mod
est proposal would compel employers who currently provide pensions
to at least offer 401(k) plans as supplementary plans if they do not
already do so and would force those who do not provide pensions to
offer 401(k) plans. A more substantial proposal would require employ
ers who currently offer defined benefit pensions to offer 401(k)-type
plans as an alternative. This last proposal would be attractive to new
employees. However, it would not be attractive to employees enrolled
in defined benefit plans for a period of time, since the previous years of
service in the defined benefit plan would still be subject to backloading.
There are a number of possible effects of policies to increase pen
sion portability. The conventional wisdom asserts that backloaded pen
sions reduce the likelihood that the worker will leave the firm to take
another job. It is plausible that firms might want to use backloading in
order to save on hiring costs or to recover the costs of training a new
employee. Eliminating the incentives provided by a backloaded pen
sion makes it more likely that the worker will leave the firm and that
the firm will lose its investment in training and will then have to incur
hiring costs to replace the worker. However, it has been the main thrust
of this book that this effect is minor. The incentives provided by backloaded pensions are simply not large enough to hold a worker in the
face of an alternative job offer, even if that offer involves only a modest
wage increase. The correlation between backloaded pensions and low
rates of mobility reported in previous studies does not reflect a causal
relationship but occurs because of the failure to control for the fact that
the job alternatives of workers with pensions are less attractive, relative
to their current positions, than the alternatives for workers who do not
have pensions.
Another possible effect is on productivity. Some authors have
claimed that backloaded pensions are an integral part of a compensa
tion scheme designed to enhance work incentives and increase produc
tivity. The reasoning is that, if workers are caught "shirking," they may
be subject to dismissal, which would, in turn, deny them the opportu
nity to realize the large increases in pension value in the years just
before retirement. Evidence on the relationship between deferred com
pensation and productivity is weak, primarily because productivity is
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so much harder to measure than mobility. However, our research does
suggest that if backloaded pensions reduce shirking and increase pro
ductivity, the effect is likely to be rather small as compared to the
effects of the other elements of the compensation premium. That is,
workers are probably reluctant to engage in activities that may result in
dismissal primarily because they could not find another job that pays
comparable wages, and only secondarily because they will lose the
opportunity to realize large increases in their pension values in the
future.
Both with respect to mobility and to shirking, the incentives pro
vided by backloaded pensions are much larger to workers who are
within 5 or 10 years of retirement than to their younger co-workers.
Our analysis has dealt primarily with workers in their thirties and for
ties, who have a number of years before retirement. For someone who
is only a couple of years away from retirement, increases in pension
value represent a much larger percentage of compensation than is the
case for younger workers. Thus, although backloaded pensions may
not be important determinants of mobility and productivity for workers
in general, they may well be a significant factor for older workers.
Funding levels of the plans may also be affected. If a plan is funded
on the basis of the benefits for which the company is currently liable, a
firm will have to contribute only a relatively small amount towards the
pension until the worker nears retirement. If legislation were to require
plans to pay benefits on the basis of projected salary, the firm would
have to contribute considerably more to cover its commitment. How
ever, the Employment Retirement Income Security Act of 1974
(ERISA) has already encouraged firms to fund pensions on the basis of
projected salary, not current salary. Thus, a move toward basing pen
sion calculations on projected salary should not have a large effect,
since most firms already fund plans in this way.
A final effect of a move away from backloaded plans is on the distri
bution of pension payments. In fact, since the effects on mobility, pro
ductivity, and funding are likely to be weak, it is likely that this is the
most important consequence of such a policy. The most obvious result
of a shift from backloaded plans would be to enhance the pensions of
workers who change jobs before retirement, particularly workers who
hold pensioned jobs early in their careers and then move. However,
some amount of caution is needed in analyzing a policy encouraging
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pension portability, since such a policy may have side effects on groups
other than the target population.
The next two sections of this chapter consider the impacts of various
approaches to make pensions more portable. A model of the firm and
its pension plan is used to simulate the effects of pension policies. Dif
ferent policies determine the level of pension contributions and, ulti
mately, the wage of various groups in the firm, even those groups not
intentionally affected by the policy. The analysis will focus on redistributive effects, particularly how these policies are likely to influence
the wages and pensions of those not targeted as well as those in the tar
geted group. In general, we will not be concerned with determining
whether government intervention is justified.

A Model of Pension Benefits and Funding
A mechanical approach to the analysis of pension policies would
assume that legislation meant to induce certain changes in plan provi
sions is simply translated into comparable revisions in pensions. 3 This
is not likely to be the case. Policies designed to increase pension porta
bility are likely to cause changes in labor costs. Whether or not firms
pay a wage premium, that is, whether or not workers are receiving
compensation on pension-covered jobs that exceeds their opportunity
wage, as long as the amount of compensation is determinate, increases
in pension costs will induce adjustments in the remainder of the com
pensation package. Such adjustments will redistribute pensions and
wages among workers who are leaving the firm or retiring at different
ages.
In this section we develop a model that is useful for analyzing the
first-round responses of firms to changes in pension policies. The
model is then used to explore the effects of the various types of legisla
tion that have been or might be adopted to modify the degree of pen
sion backloading in defined benefit plans.
Overall worker productivity is constrained to match overall worker
compensation within each period in this model. The firm is also
expected to contribute to the pension fund an amount that covers the
increase in pension liability, calculated on a projected salary basis.
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Management knows that some workers will leave the firm before
retirement and that some will stay but does not know which workers
are in each group. To allocate the pension contributions among
employees, the firm subtracts the same proportion of salary from each
worker and pays each person a wage equal to the value of that person©s
output less the pension contribution. This means that the firm does not
necessarily pay each worker an amount equal to the value of that
worker©s output over the course of his or her employment. Workers
who leave the firm early will have more taken out as pension contribu
tions than they ultimately receive as pension benefits, with the reverse
being true for workers who stay until retirement. For the workers as a
whole, however, the firm does adjust wages to reflect pension contribu
tions, so that total compensation for the group is equal to its output.
In this environment, changes in pension policy that increase the
value of some workers© pensions will require the firm to raise the over
all contribution rate to the pension fund. With unchanged output, the
higher pension contribution will tend to depress somewhat the overall
level of wages at the firm. The lower wages will affect other workers as
well as those who are receiving the increased pension values. For
example, a policy that raises the value of pensions for early leavers
may well have the side effect of reducing wages (and hence compensa
tion) for some who stay until they are eligible to retire.
The model we use in this section shows the first-order effects of the
policy changes. By first-order effects, we mean the impacts on pension
values and wages, not on hiring, retirement patterns, or productivity.
Although these first-order results should indicate the major effects on
pension values, additional, smaller changes may occur as firms and
workers adjust their hiring and retirement behavior in response to the
new environment.
In the model, the firm maintains a steady-state labor force. Each
year, it hires the same number of 25-year-old workers, half of whom
will leave at age 30 and half at the firm©s retirement age of 62. The pen
sion plan is characterized by a simple, final-average-salary defined
benefit formula. Benefits are 1 percent of the average of the final salary
times years of credited service. Although this generosity coefficient is
somewhat low in comparison with reported data, the pension benefit
formula does not include a social security offset that would otherwise
reduce the value of the pension. For an employee who joins the firm at
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age 25, retires at age 62, and dies at age 80 (the presumed age of death
of all workers in the model), a generosity coefficient of 1 percent leads
to a pension with a present value at the time of hire that is a little over
10 percent of the present value of the wage stream. In comparison with
available data (Gustman and Steinmeier 1989), the 10 percent ratio is
slightly low but not unreasonable.
The plan is funded so as to cover its liabilities on a projected liabil
ity basis. For those currently employed, the projected liability is calcu
lated as a prorated share of the present value of the pension that would
be paid if half of the workers remained with the firm until retirement
and the other half left after five years. That is, management is assumed
to know the distribution of separation ages but not necessarily which
workers will leave early and which workers will stay until retirement.
The prorated share is the ratio of the present value of the wage paid to
date divided by the present value of the wage to be paid over the full
term of attachment.
To finance the pension plan, the firm first must calculate the amount
of contributions needed each year to maintain the level of funding just
described. The firm then compares the level of contributions to the total
value of the output of its labor force in a given year and calculates a
contribution rate as a percentage of that value. This contribution rate
is applied uniformly to all workers who are employed at the firm that
year, and each worker is paid a wage that is equal to the difference
between the value of his or her output and the amount of the pension
contribution. The calculations allow for the feedback effect of wages
on the amount of the pension liability, so that, in fact, the contribution
rate and wages are determined simultaneously.
This type of financing is consistent with available evidence regard
ing the relationship between wages and increments in pension values.
Certainly, for an individual worker, compensation does not appear to
match productivity on a year-by-year basis. We have seen that pension
accrual profiles are characterized by sharp spikes at the time that bene
fits become vested, and that there are even sharper spikes when the
worker satisfies the eligibility requirements for early or normal retire
ment benefits. At these times, there does not appear to be an offsetting
depression in wages. In conjunction with fairly smooth presumed
growth in productivity, the relatively even growth of wages, despite the
jumps and dips in the accrual pattern of pensions, suggests that if

148

Pension Policies and Their Effects

workers pay for pensions in the form of reduced wages, the path of
these payments is also comparatively smooth over time.
One final premise has been noted but warrants some further discus
sion. The assumption that the productivity of workers is fixed, particu
larly with respect to changes in the rules governing pensions, runs
counter to many of the explanations as to why pensions have the spe
cific defined benefit form observed for most plans. These explanations
usually involve the effect of the plans on overall productivity. However,
at this time there is no consensus as to whether pensions affect produc
tivity and, if so, by how much, and almost all of the current hypotheses
are not fully consistent with the empirical evidence. (See Gustman and
Steinmeier 1989b; Gustman and Mitchell 1992; Gustman, Mitchell,
and Steinmeier 1994.)4 In the absence of agreement on this issue, the
following analysis ignores any effect of changes in pension rules on
productivity. For similar reasons, the analysis only addresses the
change in the pension contribution rates necessary to keep the plans
funded, rather than other revisions in pension plans by firms in
response to policy changes.

Effects of Potential Pension Policies
on the Distribution of Compensation
Using the model just outlined, this section presents the results of
simulations evaluating policies designed to increase pension portabil
ity. The firm is assumed to have been hiring the same number of work
ers for a long enough time to have achieved an equilibrium, and the
pension is also assumed to have been in existence sufficiently long for
its financing per worker to be in equilibrium. For these simulations,
productivity in the base year is assumed to be $20,000 per worker,
growing at the rate of 6 percent per year (in nominal terms). This pro
jection of wage growth is consistent with rates used by the Congres
sional Budget Office (CBO) for the late 1980s (1987, p. 154) and with
postwar experience. The interest rate used in these calculations is 6
percent, which is about 1 percentage point lower than the estimate used
by the CBO.
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Effect of Earlier Vesting
One approach to improving the situation of early leavers is to
require earlier vesting. The first two columns of data in table 8.1 show
the situation with 10-year cliff vesting. In order to finance the pensions
of the half of the individuals who stay until retirement, the firm must
make contributions equal to approximately 9.5 percent of payroll. For
both the short-tenure workers and the long-tenure workers, these pen
sion contributions (line 2 of the table) are subtracted from productivity
to yield wages. The workers who stay until retirement get pensions
whose present value is 10.8 percent of the present value of their wages.
The remaining 1.3 percent is financed by the workers who leave at age
30, who make pension contributions but receive nothing in return.
The vesting period is shortened to five years in the middle two col
umns. With this change, all of the workers are now eligible for pen
sions. Instead of not receiving a pension at all, the short-tenure workers
now receive a pension with a present value that amounts to 1.7 percent
of their wages. This is much lower than the percentage received by
workers who stay until retirement because the final (nominal) wage is
used in the pension formula. Note that because the short-tenure work
ers now receive some pension benefits, the contribution rate to the pen
sion plan has risen from 9.5 percent to 9.7 percent of payroll. This
increase is borne mostly by the workers who stay until retirement,
causing both their wages and pensions to decline. Because the pensions
of the short-tenure workers are so small, however, the compensation
reduction of the long-tenure workers is minor, amounting to only 0.2
percent of their lifetime compensation.
Effect of Using Projected Wages in the Pension Formula
Even if one©s benefits are fully vested, pension benefits received by
early leavers are worth proportionately less than the benefits of those
who stay to retirement. A mechanical reason for this result is that bene
fits for early leavers are calculated using the wage at separation rather
than the wage that would be received had the worker stayed until nor
mal retirement (Bulow 1982). Requiring that an employer use the wage
projected to the normal retirement age would eliminate the loss due to
using the current nominal wage in computing benefits for terminated,

Table 8.1 Policies to Assist Early Leavers

Benefit factors
Productivity
- Pension contribution
= Wages
+ Pension benefits
= Total compensation
Pension/wage ratio
Compensation/productivity ratio

5-year vesting using
projected wage at
10-year vesting using 5-year vesting using actual
retirement
wage at separation
actual wage at separation
Leave at 30 Retire at 62 Leave at 30 Retire at 62 Leave at 30 Retire at 62
$740,000
$100,000
$740,000
$100,000
$740,000
$100,000
72,296
9,770
65,669
8,874
64,439
8,708
667,704
90,230
674,331
91,126
675,561
91,292
72,296
9,770
73,014
1,529
73,147
0
740,000
100,000
747,345
92,655
748,708
91,212
0.108
0.108
0.108
0.017
0.108
0
1.000
1.000
1.010
0.927
1.012
0.913

NOTE: AH dollar amounts are the present values of the corresponding streams, discounted back to the base year.
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vested employees under a defined benefit plan. The last two columns of
table 8.1 show the result of such a policy. When there is full vesting
and the projected wage at normal retirement instead of the current
wage is used in calculating benefits for early leavers, the pension value
for the short-tenure workers rises to $9,770. This is the amount that
results when there is no pension backloading. Backloading is inherent
in using the nominal wage at the time of separation to calculate pen
sion benefits; this practice reduces the present value of the pension for
early leavers by about 84 percent as compared to a nonbackloaded pen
sion (comparing $1,529 to $9,770).
In this case, the pension contribution has gone up to about 10.8 per
cent. The higher pension contribution affects everyone, but whereas the
short-tenure workers recoup the increased pension contributions (and
more) with enhanced pension benefits, the long-tenure workers incur
drops in both wages and pensions. As compared with the middle col
umns of table 8.1, wages for long-tenure workers are lower by over
$6,600, and the pension is lower by over $700. The net effect of using
projected wages in the benefit formula is to redistribute over $7,300
from each long-tenure worker to each short-tenure worker. More pre
cisely, the high-tenure workers lose the $7,300 subsidy that had been
given to them by the practice of using backloaded pensions. This
$7,300 transfer represents over 7 percent of the total compensation of
the low-tenure workers but only about 1 percent of the total compensa
tion of the high-tenure workers.

Effect of Changing to Defined Contribution Pensions
If the firm had a defined contribution plan with a contribution rate of
10.8 percent, the figures in equilibrium would look exactly like the fig
ures in the last two columns of table 8.1. The long-tenure workers
would not be as well off as with backloaded pensions, but they would
still be paid an amount equal to their value of their output. If a firm
with a defined benefit pension offers workers the opportunity to con
vert to a defined contribution pension, it is fairly clear that workers
who are anticipating a short stay at the firm will be ahead by making
the change. For longer-term workers, however, the conclusion will
depend to some extent upon the specifics of the offer. If the wages to be
used in the defined benefit calculation were the unadjusted nominal
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wages at the time of conversion, long-tenure workers would incur the
equivalent of a pension capital loss if they converted and would have
strong incentives to remain with the defined benefit plan. If the wages
to be used were wages at retirement, the decision of the long-tenure
workers would depend upon the level of the pension contribution of the
defined contribution plan relative to the generosity of the defined bene
fit formula. Another determinant would be the degree to which the
individual values the defined benefit pension©s annuity aspect, which is
likely to be absent from a defined contribution plan.
Other Considerations
The analyses reported in this chapter pertain to stylized pension
plans. We have tried to select plan parameters that, on the basis of our
previous research, are representative. Nevertheless, the examples are
much simpler than most of the plans encountered in our empirical
work. Moreover, the effects of these various policies will depend on
the actual employment mix within the firm, whether employment is
growing or shrinking, and expected patterns of turnover.
There are features of pension plans, in addition to vesting require
ments and the choice of wage used in the formula, that affect pension
portability. Eligibility requirements for normal retirement based on
years of service and actuarial bonuses for early retirement raise the
penalty on early leavers. Such provisions increase the value of the pen
sions of other groups and hence the contribution rates of all. Also, there
are many idiosyncratic features of pensions affecting incentives for
mobility. Frequently, a single plan uses different formulas in calculat
ing benefits for terminated vested workers, early retirees, and normal
retirees. Indeed, the choice of formula used for calculating normal
retirement benefits may vary with the years of service accumulated by
the worker. Using the projected wage in the pension formula would not
eliminate these influences on portability, and any effort to make pen
sions fully portable would have to take these plan features into
account.
In sum, the recent easing of vesting requirements will not provide
much additional protection to early leavers. Eliminating the backloading of pensions will have a greater effect. Furthermore, neither policy
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is likely to have much of an impact on the incentives for turnover for
workers in the first decades of attachment to the firm.

Caveats for Pension Policy Analysis
If we had found that pension backloading provided strong disincen
tives to mobility, especially at young ages, it would suggest that backloading of defined benefit pensions meets one of the necessary
conditions for a firm to have adopted pensions as a device for regulat
ing mobility, presumably to increase productivity and/or reduce labor
costs. Also, if we had found that defined benefit pensions were impor
tant in determining the incentives for turnover, and the extent of turn
over, we would add one more building block to our understanding of
the factors underlying the reasons for pension plans and for their spe
cific characteristics. It could then be asserted with some confidence
that the features of the pension, such as backloading, play an important
role in determining a number of outcomes of interest.
Our findings suggest, however, that backloaded pension plans have a
smaller effect on the incentives relevant to mobility decisions than the
literature has implied. Our research also suggests that the relationship
of the cost of mobility to observed mobility behavior is weaker than
that indicated by the conventional literature. A further conclusion is
that pensions are not likely to be a major tool for influencing mobility,
and thus it is unlikely that mobility considerations are an important
motivation for the adoption of defined benefit plans by firms.
None of this means that pension characteristics are unimportant to
pension recipients who experience turnover from their jobs at different
ages. In addition, a fundamental concern of policy makers is the distri
bution of retirement incomes, which is affected by the turnover experi
ence of covered workers. What our findings do suggest is that an
analysis of the relationship of pension plan provisions to pension
incomes may safely disregard the impact of pension changes on mobil
ity. More broadly speaking, our analysis suggests that policy makers
may be less concerned with the effects of pension regulation on mobil
ity and productivity than they might otherwise be.
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Of course, pension legislation has had a number of goals in addition
to the ones cited above. One objective is to recognize and protect a
form of the pension contract under the law so as to increase the likeli
hood that a worker who is promised a benefit will receive it, as well as
to raise the fraction of the promised pension that is paid when the full
commitment is not delivered. Another, more recent, goal is to encour
age those who wish to work beyond the plan©s normal retirement age,
so as to mitigate the funding crises in social security and medicare.
There also is a desire to secure comparable treatment for low-wage
workers employed by firms offering generous pensions to their highwage workers. Another major aim is to extend pension coverage as
widely as possible. Finally, Congress has been giving more weight to
controlling the revenue loss resulting from the favorable tax treatment
of pensions.
These goals may produce initiatives that will reinforce policies to
limit backloading or work counter to such policies. For instance, work
ers who want to stay beyond the normal retirement age are hurt by
rules that mandate projected wages in pension formulas, but they may
be helped by policies that require the crediting of age and years of ser
vice or the actuarial adjustment of benefits for employees who con
tinue working. When the compensation budget is constrained, efforts to
help certain classes of workers may have negative impacts on other
classes of workers. Those individuals who are adversely affected are
often the target of additional policies designed to improve their status
or the incentives they face. Consequently, different policies may have
conflicting effects, and compatibility among goals becomes an issue.
NOTES
1. A survey of major policies to increase portability that were considered in the past is pre
sented in Turner (1993, chapter 9).
2. With projected wages, the only difference between the pension value at age 30 and its final
value occurs because different tenure lengths are used in the formula. The 14 percent figures
comes from dividing the 5 years of tenure at age 30 by 37 years of tenure at age 62. The 3 percent
figure comes from column 6 of table 2.1.
3. A number of exercises along these lines performed by Hay/Huggins are described in chap
ter 9 of Turner (1993).
4. Explanations for defined benefit pensions typically focus either on the advantages of benefit
backloading for the design of efficient compensation schemes or on the importance of the retire
ment incentives that these plans create, thereby increasing firm profitability. In the former group,
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one explanation is that the backloading of defined benefit plans discourages shirking by workers
and thereby increases productivity. However, given the accrual patterns of pension plans, the
potential pension loss from separation is greatest in the middle years of tenure at the firm. As we
discussed in chapter 3, it is unclear why incentives against shirking need to be so much stronger in
the middle years than in the early or later years. Another explanation proposed by Oi (1983), that
pensions help to screen out early quitters and hence to reduce hiring and training costs, faces sim
ilar objections. Again, if the goal is to recover training costs incurred early in the employment
relationship, it is unclear why the firms should make the cost of leaving less in the early years than
in the middle years. Further doubts about shirking and training cost explanations for pensions
come from evidence that indicates a poor understanding of plan incentives, not only by the work
ers (Gustman and Steinmeier 1989a; Mitchell 1988), but by their employers (Kotlikoff and Wise
1987b). Firms that use pensions to create incentives against mobility and shirking have good rea
son to insure that these incentives are well understood.
The other category of explanations for pensions influencing productivity focuses on retire
ment incentives. In a model discussed by Parsons (1983), older workers are characterized by a
much wider dispersion of productivity than are younger workers. Either because the firms cannot
distinguish well which older workers are productive and which are not, or because firms are
unable to act on this knowledge, they find it more efficient not to employ workers past a certain
age. In this explanation, pensions provide workers with the incentives to retire at the appropriate
age, thereby increasing overall productivity. The major drawback of this rationale is its failure to
account for the large number of plans in which eligibility for retirement depends partly, if not
entirely, on years of service. For example, there are plans that permit retirement with full benefits
after 30 years of service, regardless of age. If the goal of pensions is to induce retirement at an
appropriate age, then it would seem that eligibility for retirement should be based on age, not on
years of service.
5. For a useful discussion of pension policies and their origins, see CBO (1987, appendix A).

9
Conclusions
It is a widely accepted view that pensions reduce labor mobility.
Observing that mobility is lower on pension covered jobs and that
defined benefit pension plans backload benefits, many students of the
pension-mobility relationship have concluded that it is the disincentive
created by backloading that decreases mobility. Others have reached
this conclusion on the basis of more careful empirical analysis, as indi
cated in our survey of the literature.
In the preceding chapters, we have examined the basis for this view.
Our research provides evidence that is strongly inconsistent with the
thesis that lower mobility on pension-covered jobs is due to backload
ing of defined benefit plans.
A direct examination of defined benefit pension formulas indicates
that backloading accounts for only a small portion of the value of the
future pension. We have shown that, on average, a worker in his thirties
or forties requires a raise of only a few percentage points to overcome
the loss from pension backloading. While pension backloading may
amount to half a year©s earnings in a sample of prime-aged male work
ers, those in the sample have a remaining worklife of decades, so that
even a modest wage increase will generate earnings that can overcome
the one-time loss from leaving a job with a backloaded pension.
An analysis of worker mobility in three separate data sets also raises
questions about the idea that backloading accounts for lower mobility
from pension-covered jobs. In particular, reduced form multivariate
mobility equations indicate that the reduction in mobility from pen
sion-covered jobs is the same whether the worker is covered by a
defined benefit plan, which is backloaded, or by a defined contribution
plan, which is not.
If pension backloading does not explain the lower mobility from
pension-covered jobs, then what is causing the reduced mobility in
these cases? Much of the analysis in this book has focused on the
hypothesis that pension-covered jobs offer higher wages than do nonpensioned jobs and that this is done for unobserved reasons, including
the payment of efficiency wages or rents. Thus, the compensation pre-
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mium received by workers on jobs that offer pensions accounts for the
associated lower mobility.
This explanation has been supported in analyses using data from
three surveys: the Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF), the Survey of
Income and Program Participation (SIPP), and the Panel Study on
Income Dynamics (PSID). The descriptive information from these sur
veys suggests that higher wages are paid on pension-covered jobs than
on other jobs. The value of the pension widens the compensation dif
ference. The descriptive data also indicate that wage losses are greater
for movers from pension-covered jobs; these losses are augmented
because the new jobs frequently do not offer pensions.
Estimates of a model in which the three outcomes (mobility, com
pensation on the current job, and compensation on the next best job)
are jointly determined support the idea that it is the higher compensa
tion on pension-covered jobs that accounts for lower mobility from
those jobs. The analysis suggests that because the value of backloading
is just a small fraction of the compensation differential for those who
hold pension-covered jobs, backloading plays only a very slight role in
explaining the mobility differences between those with and without
pensions. For pension-covered workers, most of the difference in
mobility is associated with the higher compensation on their current as
opposed to next best job.
To test the idea that pension backloading and compensation differ
entials between the current and next best job fully account for the
mobility differences between workers with and without pensions, a
model was specified in which mobility was a function of separate coef
ficients for pension backloading and the compensation premium. We
then tested the constraint that a dollar©s worth of pension backloading
has the same effect on turnover as a dollar©s difference in compensation
from other sources. In one data set, the SIPP, coefficients measuring
the effect of backloading and of other compensation differences were
found to be approximately equal, with no significant differences. This
test suggests that there is no important omitted factor in the model.
However, in a second data set, the PSID, the estimated coefficients
were significantly different, with a much higher coefficient for a vari
able measuring backloading, suggesting that there may be a factor not
captured in the estimated models. Although the results from these tests
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are mixed, the small size of the pension incentives compared to the
other elements of compensation leads us to favor the SIPP results.
In the end, we have very strong evidence that lower mobility on pen
sion-covered jobs is not a result of the backloading of defined benefit
pension plans. Much of the available evidence also points to the con
clusion that turnover is lower from pension-covered jobs because they
offer incumbents higher compensation than is available in alternative
employment. There also is some suggestion that an unmeasured factor
associated with employment on jobs offering backloaded pensions may
account for part of the reduction in turnover observed for pension-cov
ered workers, although it is unclear why the effect of the unobservable
element is much stronger in the PSID than in the SIPP data. It will be
the task of future researchers to determine exactly how much there is to
that story.
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